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Introduction
FOREWORD AND SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES
I. FOREWORD
The recent years have seen, in the West, an increas-
ing debate on the presence of religious symbols 
in the public sphere (crucifix in Italy, minaret in 
Switzerland, veil and burqa in France, mosques, 
Ten Commandments and even Christmas trees in 
the USA, etc.). Most of the cases ended in court 
decisions, either local courts, supreme courts or 
the European Court of Human Rights, but with 
no clear results in terms of defining a coherent 
management of religious signs in public sphere. 
Why this increasing tensions and criminalization 
of the debate on religion? Is this the consequence 
of a growing secularization that aims at eradicat-
ing any remnants of religion, or, on the contrary, 
a “return of the sacred” that tries to reconquer the 
public sphere? Are we witnessing a clash of civi-
lizations, where traditional cultures fight against 
newcomers (Islam in the West) by re-asserting a 
religious identity more than a religious faith? Is this 
more a conflict of religiosities, that is of personal 
experiencing of faith, where new believers (converts 
and born-again) strive to exhibit their faith more 
than to insert it in inconspicuous social practices? 
In any case, the debate has far reaching conse-
quences: if the courts have to decide about religious 
signs, they have also to define what a religious sign 
is, and by consequence what is a religion, although 
most national constitutions prevent the state to 
interfere with theology and internal organization 
of faith communities.
The debate is also the expression of different con-
flicts of rights: the individual right to believe and 
practice or not to be discriminated, the collective 
right of faith communities versus individual rights, 
the minority/ majority balance, the endorsement of 
rejection by the law of a collective identity and of 
the promotion of a national culture, that could be 
catholic in Italy or secular in France. An underly-
ing issue is of course to know whether a common 
public space could be really “equal for all” in terms 
of religious symbols when many cultural symbols 
are understood also as religious (Christmas tree) 
and many religious symbols as cultural (cruci-
fix). To stress a right of a minority to be protected 
against faith or culture it does not share can lead to 
“void” the public space of any symbols.
In fact when a dominant religion loses its social 
and cultural evidence, a new issue arises: what is 
the meaning of the “religious” sign? In the Lautsee 
case (the crucifix in Italian class rooms), should 
we consider the cross as a symbol of a faith (that 
is the resurrection of Christ) or just as a national 
symbol, whose lingering presence says more about 
the secularization of religion in national culture 
than about a specific creed. It is a paradox that 
considering religious symbols as merely cultural 
(or more exactly as having been secularized, like 
the cross, because people just stop to believe that 
‘Jesus is my savior”) leads also to a secularization 
of religion.
And what we mean about the “public sphere”. 
There is an institutional one (schools, courts, 
government buildings), there is an informal one 
(streets, parks, playgrounds)? But the boundar-
ies between private and public are also more and 
more blurred: when courts interfere in circumci-
sion or schooling issues, they do circumscribe or 
more exactly put limit to the right of the parents 
to transmit, even if they by definition refer to an 
individual human right (what is more and more 
called “child’s rights”). 
This book is based on the proceedings of a con-
ference “Religious Norms in the Public Sphere: 
TheChallenge” held at UC Berkeley on May 6 and 
7 2011.
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The conference was the culmination of two proj-
ects: The Transatlantic Network of Scholars On 
Muslims Religious Identity, Secularism, Democ-
racy And Citizenship, funded by the Partner Uni-
versity Funds; and The Religious Norms in the Pub-
lic Sphere, funded by the Social Science Research 
Council. Those projects were co-sponsored by the 
UC Berkeley Center on Institutions and Gover-
nance and the Kadish Center for Morality, Law 
and Public Affairs at Berkeley Law School. The 
conference was also made possible thanks to the 
support of the Center for Islamic studies at the 
Graduate Technological Union. The researchers 
who have participated to this book come from dif-
ferent academic fields (law, political science, soci-
ology, theology, islamology). Only this transversal 
approach can offer some ideas to understand the 
present debate and to present an original perspec-
tive.
The first section discusses the religious norms in 
the public sphere. Olivier Roy compares the role of 
religion in Western Europe and the Mediterranean 
Arab world after the Arab Spring.Silvio Ferrari out-
lines the religion and public/private divide in the 
European legal systems. Peter Danchin investi-
gates Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European 
Court of Human Rights.
The second section deals with the debate of Islamic 
norms in Arab countries. Enrique Klaus with 
Charles Hirschkind and Olivier Roy as discussants 
analyses the scandals in Egypt and the manufac-
turing of religious norms in the public spheres. Benka-
cem Benzenine looks at secularism in Arab countries. 
The third section with Sarah Song as discussant 
examines the cases in European countries.
Geneviève Zubrzycki debates the Place of Reli-
gious Symbols in the Public Sphere in Poland, 
1989-2010.Matthew Francis explores the “Sacred” 
as a resource for bridging the gap between the reli-
gious and the secular.Romain Sèze takes us inside 
the Exercise of the Islamic Religious Authority 
in France.Christian Joppke considers the French 
Burka Law of 2010 and the limits of restricting 
Islam: 
The fourth section with Marianne Farina as dis-
cussant consists of two presentations: Pasquale 
Annichino on mosques controversies in the 
U.S.David Koussens on the juridical arrangements 
and political debates on catholic rituals and sym-
bols in government institutions in Quebec: 
The fifth session with Nargis Virani as discussant 
concentrates on Asian countries. Sophie Lemière 
presents the rise of Ethnonationalist groups in 
Malaysia. Marco Ventura outlines the legal argu-
ments on forced conversions before the Supreme 
Court of India.
For the sixth session Ebrahim Moosa gave a key-
note lecture on the norms in the Madrassas.
During the seventh session. Olivier Roy, 
Naomi Seidman, Ebrahim Moosa, Marianne 
Farina, Imam Faheem Shuaibe draw their con-
clusions from the presentations at the conference.
The last session was dedicated to the project 
funded by the Partner University Fund for a trans-
atlantic network of scholars on Muslims’ religious 
identity, secularism, democracy, and citizenship. 
Three of the scholars involved in this initiative 
have presented the results of their research. Elise 
Massicard looks at the Case of Alevism in Tur-
key. Munir Jiwa studies the mediation of Islamic 
norms through images and media. Soraya Tlatli 
has preferred not to include her paper in the book.
In the final contribution Olivier Roy summarizes 
the general findings of the project.
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SESSION I
RELIGIOUS NORMS IN THE PUBLIC
SPHERE: THE CHALLENGE
I. A COMPARISON OF THE ROLE OF 
RELIGION IN WESTERN EUROPE AND
THE MEDITERRANEAN ARAB WORLD 
AFTER THE ARAB SPRING
OLIVIER ROY
In Western Europe and the Mediterranean Arab 
world, there appear to be two different and almost 
opposite trends about the role of and room for 
religious markers.
Democratic movements in some Arab countries 
call into question the centrality of Islam as a legal 
and political concept, while in Europe there is an 
opposite trend to reassess the role of Christianity 
and, more specifically, Catholicism as part of the 
dominant culture, the Leitkultur, as the Germans 
call it. 
While there is a beginning of disconnection in 
the Arab countries between religion, culture and 
politics there seems to be a reconnection in West-
ern Europe. We are talking here about religious 
markers and not of religious practices nor of faith. 
Many actors who advocate the reconnection of 
dominant religious markers and the public sphere 
(like Geert Wilders in Netherlands and Marine Le 
Pen in France) are people who openly claim to be 
atheists or at least not church-goers.  The same is 
true for the so-called populist groups:  even if they 
call for a return to Christian references they are 
not Christian movements. In Italy, the Lega Nord 
might best be seen as Catholic, but not Chris-
tian. They openly criticize the church hierarchy 
on very specific issues like immigration, and they 
consider the archbishop of Milano almost a trai-
tor. But they also propose that the cross should 
be put on the Italian national flag. There is a real 
discrepancy; hence the problem of using the term 
religion. What do we mean by that? Of course, the 
question is complex: it is difficult to tag people as 
believers, non-believers, belonging but non-prac-
ticing believers, apostates, church goers, etc. Soci-
ology of religion has a tradition to scale the level 
of religious practices but it is not relevant for the 
issue we are addressing here. The issue is clearly 
that this connection—the reference to Christian 
markers in the Western public sphere—is not 
associated with faith. And, by the way, this is a 
problem for the Catholic Church, which wants to 
go further and reinstate, if not redefine, cultural 
markers in terms of faith.
Another element to take into account is that even 
if in most Western European constitutions there is 
a separation between Church and state, it does not 
mean that the constitution excludes religion from 
the public sphere. Even in France, with laïcité 
(now more an ideology than a constitutional con-
cept), religion has never been excluded from the 
public sphere. It’s an ideological reconstruction by 
the secularists now to say that religion is excluded. 
Religious markers in the public sphere are regu-
lated by the state but not excluded: e.g. bell ring-
ing and processions are not forbidden. Hence the 
debate about the Muslim prayers in the streets or 
the veil and burqa is not about religious practices 
that were never excluded as such. The debate is not 
about exclusion but more about the room for the 
dominant religion, either culturally or in religious 
terms. Of course there is an ambiguity: is it reli-
gion as such or just a cultural tradition?  But it’s 
interesting to see how the populist movements, all 
of them born from a secular milieu, have shaped 
this debate.
By the way, those movements often have a left-
ist component: you can’t say anymore that the 
extreme right in Europe is just a continuation 
of fascist organizations. It was true for many of 
Religious Norms in the Public Sphere13
the first leaders such as Jean Marie Le Pen. His 
political party, the National Front, was linked at 
the beginning to the history of the Vichy regime 
and its collaboration with Nazi forces.  We have 
the same kind of political genealogy in Belgium 
and in Germany, though not in Holland and Den-
mark. Now, however, we have a second generation 
of populist leaders who are just disregarding the 
references to the first half of the European 20th 
century history.
There is clearly a shift when you look, for instance, 
at the Swiss referendum on minarets or the French 
debate on the burqa. The issue is not whether to 
promote secularism and separation of church 
and state. The issue is clearly that some religious 
markers are now positioned explicitly as foreign, 
as alien. This view is not just the view of populist 
movements. It’s increasingly shared by the estab-
lishment. For example, Susanna Mancini’s paper 
points out that courts dealing with public cruci-
fixes in Italy and in Bavaria in Germany explicitly 
said that there’s nothing wrong with a Catholic 
sign in the school rooms because it’s part of the 
national culture. So the courts didn’t base their 
decisions on equality of religion, on secularism, 
or on the separation of church and state. They 
acknowledge the existence of a national culture 
whose roots are in Christianity. 
By the way, I have the impression—though it has 
to be corroborated by more studies—that some 
years ago the expression was “the Judeo-Christian 
tradition” but during the last two years, the term 
“Judeo” has disappeared. It’s now just “Christian-
ism.” This is never said explicitly. But it’s not by 
chance that the debate now concerns the cross, 
because the cross is Christian. It’s not the Bible, 
it’s not prayers. It’s not like in the USA where the 
definition of religious markers is more fluid, less 
associated with a given religion. Here it’s clearly 
Christian.
There have always been crosses in Italy and in 
Bavaria. They were part of the landscape, part of 
the furniture. Nobody noticed. But the fact that 
the cross has become a point of contention and 
has been reinstated by the European Court of 
Human Rights means that it is no longer just part 
of the landscape. This cross is here because the 
courts have decided that it should be here, because 
it’s part of the culture. So we have a redefinition of 
what the national culture is.  And we have a redefi-
nition of what a religious marker is. 
We are not in a process of continuity (there have 
always been crosses, bell ringing, etc.) but rather 
in the process of reconstructing religious mark-
ers as symbols of European identity.  This has far-
reaching consequences. It’s interesting to see that 
the re-installment of the cross, or the legal justi-
fication for the cross, has not been the product of 
Catholic lobbying. Of course the Church was in 
favor of maintaining the cross. But the Church 
was not at the vanguard of the debate. Rather, the 
policy of maintaining the cross was a combination 
of public opinion, populist support and the deci-
sions of courts. 
The connection between religion and culture here 
has been defined outside a theological debate. The 
debate is not about what religion is or what faith 
is. This fact puts the Church in a complex situa-
tion. The Catholic Church has always said that 
Europe is Christian and claimed that Europeans 
have forgotten the consequences of being Chris-
tian because they have lost their faith. The present 
Church policy uses culture as a bridge to bring the 
cultural Christian back into real religion. So the 
church is not fighting here for freedom of religion. 
Of course, officially the Church supports freedom 
of religion, but it doesn’t consider all religions as 
equal (although, by definition, no religion consid-
ers all religions to be equal—for all of them there 
is only one truth). 
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So the church wants to re-introduce this faith 
dimension. This dimension is outside of the reach 
of lawyers and social scientists that have little or 
nothing to say about faith. But this dimension 
cannot be ignored because it demarcates a purely 
religious symbol from a cultural symbol rooted in 
religion. 
So in Europe we are rethinking the meaning of 
religious signs as part of a larger debate about 
European identity, the separation of church and 
state, and the presence of religion in the public 
sphere.
It’s interesting to see what is happening on the 
other side of the Mediterranean, where democra-
tization raises a debate about freedom of religion. 
In the tradition of Ottoman law (which still is 
more or less pervasive in many Arab countries), 
freedom of religion is not an individual freedom 
or a human right. It’s a minority right. It’s the right 
of a community to practice. This idea has largely 
spread in the West, too, at least regarding Muslim 
minorities. 
We have a mirror effect between Europe and 
Muslim countries: the foreign, minority religion 
should be tolerated, but it is not on an equal foot-
ing with the majority religion. However, if you 
change the paradigm from belonging to a com-
munity to being an individual citizen, then you 
change the paradigm of religious affiliation. In the 
latter paradigm, religion is or should be a choice 
which brings the issue of conversion. Even if con-
versions are not statistically numerous, they have 
vital symbolic importance because it encourages 
a redefinition of what is religious affiliation and it 
destroys the connection between religious affili-
ation and identity. Conversion is not a matter of 
identity by definition but rather religious choice. 
Hence, many of the constitutional debates in the 
Arab countries concern the definition and status 
of Islam. There’s a consensus that constitutions 
must keep the reference to Islam as the religion of 
the nation, as the religion of the state, etc.—which, 
by the way, exists also in some western countries. It 
is not contradictory with being a democratic state. 
But then how do you redefine Sharia? How would 
you redefine, precisely, apostasy, for instance? And 
here the debate is very open. Rachid Ghannouchi 
made a very clear-cut declaration in Tunisia. He 
said that his party does not push for Sharia, has 
no Islamist agenda, but a democratic and politi-
cal one, by accepting a constitution, elections, and 
individual freedom. And he explicitly refers to the 
AK Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, “Justice 
and Development Party”) experience in Turkey. 
In the Maghreb the reference to the AK party is 
explicit: The Moroccan authorized Islamist party, 
“Justice and Development,” explicitly used the 
name of the Turkish Party, and Ghannouchi also 
made an explicit rapprochement. Egypt is more 
complex. The Muslim Brotherhood does not nec-
essarily consider Turkish Prime Minister Erdo-
gan’s party as a model.
In summary, we need to pay attention to these 
parallel and reversal movements. Western Europe 
is trying to redefine an identity that will go beyond 
individual freedom, while in the Muslim world 
there is an endeavor to define citizenship without 
reference to belonging to a particular religious 
group. To debate how either or both of these pro-
cesses will work is why we are here. 
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II. RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC/
PRIVATE DIVIDE IN THE EUROPEAN 
LEGAL SYSTEMS
SILVIO FERRARI
1. In Europe religions have a prominent and 
very visible position in the public sphere: almost 
everywhere religion is taught in State schools (fre-
quently in the form of denominational teaching), 
in many countries religions are financed by the 
State, and in some of these countries there is even 
a State religion.1
This strong presence of religion in the public space 
is increasingly challenged by the transformation 
of the religious landscape on the Old Continent. 
Two developments, in particular, are to be taken 
into consideration: first, a growing number of 
Europeans are not members of any religion and 
therefore question the support offered by the 
State to religious communities;2 second, a simi-
larly increasing number of Europeans follow reli-
gions that are not traditionally European (first 
of all Islam) and that are excluded from the sup-
1  For an overview of the Church-State systems 
in Europe see Gerhard Robbers (ed.), State and 
Church in the European Union, Baden-Baden, No-
mos, 2005. 
2  See Peter Berger, Grace Davie and Effie Fokas, 
Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and 
Variations, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008, p. 11. The 
decline both in Church attendance and in belief in 
God is confirmed by the data collected by Detlef 
Pollack, Religious change in Europe: theoretical 
considerations and empirical findings, in Gabriel 
Motzkin and Yochi Fischer, Religion and democracy 
in contemporary Europe, London, Alliance Publ. 
Trust, 2008, pp. 83-100. 
port reserved by the State to majority religions.3 
While the first group—those who do not profess 
any religion—want to reduce the presence of reli-
gious communities in the public sphere, the sec-
ond group—those who profess nontraditional 
religions—want to enlarge this presence so that 
they can enjoy the same advantages reserved to 
mainstream religions. The first group supports a 
neutral public sphere, without any religious con-
notation; the second is in favor of a plural pub-
lic sphere that is inclusive of different religions. 
Finally, some traditional religions oppose both the 
neutrality and the plurality of the public sphere 
because, in the first case, they are afraid of being 
confined in the private space and, in the second, 
of losing their dominant position. For these rea-
sons a complex and lively debate about the place of 
religions and beliefs in the public sphere is taking 
place in Europe.
2.  Although it is very much influenced by specific 
national backgrounds, this debate has a few com-
mon features.  Three basic patterns can be identi-
fied.
The first pattern is particularly evident in some 
Catholic and Orthodox countries. It is based on 
the conviction that traditional religions can still 
play a central role in creating a national cohesion 
that, in the opinion of many, is required to deal 
3  On Islam in Europe see Jocelyne Cesari (ed.), 
Handbook of European Islam, Oxford Univ. Press 
(forthcoming); Jørgen Nielsen (ed.), Yearbook of 
Muslims in Europe, Leiden-Boston, Brill, v. I, 2009; 
v. II, 2010. More in particular on the legal status of 
the Islamic communities in the European coun-
tries, see Silvio Ferrari, The Legal Dimension, in 
Brigitte Maréchal, Stefano Allievi, Felice Dassetto, 
Jørgen Nielsen (eds.), Muslims in the Enlarged 
Europe. Religion and Society, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 
2003, pp. 219-254; Silvio Ferrari, Juridical profiles 
and political management of Muslims’ presence in 
Europe, in European Parliament, Islam in the Euro-
pean Union: What’s at Stake in the Future?, Brus-
sels, European Parliament, 2007, pp. 35-60. 
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with the process of globalization and pluralisa-
tion: therefore they deserve a special position in 
the public space. In this perspective the dominant 
religion of a country is seen as a central compo-
nent of the civil religion, a set of principles and 
values that all citizens of that country are required 
to accept and defend. Italy is a good example of 
this trend. The central core of the Italian pat-
tern is the attempt to govern the growing ethi-
cal, cultural and religious plurality of the country 
through the values of Catholicism, raised to the 
rank of civil religion.4 More precisely, Catholi-
cism supplies the cultural and ethical principles 
on which full citizenship5 is based; provided they 
are ready to accept these principles, non-Catholics 
can fully enjoy religious freedom rights (although 
not religious equality rights). Governing diversity 
by stressing (Catholic) identity is the narrow and 
arduous path Italy is trying to follow.
The debate about the crucifix is the best example of 
this way of understanding the place of religions in 
the public sphere. In Italian State schools a cruci-
fix has to be hung on the walls of every classroom. 
Two years ago the European Court of Human 
Rights decided that the compulsory display of the 
crucifix violated the freedom of religion of the stu-
4  See Silvio Ferrari, The Italian Pattern of Law and 
Religion Relations: Catholicism as the Italian Civil 
Religion, in Convictions philosophiques et religieuses 
et droits positives, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2010, pp. 
397-420.
5  That is not only legal citizenship. Full citizenship 
is not only a matter of status and rights but also of 
shared values: to be a good citizen does not mean 
(only) not to commit crimes but also entails feeling 
part of a common narrative, partaking in some 
foundational myths, developing a sense of belong-
ing, solidarity and commitment. The different 
dimensions of citizenship are underlined by Chris-
tian Joppke, Transformation of Citizenship: Status, 
Rights, Identity, in Engin F. Isin, Peter Nyers, Bryan 
S. Turner, Citizenship between Past and Future, 
London, Routledge, 2008, p. 37.
dents and their parents.6 The Italian government 
appealed against this sentence, arguing that the 
crucifix is not only a religious symbol but also the 
symbol of Italian identity: it manifests the histori-
cal and cultural tradition of the country and is a 
sign of a value system based on freedom, equality, 
human dignity, and tolerance.7 
As citizenship is founded on these same values, 
which are to be respected by everybody, the pres-
ence of the crucifix in the classroom is and must 
be compulsory, because it shows a set of values 
that everybody who wants to live in Italy has to 
accept and defend. As a consequence, the crucifix 
cannot be removed from the classroom wall, nor 
can its presence be made dependent on the choice 
of the students and the teachers. These arguments 
express in legal terms the idea—supported by a 
large part of the Catholic hierarchy, the governing 
political coalition and public opinion—that only 
the Catholic tradition can perform the role of civil 
religion of Italy and provide the set of fundamen-
tal principles and values on which social cohesion 
is founded. This model is not exclusive to Italy. The 
Italian appeal against the decision of the Stras-
bourg Court has been supported by other Catho-
6  See Lautsee v. Italy, Nov. 3, 2009 (Appli-
cation no. 30814/06), available online at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=lautsee&sessionid=47526629&skin=hudoc-en. On this decision see Susanna Mancini, 
The Crucifix Rage: Supranational Constitutionalism 
Bumps Against the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 
in European Constitutional Law Review, 6, 2010, pp. 
6-27
7  See Mémoire du Gouvernement Italien pour 
l’Audience devant la Grande Chambre de la Cour 
Européenne des Droits de l’Homme,  in http://
www.governo.it/Presidenza/CONTENZIOSO/con-
tenzioso_europeo/grande_camera/Memoria_Rap-
presentanza_Lautsee_Grande_Camera.pdf. 
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lic and, more interestingly, Orthodox countries:8 
an unprecedented alliance between Catholic and 
Orthodox States was formed to counter the trends 
of the European Court, which are considered det-
rimental to both national sovereignty and reli-
gious tradition.
The second pattern answers the same need in the 
opposite way. It is based on the conviction that 
national identity and social cohesion can no lon-
ger be granted by the traditional religions, which 
have become too weak to serve as a unifying factor. 
Common citizenship can be built only around a set 
of secular principles—liberty, equality, tolerance, 
and so on—that every individual and group must 
embrace independently from his origins, prefer-
ences, and creed. These principles are assumed to 
be religiously and culturally neutral: in this way 
secularism can claim the right to govern the whole 
public sphere, where every citizen can feel at home 
exactly because this space is without any reference 
to the particular values and symbols of the differ-
ent religious, racial, ethnic, cultural and political 
communities living in the country. The French 
laws that forbid the wearing of religious sym-
bols at school and the burqa in all public places, 
including the streets, are a good example of this 
8  Ten countries asked to intervene in the judgment 
in support of the Italian position. They are Lithua-
nia, Malta, Monaco, San Marino (all countries with 
a Catholic majority), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Ro-
mania, Russia (all countries with an Orthodox ma-
jority) and Armenia (see Grand Chamber Hearing 
Lautsee v. Italy - Press Release issued by the Registrar 
30.06.10, available at http://strasbourgconsortium.
org/document.php?DocumentID=5015). It is sig-
nificant that no country with a Protestant majority 
of citizens is part of this group.
approach.9 Of particular interest is a passage of 
the French Constitutional Council decision that 
declared the constitutional legitimacy of the law. 
It affirms that the self-determination of women 
is irrelevant: even if their decision to wear the 
burqa is taken freely and consciously, they are in 
an objective “situation of exclusion and inferiority 
that is clearly incompatible with the constitutional 
principles of freedom and equality.”10 Beneath this 
statement there is the conviction that, if national 
identity has to be built around the notion of laïcité, 
“it is the role of the State to create laïque citizens”11 
by educating them to the values of secularism and 
shielding them from the competing values upheld 
by religion. This approach to the place of religion 
in the public space is shared by some international 
organizations, like the Council of Europe and the 
European Court of Human Rights: it is no coinci-
dence that all the applications against the ban of 
9  See  Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en 
application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes 
ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance reli-
gieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics, 
in Journal Officiel de la République Française, 15 
March 2004; Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 
interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace 
public, in Journal Officiel, 12 October 2010. See 
also John R. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like 
Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space, 
Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press,  2006; Christian 
Joppke, Limits of Restricting Islam: The French 
Burqa Law of 2010, unpublished paper available at 
www2.lse.ac.uk/government/research/resgroups/
MSU/events.aspx.  
10  Décision n° 2010-613 du 7 octobre 2010, in Jour-
nal Officiel, 7 October 2010.
11  Peter Berger, Grace Davie and Effie Fokas, Reli-
gious America, Secular Europe?, p. 77.
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religious symbols in the French and Turkis schools 
have been rejected by the Court of Strasbourg.12
The third pattern is best exemplified by the United 
Kingdom, probably the most advanced European 
country in the pursuit of an extensive multi-cul-
tural organization of society. The United King-
dom is a common law country where, as in many 
countries of this type, the central role in shaping 
the legal system is not played by the State and its 
laws but by the courts and their judgments.13 In 
the task of striking a balance between the differ-
ent ethnic, religious and cultural groups coexist-
ing in British society, the courts are guided by the 
respect of fundamental human rights. But some-
times human rights are interpreted and applied in 
a way that ends up restricting one of them: free-
dom of religion. An example of this approach is 
provided by the British Supreme Court ruling in 
the case of the Jewish Free School.14 This school 
had an admission policy that privileged Jewish 
students and, more specifically, in accordance 
with the principles of Orthodox Judaism, students 
born to a Jewish mother: these admission criteria 
led to the exclusion of a student born to a non Jew-
ish mother who had converted to Judaism accord-
ing to the rites of a non Orthodox branch. The 
12  See Carolyn Evans, Individual and Group Religious 
Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights: 
Cracks in the Intellectual Architecture, in Journal 
of Law and Religion, XXVI, 2010, in particular pp. 
109-115; Julie Ringelheim, Rights, Religion and the 
Public Sphere: The European Court of Human Rights 
in Search of a Theory?, forthcoming in C. Ungure-
anu and L. Zucca, A European Dilemma: Religion 
and the Public Sphere, Cambridge, Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 2011.  
13  See Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens and Noura 
Karazivan, The ‘Public’ and the ‘private’ in the com-
mon law and civil law traditions:  some compara-
tive remarks, in Silvio Ferrari-Sabrina Pastorelli, 
Religion and the public/private divide (forthcoming 
with Ashgate).
14  See  R v The Governing Body of JFS (2009 UKSC 
15). 
Supreme Court judged that the school admission 
policy, focusing on the maternal descent of the 
student, was based not on religion but on ethnicity 
and therefore violated the Race Relations Act 1976 
that forbids any discrimination on this ground.15
This judgment has far-reaching consequences. It 
implies that the membership rules of a religion are 
subject to the scrutiny of State courts. By apply-
ing the principle of non-discrimination, they can 
overrule the decisions of the religious authorities 
about  membership in the religious group, thus 
limiting its collective religious freedom right. The 
application of a fundamental right—non discrim-
ination—collides with the respect of another fun-
damental right, religious freedom. This contrast 
exemplifies the potential tension between human 
rights and religious rights:16 the former, as codi-
fied in the declarations of the last two and a half 
centuries, has a rational/ethical foundation and a 
universal scope that can easily clash with the reli-
gious foundation and the more particular scope 
of rights claimed by religious individuals and 
groups.17 As Oftestad underlines, “liberal democ-
racy has its own fundamental ideology rooted in 
universal human rights” and “the ideological goal 
of the democratic state is to implement individual 
15  See Susanna Mancini, To Be Or Not To Be Jewish: 
The UK Supreme Court Answers the Questions, in 
http://ssm.com/abstracts=1693127 
16  See Roger Ballard, Human Rights in Contexts of 
Ethnic Plurality: Always a Vehicle for Liberation?, 
in Ralph Grillo, Roger Ballard, Alessandro Ferrari, 
André J. Hoekema, Marcel Maussen, Prakash Shah 
(eds.), Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity, Alder-
shot, Ashgate, 2009, pp. 299-330.
17  Religions cannot compete with fundamental rights 
on the ground of universality. Even large supra-
national religions - Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, 
etc.- are not as universal as human rights claim to 
be. See Silvio Ferrari, Tra geo-diritti e teo-diritti. 
Riflessioni sulle religioni come centri transnazionali 
di identità, in Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesias-
tica, aprile 2007, pp. 3-14.
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freedom and cultural and social equality among 
all members of the society.” 
Such a goal places some religious communities, 
whose doctrine and organization is not entirely 
consistent with these principles (think of the 
Catholic Church teaching and practice on ordi-
nation of women and homosexual marriages), 
on a collision course with these democratic ide-
als. “Until now the state has avoided a concrete 
confrontation with the Church on these issues, 
because the state is obliged to respect the ideal 
of religious freedom not only for the individual, 
but for the religious institutions as well. But how 
long the state will maintain an attitude of reserve 
towards the ‘discrimination’ in the Church is a 
delicate question.”18 A “fundamentalistic” inter-
pretation of human rights is another—perhaps 
less evident but equally insidious—way to affirm 
the dominance of secularism in the public sphere. 
Each of the three models I have described has its 
limitations. The “Italian” pattern is based on the 
gamble that citizenship and social cohesion can 
be built around a particular religious and cultural 
tradition.  In the short term, this strategy may 
work, yet nobody knows how long it will be able to 
deal with the challenge of the increasing immigra-
tion of non-Christian communities. The weakest 
point of the “French” pattern is the assumption 
that not only the State and its institutions, but also 
society and politics, have to be independent from 
18  Bernt Ofenstad, Presence and Mission. The Social-
Ethical Engagement of the Catholic Church Within 
the Nordic Context 1970-2006, in Lisbet Christof-
fersen, Kjell Å Modéer, Svend Andersen (eds.), Law 
& Religion in the 21st Century – Nordic Perspectives, 
Copenhagen, Diøf, 2010, p. 473.
particular traditions and conceptions of life.19  To 
attain such a goal these traditions are to be pushed 
to the margins of public life.  Yet the privatization 
of religion is being met with growing resistance 
by many historical religions of Europe and it is 
rejected by a substantial part of the immigrant 
communities, especially those that come from 
countries where law and politics are intermingled 
with religion. Finally, the “British” model is flawed 
by an internal contradiction: it has the stated aim 
of securing and developing religious pluralism but 
ends up using human rights to compress differ-
ences and promote cultural homogenization. 
These models are little more than “ideal types” 
that do not exist, in a “pure” form, in Italy, France, 
the United Kingdom, or in any other European 
State. Moreover, they are far from being static: 
the British Prime Minister has recently advocated 
“muscular liberalism” as the best way to tackle the 
multiculturalist drift,20 while the French Presi-
dent is taking the lead in Europe as a supporter of 
“positive” and “open” laïcité.21 Nowadays British 
multiculturalism and French laïcité are no lon-
ger inviolable dogmas that must be blindly reaf-
firmed without taking account of social changes. 
However, these models foreshadow three different 
ways of understanding the place and the role of 
religion in the public sphere. It makes little sense 
to ask which of them is the best in abstract terms. 
19 This assumption emerges clearly in the Déclaration 
sur la laïcité prepared by Jean Bauberot, Roberto 
Blancarte, and Micheline Milot and published on 
December 9, 2005 (see its articles 4 and 9). See Jean 
Bauberot, L’intégrisme républicain contre la laïcité, 
Paris, Aube, 2006, pp. 247–65.
20  Cameron’s speech of February 5 2005 can be read 
at www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-tran-
scripts/2011/02/pms-speech-at-munich-security-
conference-60293.
21  See the speech delivered by Sarkozy in Rome on 
December 20, 2007, in www.elysee.fr/president/
les-actualites/discours/2007/allocution-de-m-le-
president-de-la-republique.7012.html
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It is more appropriate to ask in which direc-
tion each of them should progress to deal with 
the changes that are taking place in Europe. The 
French model has evolved in a context character-
ized by a strong State and a declining religion, 
while the Italian one has arisen from a situation 
where, ever since its creation, a relatively young 
and weak State has had to deal with a strong reli-
gion. These different starting points have to be 
taken into account in order to understand what 
can be reasonably expected from each national 
tradition regarding the accommodation of reli-
gion in the public sphere. 
3.  One of Europe’s main assets is its internal 
diversity and it is wise to try to make the most of 
it, giving up from the very beginning any dream 
of assigning to religion the same space and rel-
evance in the public sphere all over Europe. The 
existenceof different national systems of relations 
between States and religions is not in contrast 
with the unification process of Europe, provided 
they stay within a broad framework defined by the 
respect of human rights. That said, we can briefly 
mention the two processes that are challenging 
the traditional conception of public sphere in 
many European States. 
The first is the cultural, religious, ethnic and ethi-
cal pluralization of contemporary Europe. Due to 
immigration and globalization, individuals and 
groups are now present in Europe (physically or 
virtually) who do not recognize the primacy of 
individual religious liberty as it has been estab-
lished in European history: in different ways, they 
are in favor of a communitarian approach that 
questions the centrality of individual rights and 
therefore the distinction between the public and 
private sphere.22 
Second, there is the publicization of religion. In 
most of Europe (and with the exception of the 
Communist regimes) religion was never priva-
tized, in the sense of being excluded from public 
recognition and support: but there was a clear dis-
tinction between the spiritual and the temporal 
sphere and it was widely assumed that, in the lat-
ter, religions had a duty of self-restraint. In the last 
20 to 30 years the boundaries between spiritual 
and temporal have become much more blurred 
and religions have been able to influence the public 
discourse on matters from which they were previ-
ously excluded. Alberico Gentili’s “Silete Theologi 
in Munere Alieno” has gone out of fashion and an 
increasing number of citizens claim that they have 
the right to publicly follow the tenets of their reli-
22  The modern distinction between public and 
private is founded on the recognition of the legal 
subjectivity of the individual that was affirmed 
through the American and French declarations 
of rights, attesting (not just at the philosophical 
level, but also in law) to the existence of a private 
sphere where neither the State not the Church were 
entitled to interfere. The history of the right of reli-
gious freedom shows clearly the importance of this 
passage.  For centuries religious freedom had been 
a matter of Church-State relations, with the indi-
vidual having to act as a spectator: starting from 
the Enlightenment, the main role has been taken 
over by the individual and the legitimacy both of 
the State and increasingly also of the Church is 
questioned when their activity clashes with the 
respect of individual rights. In this perspective it is 
not religion but individual religious freedom that 
has a public dimension today. This approach is 
not shared by the followers of some religions that, 
through the process of immigration, have recently 
become part of the European religious landscape. 
See Silvio Ferrari, The formal and substantive neu-
trality of the public sphere, available at http://www.
religareproject.eu/?q=content/state-art-report-
public-space-formal-and-substantive-neutrality-
public-sphere.
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gion in matters of dress codes, gender relations, 
dietary rules and so on.23 
These two processes take place in a context domi-
nated by the fear that Europe is entering a phase 
of demographic, economic, political and military 
decline. This feeling has instilled many doubts in 
European minds about being able to manage the 
pluralization and publicization of religion with 
the tools available in the store of human rights.24 
This lack of confidence results in a constant oscil-
lation between the impulse to confine religion 
more strictly to the private sphere, excluding it 
from the process of building the national iden-
tity, and the desire to strengthen national identity 
through the revitalization (and therefore the re-
publicization) of the majority religion(s) only. In 
the first case the arsenal of human rights is rigor-
ously applied without fear of marginalizing and 
alienating a substantial part of the population 
and, in certain cases, of obtaining illiberal results. 
In the second case a limited application of human 
rights (particularly when equal treatment is at 
stake) is adopted with the aim of maintaining the 
privileged status of the majority religion(s). The 
French law that forbids wearing religious symbols 
at school is a good example of the first trend; the 
laws that mandate the display of the crucifix in the 
Italian classrooms,25 that prevent teachers from 
wearing religious symbols other than Christian 
ones in some German Länder,26 or the Swiss refer-
23  The analysis of this phenomenon goes back to José 
Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, 
Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1994 and Gilles 
Kepel, La revanche de Dieu, Paris, Seuil, 1990. 
24  Tariq Modood defined this process as the passage 
from a “pluralism of hope” to “a pluralism of fear” 
(see: We need a multiculturalism of hope, in The 
Guardian, 24 September 2009).
25   See supra, footnote 6.
26  See Ruben Seth Fogel, Headscarves in German 
Public Schools: Religious Minorities are Welcome 
in Germany, Unless – God Forbid - They are Reli-
gious, in New York Law School Law Review, v. 51, 
2006/07, pp. 619-53.
endum that forbids the building of minarets,27 are 
a good example of the second trend. 
To overcome this impasse, the common law 
model (of a “light” State and no inclination to 
marginalize religion from the public sphere) 
could be appealing. But—apart from the fact that 
it is hardly exportable beyond the English Chan-
nel—this model too presents some dangers. Judg-
ing from some court decisions, the price religions 
have to pay to be admitted to the public sphere 
is the respect for human rights within their own 
doctrinal and organizational system. If rigidly 
applied, this principle can start a process of cul-
tural homogenization that, in the end, under-
mines the specificity of religious communities and 
the contribution they can give to building a plural 
society: a much more dangerous result than their 
marginalization from the public sphere (as in the 
case of the “French” model).
4. According to some, these difficulties foreshadow 
“the end of a secular order based on principles—
however inadequately they may operate in prac-
tice—of consensual rationality,” the decline of the 
distinction between public and private sphere and 
“the fusion again [...] of those relatively distinct 
spheres.”28 Personally, I do not think this outcome 
is inevitable or even desirable. Liberal democracy 
27  See Marcel Stüssi, Banning of Minarets: Addressing 
the Validity of a Controversial Swiss Popular Initia-
tive, in Religion and Human Rights, v. 3, n. 2, Sept. 
2008, pp. 135-53; Vincenzo Pacillo, “Die religiöse 
Heimat”. Il divieto di edificazione di minareti in 
Svizzera ed Austria, in Quaderni di diritto e politica 
ecclesiastica, 2010/1, pp. 199-226.
28  John Frow, Waiting for the Antichrist, in Antonio 
Pinto Ribeiro, The State of the World, Manchester, 
Carcanet and Fundacao Calouste Gulbenkian, 
2006, p. 87. On this perspective see Hanne Pe-
tersen, Beyond National Majority/Minority Dichoto-
mies. Towards Legal Traditions & Religions of World 
Society – A Local Example, in Lisbet Christoffersen, 
Kjell Å Modéer, Svend Andersen (eds.), Law & 
Religion in the 21st Century, pp. 321-344. 
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has sufficient resources to govern the transforma-
tions of contemporary society without calling into 
question the fundamental principles on which it 
is based. 
To find a way out, the notion of public sphere has 
to be: re-thought so that it is made hospitable to 
individuals and groups who want to manifest 
their religion or belief; accessible to all individuals 
and groups (not only to a select few) who are ready 
and able to accept the plurality, on an equal foot-
ing, of different religions and beliefs in this same 
sphere (this is the access card required from all 
subjects that want to enter it); respectful of human 
rights but open to the accommodations that are 
necessary to safeguard the internal autonomy of 
religion and belief communities. This strategy 
presupposes a better understanding of the dis-
tinction between the informal public sphere (the 
square, internet, the mass media, that is the space 
of debate and discussion where the public dis-
course takes shape) and the institutional public 
sphere (which is the space where coercive delib-
erations, which are binding to all, are taken: par-
liament, the law courts, public administration).29
The first, the informal public sphere, in order to 
perform its function of elaborating and proposing 
projects of collective interest, should be free and 
plural: the visible presence of different religions 
and beliefs in this area is indispensable for the 
pluralism on which a democratic society is based. 
Instead, the institutional public sphere, in order 
to gain general respect and recognition for the 
binding decisions that are taken by its represen-
tatives, must be (and appear) fair and impartial. 
These principles of fairness and impartiality do 
not mean the automatic exclusion of all religious 
29  On this distinction see Jurgen Habermas, Religion 
in the Public Sphere, in European Journal of Philoso-
phy, 14/1, pp. 1-25; Cristina Lafont, Religion in the 
Public Sphere. Remarks on Habermas’s Conception 
of Deliberation in Post-secular Societies, in Constel-
lations, 14/2 (2007), 236-56. 
references, manifestations and symbols from the 
public institutions. The presence of religious sym-
bols can be unsuitable in some of them and not in 
others, particularly if the principle of fairness can 
be interpreted in a way that includes different reli-
gions and conceptions of life: when appropriate 
and possible, the quest for solutions that consent 
to the coexistence of different religious symbols 
in the same physical space can be the best way to 
educate towards responsible and accountable plu-
ralism. This inclusive approach makes it possible 
to take into account the historical, ethnic, cultural, 
religious and social specificities of each national 
community and then may develop into a sustain-
able pluralism that is able to accompany the ongo-
ing changes in European society and keep the law 
in touch with its social and cultural background. 
Such a strategy requires different actions by the 
different European States. Those where a strong 
and secular State is in place should refrain from 
extending to the informal public sphere the limits 
to the manifestation of religion that are legitimate 
in the institutional public sphere: forbidding the 
teacher of a State school to wear a religious symbol 
can be acceptable, due to his public role; extend-
ing the same prohibition to students is much more 
questionable. The States where a dominant reli-
gion exists should refrain from giving it the reli-
gious monopoly of the institutional public sphere: 
recognizing the possibility to display a crucifix 
or another religious symbol in the classroom in 
response to a request by the students or the teach-
ers is one thing; imposing it by law, independently 
from their opinion, is another matter. 
By these different paths the challenge of the plu-
ralization and publicization of religion can be 
tackled in a way that takes into account the speci-
ficities of each national Church-State system and, 
at the same time, identifies a common ground 
where, in different forms, the questions raised 
by the transformation of the European religious 
landscape can find convincing answers. 
Religious Norms in the Public Sphere23
III. ISLAM IN THE SECULAR NOMOS 
OF THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
PETER DANCHIN
My field is international law, and my work in this 
area analyzes competing accounts of religious 
freedom in international legal and political theory. 
I would like to speak about the post-2001 juris-
prudence of the European court under Article 9, 
which helps us see some quite interesting dynam-
ics. What’s interesting, particularly about the 
place of Islam and Islamic norms in European 
nation states (and more broadly within the secular 
nomos of the European court itself), is how these 
encounters and cases catalyze and unsettle exist-
ing legal categories and normative assumptions. 
They force us to think about the historical and 
theoretical premises of the modern liberal politi-
cal order. 
In my work I try to look at two questions that the 
European cases raise. The first concerns the scope 
of the right itself under Article 9. How does one 
think about and establish the appropriate scope of 
the claim of right itself? For example, there’s been 
controversy over whether Article 9 includes the 
right to be free from injury to religious incivilities 
or feelings. There’s a line of cases in the European 
court that takes this position, like Otto-Prem-
inger30 and Wingrove,31 that got me interested in 
this whole question. In American settings, this 
question is not even on the table, but it is a much 
more live question in Europe. 
The second question is how we think about the 
nature of the so-called secular public sphere itself. 
30  Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) 1 (1994).
31  Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. H.R. 
1938. 
What is the problematic that the secular public 
sphere is meant to solve? What is the relationship 
between religion and morality within that space? I 
found Professor Ferrari’s talk extremely helpful in 
disaggregating some of the concepts that get con-
flated in this question. If I might say so, I think 
the European court has made a spectacular mess 
of these questions by failing to disaggregate and 
think more carefully about how it defines notions 
of secularity and neutrality in its jurisprudence. 
Indeed, the tactic to use the margin of apprecia-
tion, which becomes a kind of residual defensive 
mechanism, by which the problem is avoided 
rather than confronted normatively.
The concept of the secular public sphere has been 
haunted from its very beginning by at least three 
problems. 
The first concerns the right to religious freedom 
itself. What is the object of protection of the right? 
I heard Professor Roy saying that much modern 
thinking about this question conceives the right 
in very individualistic terms. Interestingly, the 
European courts have not taken that position. 
Rather, their jurisprudence deals with all sorts of 
complicated questions of church autonomy and 
the claims of religious communities. There is a 
rich line of cases where the court has dealt with the 
collective aspects of the right, particularly church 
autonomy questions in Europe.
Yet much academic writing conceives these cases 
in terms of the right to freedom of conscience. 
There’s a subtle transformation that has occurred 
in these normative discussions where we don’t talk 
about freedom of religion, per se. We talk about 
the freedom of individual conscience. I think we 
need to think a lot more carefully about this trans-
formation.
Now, particularly in the United States and its aca-
demic writings, we see a third kind of transforma-
tion where people think about religious freedom 
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in terms of values of autonomy. This reframes the 
issue of religious freedom in terms of freedom of 
choice, rather than freedom of conscience. There 
is an unstable set of normative assumptions about 
how conscience and autonomy relate in the mod-
ern secular imagery of religious freedom. I’m 
suggesting that is there is a deep set of normative 
assumptions, confusions and instabilities under-
lying this whole body of laws that is not only very 
interesting in itself, but also unsettled by these 
cases. 
The second dilemma (I won’t speak in detail 
about this) is how to demarcate the spheres, how 
to identify a realm of public reason separate from 
a sphere of private faith, and how to contain and 
construe these separate spheres. Europe is fasci-
nating to think about here. What’s going on in 
France shows all the dilemmas that these notions 
of public and private give rise to. I think that the 
notion of a free-standing public sphere, where rea-
son and rational deliberation are separable from 
religion and arguments of religious communities, 
has been shown to be false. 
The third (and perhaps deepest) dilemma is how 
to secure the authority of public reason itself. I see 
this as the extension and crisis of the Enlighten-
ment project at large, the quest to place reliance on 
reason as some kind of universal category in order 
to give primacy to moral philosophy, i.e. secular 
theorizing over ecclesiastical and theological posi-
tions. Of course, this is a deep set of questions that 
I cannot go into now.
At a theoretical level, what I see in these questions 
and cases is a kind of circular and self-reinforcing 
dialectic between notions of neutrality and uni-
versality. Charles Klaus has made the interest-
ing observation that, in much modern writing 
about these issues, Europe is seen as simultane-
ously exceptional and universal. For scholars 
such as Marcel Gauchet and Charles Taylor, the 
close intertwining of Christianity with secular 
modernity seems to cause no undue theoreti-
cal complications. Rather, it confirms Christian-
ity’s unique ability to transcend its own particu-
larity. Of course, if one takes this view then the 
inexorable rise of modern liberal political orders 
is really the achievement of Latin Christendom 
itself. For Hirschkind, both secular politics and 
private belief on this view emerge as the inheri-
tors of the arc of religion returning to itself. The 
public sphere is neutral to religion, but unique to 
a particular political order, particularly the role of 
Christianity in the broader European normative 
sphere itself with all the national variations Pro-
fessor Ferrari has referred to.
On the other hand, the right to religious freedom 
is universal because it protects religion in its true 
form (regardless of whether we define this right 
in terms of religion, conscience, or autonomy). Of 
course, the latter position collapses quickly when 
we push the particulars.
I have suggested that two pathologies come out of 
this way of thinking about the problem. The first is 
that the claim to have secured secular authority in 
the public sphere rests at some level on the notion 
of the unique vantage points of epistemic neutral-
ity. I think this is the French position: that the sec-
ular order is above history, above politics, above 
culture, and indeed is the vantage from which 
other histories and political formations can be 
ranked and demarcated as either tolerable or not. 
Of course, the difficulty with this way of think-
ing is that accounts of neutrality and secularity, as 
we see in the European cases, quickly devolve into 
the unarticulated liberal strategy of hypostasis or 
reification of a historically specific political order. 
To make this point most clearly, it’s interesting to 
think about the pre-2000 cases of the European 
court, where (as Professor Roy put it) the cross was 
just a part of the furniture. A background assump-
tion that seems to raise no serious problems for 
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notions of neutrality or secularity was the right to 
be free from injury to religious feelings in a major-
ity Catholic area, as we can see in a case in Austria 
where the court upheld the right to restrict a film 
deemed offensive to Catholics. 
It’s only once we get into the Islam cases that we 
start to see the dialectic reversing in quite spec-
tacular ways. I think that the most catastrophic 
decision of the court was the Refah Partisi case,32 
where the court effectively held that a political 
party seeking to institute reforms to the public 
sphere in Turkey through democratic means (in 
this case, a plural legal system premised on Sharia 
and other religious traditions) was a human rights 
violation. This decision is just preposterous if one 
thinks about religious freedom in a global sense. 
For example, in states like India or South Africa, 
we see very interesting and complicated plural 
arrangements of religious and secular laws. As 
such, the European court’s conclusion that the 
institutionalization of Sharia within a Turkish 
framework was a violation of the European Con-
vention was a grave mistake.
This leads to the second pathology, which is even 
more problematic in some senses: the notion of 
religious freedom as a stable norm entirely separa-
ble from specific histories and relations of power. 
Once one starts delving into the genealogy and 
history of the emergence of the right itself, we start 
to see rival intellectual traditions and normative 
dissonances that are internal to the right to reli-
gious freedom itself. My work shows that there are 
views within the European tradition of religious 
freedom (specifically in the early Enlightenment) 
that are quite distinct and operate on quite differ-
ent assumptions from what follows later in the 18th 
century, Kantian tradition of religious freedom. 
Article 9 today encompasses both of these tradi-
tions. Indeed, we see the court moving seamlessly 
32  Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2003)
between notions of public order and the rights 
of others, merging in its case laws two traditions 
without distinguishing their genealogies. 
If we look back to the older, 17th century liberal 
tradition as it emerged in Europe, we see that the 
public sphere was understood in terms of social 
peace. Religious liberty was conceived in jurisdic-
tional terms, the classic separation in effect being 
based on simultaneous religious and secular argu-
ments. This conception, derived from a civil phi-
losophy that sought to desacralize the state, led 
over time to the churches losing their civil and 
political authority and to the gradual spiritualiza-
tion of religion in Europe. Now, one could read 
some of the early cases in the court’s jurisprudence 
along these lines (particularly in Otto-Preminger 
and Wingrove). One could construe the state as, in 
effect, seeking to preserve religious peace within 
those regions, and see injury to religious feelings 
being protected, not as an incident of individual 
freedom so much as an attempt to maintain har-
mony between plural religious communities in 
European nation states. Of course, this argument 
is preposterous if we apply it to Sahin33 and Dog-
ru.34 The argument really can’t be understood on 
these terms if, for example, we conclude that a 
medical student at a university wearing a heads-
carf is a threat to peace within Turkey. 
If we then look into the later, 18th century tradi-
tion of religious freedom, we see the public sphere 
being reconceived not in terms of peace, but in 
terms of a moral theory of justice, with religious 
liberty grounded in a complex and unstable notion 
of freedom of conscience. This conception derived 
from a metaphysical, philosophical tradition, one 
that simultaneously sacralized reason and ratio-
nalized religion. Kant’s Religion Within The Lim-
its of Reason Alone illustrates this very interesting 
historical trajectory of religious freedom.
33  Sahin v. Turkey, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5 (2005)
34  Dogru v. France, 49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 8 (2008)
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The jurisprudence of the court today entangles 
both of these traditions. The court can restrict 
religious freedom to protect public order and 
social peace on the one hand. On the other hand, 
it can restrict it to protect the so-called rights of 
others. I think it’s helpful, in the same way that 
Professor Ferrari disaggregated notions of public 
space, to disaggregate these notions of the Article 
9.2 jurisprudence of the court.
What I suggest, then, is to look at this histori-
cal genealogy. If we do, then we start to see that 
religious freedom is not a single stable principle 
existing outside of culture, or spatial geographies, 
or power. Rather, it is a contested, polyvalent con-
cept existing and unfolding within histories of 
concrete political orders. If neutrality and univer-
sality need to be understood in these contingent 
terms, then the theoretical challenge is to think 
about pluralizing our understanding of the right 
and simultaneously relativizing it historically into 
the contexts in which it’s being contested. 
Professor Ferrari’s idea that these accommoda-
tions will occur differently in different politi-
cal orders within European states strikes me as 
entirely correct. 
I, too, would like to finish my comments with the 
Grand Chamber’s decision in Lautsee,35 the cru-
cifix case. What’s interesting there is that, having 
previously held a Swiss school teacher and a Turk-
ish medical student who were wearing a headscarf 
to be threats to secularism and public order, in 
Lautsee we see the Grand Chamber saying that a 
state-mandated symbol of the dominant religion 
in every public classroom in Italy is a passive sym-
bol. And that it is within the margin of apprecia-
tion of the public sphere of European nation states.
Of course, in some sense I support the decision 
of the Grand Chamber, but not its conclusory and 
narrow reasoning on these questions. Two judges 
35  Lautsee v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009). 
dissented in Lautsee, arguing that a narrower mar-
gin of appreciation should be accorded in situa-
tions like Italy where there is a very strong domi-
nant religion and that we should be more sensitive 
to the rights of dissenters and non-believers. This 
reasoning is based on an autonomous notion of 
religious freedom. This idea of negative freedom 
can be compromised, the dissenters contended, by 
state endorsement of majority religious symbols. I 
think the Lautsee decision is deeply flawed, but for 
an opposite set of reasons. It fails to take seriously 
the collective aspects of the claims in Lautsee. 
There is an interesting discussion of the cross as a 
kind of national cultural symbol, and many schol-
ars have long argued that we should think about 
religious freedom as a cultural right. The kind of 
work that culture’s doing in this equation, I think, 
needs a lot of further thought. 
The most interesting thing, for those who haven’t 
read the case, is the two separate judgments of 
Judge Giovani Bonello from Malta and Judge Ann 
Power from Ireland. Bonello, in highly polemical 
terms, effectively says that no court (and certainly 
not this court) should rob the Italians of their cul-
tural personality, that before joining any crusade 
to demonize the crucifix we should start by plac-
ing the presence of that emblem in Italian schools 
in its rightful historical perspective. Bonello’s con-
ception of neutrality draws a clear conceptual dis-
tinction between freedom of religion and secular-
ism. To quote his conclusion, “the convention has 
given this court the remit to enforce freedom of 
religion and of conscience, but has not empowered 
it to bully states into secularism or to coerce coun-
tries into schemes of religious neutrality.” This 
must come as really surprising news in Ankara. 
It is for each individual state to choose whether 
to be secular or not, whether and to what extent 
to separate church and governance. Bonello then 
sets out, in fairly strident and emotional terms, a 
kind of liberal nationalist view where the back-
ground of the Italian people is deeply embedded 
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in the history of Catholicism. He points out how 
the entire education system in Italy is (and it’s a 
good thing, by the way) grounded in the values 
of the Catholic church—tolerance, pluralism, neu-
trality, and so on. 
The most interesting judgment in Lautsee, how-
ever, is in fact Judge Power’s separate concurring 
opinion, which exposes the flaws of Bonello’s 
reasoning. Judge Power agrees with Bonello that 
neutrality does not require a secularist approach. 
However, she articulates a more value pluralist 
approach to religious freedom, one sensitive not 
only to the values of the majority but also to those 
of religious and non-religious minorities. She 
rejects the majority’s assertion that the crucifix is 
a passive symbol. Rather, she says, it is a carrier 
of meaning that speaks volumes without having 
to do so necessarily in a coercive or an indoctri-
nating manner. Power’s inquiry focuses on the 
environment in public schools in Italy, investigat-
ing how inclusive the treatment of minorities and 
non-religious students is in those environments. 
She sees the presence of the crucifix as a stimulus 
to dialogue, a space where genuine differences of 
opinion and honest exchange of views can occur. 
Power emphasizes that the duty of European states 
is to respect religious freedom of all persons and 
groups, both majorities and minorities. But on 
this conception of neutrality what is required is a 
kind of pluralist and inclusive notion of the public 
sphere, rather than a secularist and exclusionary 
approach. If I understand it correctly, I think that’s 
what Professor Ferrari was arguing for as well. 
The distinction Power draws between pluralism 
and secularism is very helpful in illustrating how 
the margin of appreciation is used in the court’s 
jurisprudence to avoid confronting this collective 
aspect of the right to religious freedom, whether 
viewed as a cultural right or more broadly as a 
collective right of the people to self-determination 
within the public sphere of the state itself. Her 
judgment, I think, reveals the double contradic-
tion in the court’s Article IX jurisprudence. She 
shows that the court on the one hand has found a 
danger of pressure or proselytizing when a Swiss 
teacher wears a headscarf on Dahlab36 or when a 
medical student wears a headscarf in Sahin, 
but not when the state officially adopts a majority 
religious symbol in Lautsee. That’s one contradic-
tion. 
The second contradiction is that the court has 
found that the democratic decision to perpetuate a 
religious tradition in the public sphere violates the 
principle of secularism in Muslim majority states. 
I think Refah is a catastrophe as a human rights 
decision. In effect, the court allowed Article 9 to 
be used by a militarist and enforced notion of sec-
ularism against genuine democratic movements 
within Turkey, while applying a much broader 
margin of appreciation to a Christian majority 
state in Lautsee. Thinking carefully about these 
two sets of contradictions helps reveal what’s 
going on at the moment in thinking about religion 
in the public sphere in Europe.
36  Dahlab v. Switzerland, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001).
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SESSION II
THE DEBATE OF ISLAMIC NORMS 
IN ARAB COUNTRIES
I. INTRODUCTION
HATEM BAZIAN
I think for many of us who are observing what is 
occurring in the Arab world today and the Mus-
lim world, on a personal level I would say it’s about 
time. On a deeper level, it’s been in the making 
for quite some time. There are very rich debates in 
Egypt, in Tunisia, in Yemen, in Syria, in Jordan, in 
Bahrain. Possibly one of the transformations that 
we are witnessing is the place of Islam, and in par-
ticular the place of Islamic groups and organiza-
tions that are attempting to engage in the political 
process and enter into the civil society. It will be 
a highly contested space and we will see what will 
be the outcome in the future.
II. SCANDALS IN EGYPT AND THE 
MANUFACTURING OF RELIGIOUS NORMS 
IN THE PUBLIC SPHERES
ENRIQUE KLAUS
Norms, religious or otherwise, do not stand magi-
cally in the public sphere. We do not live with a 
cluster of norms above our heads that we could 
choose or pick according to our specific needs 
as from a reservoir.  In the everyday world that 
social scientists study, norms are relevant only in 
the contexts in which they are enunciated. In the 
public sphere, these contexts can include scan-
dals, debates, controversies, or what (more gener-
ally) we might call public or media events. In this 
respect, the manufacturing of religious norms 
does not preexist its own context of enunciation.
Two inferences follow. First, norms are not defined 
transcendently. Rather, they are constantly negoti-
ated and renegotiated in the unfolding of a public 
event. Second, the manufacturing of norms is con-
tingent upon the unfolding of public events such 
as scandals or controversies. Therefore, norms 
cannot be analyzed independently from the con-
text of their instantiation. Analyzing the prob-
lematic of normativity within the public sphere 
requires understanding the practical conditions of 
the production of norms, including media events 
like scandals or controversies. 
Because of this, I would like to introduce some 
aspects of what one could call a praxeological 
approach to media events, or an ethnomethod-
ological approach of scandals. I will address two 
main points. The first point is to expose some of 
the difficulties faced by the formal social sciences 
when tackling the question of scandals. The sec-
ond point is to describe an alternative mode of 
analysis that can explain how religious norms are 
increasingly present in the public sphere.
Towards these ends, I will discuss a few practi-
cal variables concerning the birth and consolida-
tion of a scandal, drawing on research that I led 
in Egypt concerning scandals in the political life 
under the rule of Hosni Mubarak. When conduct-
ing these studies, I didn’t know my research was 
taking place in what would be the last years of reign.
Let’s start with the main problems encountered by 
social scientists when they want to study scandals. 
There are at least three.
First, various works dedicated to scandals—such 
as that of John B. Thompson, the so-called scan-
dologists Andrei Markovits and Mark Silver-
stein, and Damian De Blic and Cyril Lemieux in 
France—ground their definition of “scandal” in 
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its Latin origin and etymology, skandalon, and 
in its Biblical meaning of “stumbling block” or 
“stumbling stone.” This definition is of no use, 
not only because I am interested in scandals in 
an Arabic speaking society where the population 
is predominantly Muslim, but because people 
don’t have in mind these references when they use 
the term scandal.  And even if there are Qur’an 
verses that refer to the word “ fadîha” or “scandals 
people don’t have the etymology of “scandal” in 
mind when they use this word in everyday life. 
Better than grounding the definition of scandal 
in etymology, we should acknowledge the sover-
eignty of ordinary people in the qualification of 
the situations in which they take part by relying 
upon spontaneous or endogenous definitions of 
scandals.  
A second difficulty with social science methodol-
ogy is that many works try to analyze the scan-
dal by considering its causes or its social, political, 
and electoral consequences. On this approach, the 
process of the scandal itself becomes what Harold 
Garfinkel would call “the missing what.” What is 
lacking from this approach is a consideration of 
the scandal as such, that is, as a practical accom-
plishment.  
A third difficulty is that the few works that focus 
on the scandal process impose to study its unfold-
ing structure prior to any analysis. Most of the 
time this structure draws upon a dramatic form 
consisting of four phases—the pre-scandal phase, 
the scandal itself, the culmination, and the afte-
math. This approach presents three problems for 
the analysis. First, it explains one phenomenon 
(the scandal) by another (a drama). Second, it 
reduces the unfolding of scandal to its causal con-
catenations, thus employing a teleological reason-
ing. Finally, this reductionism blurs the intelligi-
bility of the phenomenon to be analyzed, namely 
the scandal.
Each scandal has its own unfolding trajectory. To 
take an American example, compare Watergate 
to the Iran Contra scandal. Both had very differ-
ent unfolding trajectories. The trajectory of each 
scandal does not preexist the scandal, but rather 
emerges contingently in the midst of the sequen-
tial interactions which are constitutive of this type 
of media event. 
My research on scandals in Egypt seeks to avoid 
these analytic mistakes. I provide detailed analysis 
of the unfolding of three scandals that occurred in 
2005-2006. The first two cases can be categorized 
as sexual scandals, as they respectively dealt with 
the question of pedophilia and sexual harassment 
in Egypt. The third case addressed a question of 
the Islamic headscarf. I will only speak here about 
the latter case, but the conclusions that I reach 
are drawn from the empirical observations in all 
three cases. 
First, let me give you some of the context of the 
Egyptian headscarf scandal before raising a few 
points about its production. The headscarf scandal 
broke out in November 2006, after the publication 
of declarations allegedly made by then Minister of 
Culture Fârûq Husnî that deemed the headscarf 
a mark of backwardness in Egyptian society. The 
publication of this declaration created a nation-
wide argument, the apex of which was a discus-
sion in parliament. The scandal lasted for nearly a 
month before dying out. 
This scandal did not break out in a vacuum. 
It followed a month of intense debates about 
whether female students in Cairo University 
dorms should be allowed to wear the niqab or 
burqa, as well as other debates abroad that I 
will brief ly consider later. The declaration was 
published only four days before the reopening 
of the Egyptian Parliament following the 2005 
elections in which the Muslim Brotherhood 
won a historical record of 88 seats out of 454. 
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The media and the press were the only arenas of 
the public sphere where the debate on the topic 
could be held, at least during the first four days 
in the unfolding of the scandal. 
Despite what I have told you, the publication of 
Fârûq Husnî’s declarations was not actually the 
beginning of the scandal. Al-Misri al-Yawm, the 
newspaper that published these declarations, did 
not initially attribute major importance to these 
remarks, and there were no banner headlines.  The 
remarks were inserted in an inside page, at the very 
bottom. Their newsworthiness was upgraded only 
in the light of the reactions following their pub-
lication. The first article, then, is what we could 
call a “trigger narrative” for the scandal. Remem-
ber, as we can see in all the 3 cases, a scandal does 
not come out of the blue. It must be grounded 
in something public, something we could call a 
“master document.” The master document orients 
the participants in the scandal. 
Revisiting the issue of the starting point of the 
scandal, the very first reaction and denuncia-
tion came from the spokesperson of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the Egyptian Parliament, Hamdî 
Hasan. Formally, his reaction was the procedural 
demand of communication, bayyân ‘âjil, which 
leaked into the press and ignited further par-
liamentary discussion. This first reaction gave 
an institutional dimension to the scandal, thus 
boosting its constitution. Beyond that, what is 
interesting for us is that the initial reaction did 
not directly address the headscarf as a religious 
norm or its infringement. If it did so it was indi-
rectly through the disqualification of Fârûq Husnî 
through what Harold Garfinkel calls a “ceremony 
of degradation of status.”  It is striking to note that 
all the 3 cases that I have been studying begin with 
this ceremony of degradation defined as “a com-
municative work between individuals whereby 
the public identity of an actor is transformed into 
something else considered as inferior on the local 
scale of social types.” It is a work of qualification 
and disqualification relying upon a rhetoric of 
irony and biographical reexamination.  It would 
take too long to explicate the eight success con-
ditions of this kind of ceremony, as well as to 
explain how they are realized in Hamdî Hasan’s 
case. What is important to note is that Hasan’s let-
ter did not offer a positive defense of the headscarf 
as a religious norm, but rather invoked a personal 
disqualification of the denounced person.
This pattern is also realized in later parliamen-
tary discussions of the topic, which occurred 
after the scandal’s early unfolding in the media. 
The debate was very heated, but it is worth not-
ing that both Mubarak’s majority party and the 
opposition (both the religious opposition and the 
tiny secular opposition) condemned Fârûq Husnî 
for his declarations. In fact, the only cleavage con-
cerned whether Husnî’s declarations were merely 
a personal statement or reflected a more general 
tendency of the regime. The members of Parlia-
ment unanimously refused to discuss the question 
of the headscarf as such as they considered it as 
an intangible religious prescription. Rather, both 
MPs and journalists showed what Jean-Noël Fer-
rié calls “a negative solidarity” on the subject of the 
headscarf, that is, solidarity that results not from 
a convergence of views but rather from the diffi-
culty of showing public discord on a question, in 
this case the question of the headscarf. Eventually 
this institutional sequence did not mark the end of 
the polemic, as it lasted for nearly a month. It was 
after a long postponed reconciliation between the 
Minister of Culture and a group of MPs that the 
scandal came to an end and also, as it entered the 
public sphere, the scandal’s salience dissipated in 
light of other emerging topics in the news in Egypt 
and in the broader region.
In conclusion, I would like to make two points 
that interrelate with other contributions to this 
conference dealing with other contexts. First, as 
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mentioned before, this scandal did not occur in a 
vacuum; it was preceded by other debates in Egypt 
and abroad. Indeed, it broke out only two years 
after the promulgation of the French law on the 
headscarf banning the headscarf in public spaces 
and a month after Jack Straw’s declarations con-
cerning the niqab in Britain. In this respect there 
is a clear convergence of international debates con-
cerning religious norms. But the recasting of these 
debates in the Egyptian public sphere was slightly 
different from that of the secular context of France 
and the multicultural context of England. On the 
one hand, in Egypt, contrary to France, there was 
a political force in Parliament that was able to take 
a position in favor of the headscarf. On the other 
hand, national identity seemed to be at stake in all 
of these cases, as Professor Olivier Roy has said. 
In Egypt, the question was whether the headscarf 
was a part of national identity. In France, by con-
trast, the question was whether secularism was a 
part of national identity. 
Before ending, a quick word about the Egyptian 
public sphere after what Egyptians call “The 25th 
of January Revolution.” As Professor Roy has 
mentioned elsewhere, this revolution defies politi-
cal science paradigms for the region because it 
was non-religious in nature. However, in the after-
math of this revolution, a counter-revolution has 
threatened and still threatens the achievements 
of the revolution. This counter-revolution relies 
on two things, in Egypt at least. The first is sec-
tarian conflicts or tensions between Copts and 
Muslims. The second is a revisiting of old debates 
concerning religious norms, and specifically con-
cerning issues like the headscarf, whether it be on 
television, in the dorms, or during exams in the 
university. In some ways, this tends to prove what 
was difficult to document before the toppling 
of Mubarak’s rule: the regime exploited these 
debates about religious norms in order to factual-
ize or to put some flesh on the Islamic threat that 
has allowed this authoritarian regime to exist for 
30 years. To conclude on a positive note, but with-
out risking prospectively analyzing Egypt, let’s 
hope that the toppling of Mubarak’s rule will put 
an end to this kind of misuse of religious norms in 
the Egyptian public sphere. 
Charles Hirschkind, Commentary 
on Klaus
Whenever I hear discussions about religious 
norms in the public sphere in the context of Egypt, 
I think of Tocqueville’s observations about the 
United States in the 19th century. Tocqueville sug-
gested that there is a kind of Christian morality in 
the US that, without ever being directly invoked, 
effectively shapes debates within the public arena. 
In other words, insomuch as Christianity consti-
tutes the unspoken background shaping the moral 
framework of all participants, the public arena is 
left relatively free from the direct intervention of 
religious institutions in public life.
The question we might pose following Toc-
queville’s observation is the following: to what 
extent does a religious tradition shape the pro-
tocols of discourse, the styles of argument, the 
boundaries of what’s considered relevant and 
irrelevant, in any given context of political life? 
I know you [addressing Enrique Klaus] don’t 
address this question directly, but I want to take 
this opportunity to lay out a potentially different 
way to analyze the question of religious norms in 
the public sphere. The idea here would be to follow 
out a Habermasian take on the public sphere, as a 
space in which a kind of critical discourse unfolds, 
and to ask how religious sensibilities, attitudes, 
and traditions of moral and legal argumentation 
shape the discursive boundaries of that sphere, 
determining what is relevant and irrelevant, and 
which kinds of arguments carry weight and which 
ones don’t.
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I think you’re quite right in your observation that 
the Mubarak regime instrumentally both used 
and, to some extent, manufactured scandals as a 
means of furthering its own policies and limiting 
the political force of movements that challenged 
those policies. However, when you talk about reli-
gious norms entering the public sphere, are you 
suggesting that there’s a certain style of religios-
ity, or a set of religious norms, that acquire their 
social force via the mechanism of circulation and 
uptake specific to the public sphere? If so, then 
when talking about the institutions of public life, 
and particularly the media, you would be focus-
ing on the way in which those institutions mediate 
and determine to some extent what comes to be 
understood and lived as public—and specifically, 
religious—norms. I don’t know if it is the right way 
of analyzing those questions.
To take a hypothetical example from the United 
States, say that there’s a public debate about dis-
playing a crèche in public. Are we speaking about 
the force of religious norms in the public sphere, 
or is the argument about the appropriate space of 
religious symbols within a secular society? That is, 
the arguments themselves might not necessarily 
be religious or based on religious norms, but could 
instead be understood as informed by a commit-
ment to secularity, and a will to determine what 
are the proper boundaries authorized by our secu-
lar legal traditions. This mode of analysis would 
not concern the force of a religious norm in shap-
ing public debate, but rather the proper place of 
religion within a secular framework. 
Another thing you emphasized was the impor-
tance of scandal and controversy for the question 
of religious norms. Now when we speak about 
religious norms, we generally are thinking about 
practices that have a kind of social and institu-
tional depth, and that owe their normative force to 
the way they are inscribed in our habitual ways of 
acting and thinking. Their normative force is not 
produced by, or reducible to, the way such norms 
may be invoked in the context of media scandals. 
Rather, in some way, they provide a normative 
background against which such media debates 
and scandals acquire their social salience and 
mass audience. 
The recognition of this embeddedness of certain 
religious practices is necessary if we are going 
to interrogate the force of religious norms in the 
public sphere. Such norms are not simply prod-
ucts of, and transparent to, the discourse that 
explicitly invoke them. In short, we must address 
these norms, not simply as objects of debate, but 
as integral to the background of attitudes and dis-
positions structuring the limits and possibilities 
of public engagement. What is the pervasive force 
of religious norms as registered in the tone, style, 
and content of public and political life? 
Finally, let me address your comments about the 
revolution in Egypt. You call the revolution non-
religious. I would agree with you, but only part of 
the way, as I think we should also characterize it 
as non-secular as well. It was striking to me how 
little the secular/religious dichotomy played a role 
in shaping the forms of interaction and discourse 
that unfolded in Egypt in early 2011, as well as 
in the commentary on these events. Take, for 
example, the scenes of collective prayer that were 
so commonly viewed in Tahrir square. I heard 
very few people, whether in Egypt of abroad, com-
ment on these scenes as evidence of the imposing 
force of religious norms. In other instances, large 
assemblies of collective worshipers, particularly in 
explicitly political contexts, would have worried 
many people as an instance of the instrumental 
use of religion for political ends. Yet neither Egyp-
tians nor outsiders raised this worry in regard to 
these scenes in Tahrir Square. It seems that very 
few saw a dangerous contradiction in the inser-
tion of religious practices into the democratic 
political space of the Square. I’m sure a few people 
Religious Norms in the Public Sphere33
were worried, but it is curious how little comment 
was made on this issue. It struck me overall that 
the whole question about the dichotomy between 
secular and religious (as part of the political ratio-
nale modern states) seemed to be absent. The 
revolution was neither a religious nor a secular 
practice, but rather a movement irreducible to the 
frames offered by those two categories. Notably, in 
Egypt and throughout the world, those categories 
powerfully schematize political life: is that a secu-
lar or a religious argument? Is that party secular 
or religious? Is that a violation of the state’s com-
mitment to secularism?  All those questions have 
both shaped and limited Egyptian political life 
for many years, and indeed, now again, one finds 
them forcefully applied in assess¬ing Egypt’s 
contemporary political challenges. But in that 
moment, the question was largely absent (though, 
of course, I am sure there were exceptions). But 
I think it is worth thinking about how a kind of 
democratic exercise was being elaborated outside 
the rationale authorized by the binary division of 
secular/religious.
Olivier Roy, Commentary on Klaus
The scandals we are referring to were the subject 
of constant, polemical debates. In fact, when the 
political space was closed, debates over religious 
norms were possible in this so-called religious 
space, even though larger political debates were 
not possible. 
So scandals played a big role, in Egypt as well as 
elsewhere. But Egypt is a very interesting case. 
Actors were able to challenge the political order by 
pushing for religious norms that a religious state 
can’t ignore. For instance, people that were not 
involved in the court case made requests, in the 
name of hisba [verification], to nullify the mar-
riage of Nase Abu Zeyd because of its supposed 
apostasy. However, of course, pushing these reli-
gious norms had a tremendous political impact 
on the relationship between state and society and 
on the legitimacy of the state and the regime. The 
apostasy debate also played a big role by forcing 
the state to give up its monopoly on power and 
the maintenance of public order. It also forced the 
state to accept norms that were not defined by the 
state because they were religious norms and also 
because the main actors were individuals who 
were not part of the regime. This debate had a sig-
nificant destabilizing effect on the state.  
But what happens when the political space opens 
suddenly? What happens to the actors who pushed 
for the implementation of religious norms, regard-
less of context, when there is at least an open space 
of debate and freedom? 
Recently, we had a workshop in Florence with 
participants from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Egypt. Most of our interlocutors were part of the 
so-called liberal Islamists (for example, members 
of the Party of Development and Justice [PJD] 
in Morocco, the left of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt, and Ennahdah in Tunisia). While the 
contexts of these countries are very different, the 
participants said basically the same thing. Main-
stream, so-called Islamist parties are confronted 
by their own expectations of democracy (like free 
elections, the building of a political party, and 
the accepting of contestation) while not trying 
to impose an Islamic state or Sharia law. But the 
actors who were pushing for Islamic norms before 
are still there (let’s call them Salafis, although 
there is come controversy over the usage of this 
term). Salafis complained about the neglect of 
Islamic norms. For instance, in Egypt there were 
widespread demonstrations in the name of Islamic 
norms against the appointment of a Christian 
governor, even if it was not the first time that there 
was such an appointment. The Salafis were chal-
lenging the Muslim Brotherhood Ennahdah, and 
the PJD by saying that it was a clear case where 
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one could forget the religious norms in the name 
of democracy, citizenship, etc., but that it should 
not be the case. They claimed that democracy was 
important but Islamic norms should have pre-
cedence and a Christian governor should not be 
appointed.  So the Muslim Brotherhood had to 
answer in political (rather than theological) terms 
to this challenge and they maintained that it was 
not a problem to appoint a Christian governor. The 
same goes for Mohamed Ghannouchi in Tunisia, 
who is nevertheless trying to find an Islamic nar-
rative to explain why Ennahdha is a democratic 
party pushing for citizenship. 
But there is this permanent overbidding of the 
Salafis, which obliged the mainstream Islamic 
parties to explain their commitment to democracy 
and a different set of norms. Of course, the main-
stream Islamic parties argue for keeping Article 
2 of the Egyptian Constitution, which maintains 
that Islam is the religion of the state. But they are 
pushed to accept the autonomy of democratic 
norms and the rules of the game. But even the 
Salafis have begun to push for Islamic norms in 
a public space that is far more open  and this is 
problematic. For instance, when Salafis attacked 
Sufi graves in Egypt, they faced not just the disap-
probation of the religious community, but also of 
the entire population who thought it was not the 
time for such attacks or attacks against Christian 
churches. This strategy was from the past and it 
was running against the movement. 
So it is a challenge for the Salafis to reconcile their 
will to stick to religious norms, as the norms to 
apply in the public sphere, with the existence of 
an open, democratic space. My impression is that 
they are very embarrassed. They are no longer 
confronted with the police and the regime but 
with people who seek to engage them in discus-
sion. And they are not familiar with that.
The same thing goes for the Catholic or the Ortho-
dox Church in the Middle East, by the way. Until 
recently, the clergy succeeded in representing the 
entire local community and was quite happy to 
have religious affiliations expressed in terms of 
identity and belonging. But this authority of the 
clergy is also challenged by some young Chris-
tians who emphasize the role of citizenship and 
democracy. This challenge has consequences for 
the issue of religious freedom. If citizenship takes 
the predominance then everybody can change his 
or her religion: it is not an issue for a Copt to con-
vert to Islam or for a Muslim to convert to Christi-
anity. But it is a problem for the Church of course 
by definition to acknowledge individual freedom 
of religion.
So we see an interesting process of change in 
the nature of the debate about religious norms 
when the political space is open. Here, as Charles 
Hirschkind said, it’s not an issue of secularization 
versus religion. Rather, it is a change in religious 
attitudes, such as praying in public, that changes 
of meaning.  
If we compare the recent events in Egypt with 
the Islamic revolution of Iran, we find differences 
between the exhibition of religious practices in 
the public sphere. To pray in the street in Iran was 
clearly a sign of political protest, but not in Tahrir 
where it was a sort of banalization of religion. It 
is not a process of secularization but a process of 
normalization of religious freedom and practices. 
Of course it’s too soon for definitive theorizing, 
but these events at least provide new input for our 
discussion of religious norms in the public sphere.
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III. SECULARISM IN ARAB COUNTRIES
BELKACEM BENZENINE
I plan to analyze secularism in Arab countries by 
examining what is at stake in their political and 
religious spheres. The interests of Ulemas, reform-
ists and liberal thinkers, as well as Arab intellec-
tuals and politicians in the question of secular-
ism demonstrates the importance of the relation 
between politics and religion in the life of Arab 
societies today.
The state-religion relationship is so connected in 
Arab countries that Islam has been imposed as the 
official state religion through national constitu-
tions, except for Lebanon. According to Hamadi 
Redissi, such arrangements are superfluous, but 
let us stick to the politico-religious spirit that 
characterizes these constitutions. Is this a simple 
compromise, a reflection of the fact that Islam is 
the majority religion of Arab societies? Or is this 
the desire of Arab states to politicize religion in 
the face of rising Islamism? 
The social and political realities show this ever-
growing opposition between Islamization and the 
depoliticization (i.e. outside the domain of poli-
tics ) of religion. The social shifts, power conflicts, 
Islamist dogmatism, and influence of religious 
institutions only reflect the dominating role that 
religion plays in the political and social spheres. 
It was Ali Aberraziq who, in the 1920s, expressed 
the need to adapt religious laws to social, eco-
nomic, and political developments. He believed it 
was almost self-evident that the veiling of women 
supports their inclusion in the working world and 
that the separation between spiritual and tem-
poral power, the practice of usury (ribā), and the 
restriction of divorce and polygamy had become 
socially accepted without needing to be a part of 
legislation. 
However, the impact of Islamism on societies 
and on the political-religious orientation in Arab 
countries was such that depoliticization was on 
their agenda as a compromise to reconcile diver-
gent positions. There are concrete examples of this 
form of compromise on two levels, government 
and intellectual elite. 
The compromise between religion and state, as 
noted by Burhan Ghalioun, was an important 
characteristic of post-colonial Arab countries and 
a consequence of the development of the mod-
ern state.  But his predictions were not realized. 
To the contrary, we can see today that the open-
ing of political power is associated with a greater 
intransigence and radicalization of Islamism. This 
is reflected in the cases of Egypt and Algeria in 
1980 and 1990, respectively, where fundamental-
ism profited from the opening of the political ter-
rain and the tolerance of religious parties. 
The failure of the ideologies and economic policies 
of Arab nations, their defeat by Israel in 1967, and 
the success of the “Islamic” Revolution in Iran in 
1979 have enhanced the legitimacy of the Islamic 
platform. Within the Islamic discourse itself, the 
Islamic Revolution was part of a mobilization 
for social change. It has also been a useful model 
for realizing the Islamic state and ending secular 
regimes. Thus, religion has become (to borrow 
Michel Foucault’s insight about the Iranian revo-
lution) “the force behind the political battle.” 
The implication of Islamists in the recent and 
ongoing revolts and social movements in Arab 
countries shows this willingness to resurrect the 
project of Islamic style. In the wake of the fall of 
the Egyptian and Tunisian governments, the call 
for a civil (rather than religious) state by many 
political formations and large parts of civil society 
shows that the relation between state and religion 
persists as a major source of tension.
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The state policy that aims to control religion 
through both its politicization and depoliticiza-
tion has not succeeded in separating itself from 
religious institutions. The crisis of Arab regimes 
has only contributed to the creation of, according 
to Brandon Turner, a “socio-political background 
for the re-politicization of Islam.”37 
One has to recognize that re-Islamization is 
occurring throughout the media, fatwa, books, 
schools, and universities. Its objective is militant 
Islam, which is claimed to reflect the “need for real 
visibility of Islamic values at all the levels of social 
and political life.”38 Olivier Roy speaks of a con-
servative re-Islamization, led by religious person-
nel, that touches all Arab and Muslim countries. 
This movement is politically loyal, but religiously 
conservative. According to Roy, the biggest prob-
lem that re-Islamization poses is “shariatization 
from the point of view of a modern state.” If, for 
Roy, re-Islamization expresses itself on an exis-
tential level, Bruno Étienne sees it as a “political 
awakening occurring throughout a policy of Islam 
rather than a religious renewal.”39 
From another angle, Ghassan Salamé claims that 
Arab regimes sought to associate with the secu-
lar elite only after the rise of Islamism as part of a 
strategy dealing with this phenomenon. 
For certain secular thinkers, secularism is really 
at the heart of the battle between depoliticization 
and re-Islamization. The politicization of religion 
is a historical fact in response to social and politi-
cal conflicts where the authority of the Qur’an 
replaces the authority of reason. The rejection of 
secularism is a form of the politicization of reli-
37  Islam Critical Concepts in Sociology, London, Routledge, 
2003, p. 132.
38  Ali Mérad, L’Islam contemporain, Paris, P.U.F., 8ème 
édition, 2007, p. 103.
39  Islam, les Questions qui fâchent, Paris, Bayard, 2003, p. 
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gion by religious institutions who, in the name 
of the Qur’an, seek to impose their authority and 
censure freedom of thought. 
For Nasr Abu Zayd, the Qur’an represents to Mus-
lims neither an Islamization of life nor a separa-
tion of life and religion.40  Separating religion from 
the state is essential for protecting the integrity of 
religion. However, this does not mean relegating 
religion to the backseat in society. The Qur’an’s 
text gives no political theory and espouses no 
political principles. 
Hasan Hanafi writes:
I firmly believe that separation of state 
and religion is essential for protecting 
religion from political manipulation 
when the state identifies itself with a 
certain religion. When the state identi-
fies itself with a certain religion, folks 
who belong to another religious tra-
dition inevitably are discriminated 
against….A secular state—one that 
gives no official sanction to any partic-
ular religion—gives religion the space it 
needs to meet the needs of the people. 
Otherwise, religion easily becomes a 
weapon in the hands of those in pow-
er.41 
The relationship between religion and the birth of 
the Islamic caliphate in contemporary Arab think-
ing poses a real question for the future of secu-
larism. Even if, for certain Islamist theorists and 
specialists on Islam, secularism can be enacted, 
the conception of secularism here is ambigu-
ous. The criticisms of secularism today lead to a 
compromise with the ideology that is imposed by 
Islamists. In the actual social and political con-
40  Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Voice of an Exile: Reflections on 
Islam, Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 2004, p. 183. 
41  Hasan Hanafi, Dirasat falsafiyya, Le Caire, Librairie 
anglo-égyptienne, 1988.
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ditions characterized by authoritarianism and 
instability, it is not the separation of politics and 
religion that seems privileged but the reconcilia-
tion of the two. “Is reconciliation between secu-
larists and Islam possible, or even inevitable to 
avoid the slide towards violence?”  In response to 
these questions, the Egyptian philosopher Hassan 
Hanafi proposes, under the guise of the “Islamic 
left,” the need to find a middle ground between 
Islamism and secularism. The “Islamic left,” born 
in Egypt in 1980 to protest against the liberalism 
of President Sadat, supports the project of a ratio-
nal, authentic, and conscientious society to serve 
as an alternative to both Islamic fundamentalism 
and secularism based on the occidental model. 
According to Hanafi, contemporary Arab societ-
ies are divided into two movements, salafiyya and 
secularism. The former movement claims to be a 
part of Islam’s cultural patrimony, the latter to be 
of Western origin. Hanafi contends that the secu-
lar solution, which is an occidental doctrine, can-
not succeed in Arab societies. 
The positions of the Islamic left on secularism 
mostly restate (albeit in new language) the basic 
difficulty of reconciling the religious sensibili-
ties of Islam’s cultural heritage with modernity 
(as well as the colonial and occidental heritage). 
This social project aims to rediscover the religious 
and rationalize it, to render credible politics and 
rethink it in humanist terms in order to make it 
acceptable to both the masses and religious insti-
tutions in Arab societies. 
In short, the Islamic left proposes an alternative 
path to reconciliation, one grounded in Islam’s 
heritage. Yet this alternative remains very abstract 
and has internal difficulties. When praising Said 
Qutb and Khomeini in order to attract attention 
to the importance of social justice in Islam, the 
idea of secularism loses all its value and all its sig-
nificance. 
The secular militants face a particularly difficult 
situation: the malaise of secularism. The persis-
tence of this malaise is a testament to the politi-
cal commitment of the secularist to a principle of 
conformity, i.e. to applying an occidental model 
that does not mesh easily with the traditions of 
Muslim society. 
Fouad Zakarya remarks that, because of its 
decline in the 1970s and 80s, secularism is mis-
interpreted by both the public and intellectuals. 
Despite this criticism, the ideal of secularism con-
tinues to inspire certain political and intellectual 
Arab elites. In the Arab political context, secular 
militancy arises as a by-product of efforts to intro-
duce secularism into the state.
Let’s look at the manifesto for secular republican-
ism in Lebanon, an interesting example because 
the manifesto declared a desire to mobilize intel-
lectuals to defend secularism in a country where 
politicians and religious persons were attached to 
the principle of confessionalism.
In 1984, while a civil and confessional war was 
raging, a group of lawyers, writers, students, 
and independent political personalities drafted 
a manifesto called “The Permanent Congress of 
Secular Lebanese.”  It was the first of its kind in 
Arab countries. It advanced a precise and global 
project for secularity. Concerning the integration 
of secularization, the manifesto adopted the posi-
tion that “Secularism (laïcité) is a global vision of 
the world.” After distinguishing several forms of 
secularism, the manifesto opted for one founded 
on neutrality and respect for all religions and for 
all political tendencies. From this commitment, 
the manifesto proposed a secular solution to con-
fessionalism, a position accepted by the major-
ity of the intellectual and political elites. Though 
the Lebanese intellectuals behind the manifesto 
adopted a global conception of secularism, they 
suggested adopting a model taking into account 
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the political, sociological, and religious specifics 
of Lebanon. The manifesto claimed that secular-
ism must be applied progressively in stages. The 
first stage required bringing about the end of con-
fessionalism, not only in texts but also in psyches.
In Egypt, where secularism has been a cultural 
and political demand of liberal thinkers for a cen-
tury, religious and political tensions call today 
more than ever for a rethinking of the relationship 
between the political and the religious. “The Con-
gress of the Institution of Secularism in Egypt,” 
reunited in 2006, seeks not to relaunch a debate 
on secularism but rather to demand it as a fun-
damental element of democracy under the slo-
gan “no democracy without secularism.” As was 
the case in the Lebanon initiative, the Egyptian 
Congress brought together a group of intellectual, 
political, and religious leaders to lay down the 
foundation of secularism. Secularism, according 
to the manifesto, must be under the same level as 
the state project. 
This idea is very interesting. It suggests that, as 
Leila Babès writes, “Secularism is first a matter 
of state. Second, it is a contract that concerns the 
entirety of the community. It is not an alternative, 
an option, or a personal opinion.”42
Since secularism concerns the community, par-
ticipants insist on the importance of associating 
civil society with this process. The institution of 
secularism begins, according to secular Egyp-
tians, by suppressing all indication of religion in 
administrative documents, outlawing religious 
instruction in public schools, and (most impor-
tantly) eliminating Article 2 of the Constitution 
that establishes Islam as the state’s religion. Such 
procedures are seen as required to ensure neutral-
ity of the state and the quality of citizens. 
42  “La laïcité est une affaire d’État,” leilababes.canal-
blog.com. 
Drawing from the writings of Farag Fouda, the 
participants of the Congress of the Institution for 
Secularism in Egypt articulate several principles 
of secularism: first, the right of citizenship as the 
principal element for national identity; second, the 
Constitution as the pillar of power that guarantees 
the equality of all citizens and unrestricted free-
dom of belief; third, the public interest as a pillar 
of legislation; and fourth, a system of civil govern-
ment which, by its constitutional legitimacy, guar-
antees the respect of laws and human rights. 
The Congress also recognizes the American 
model, which guarantees the separation of powers 
and the autonomy of the religious sphere, as valid 
for the social and cultural realities of Egypt.
Finally, let’s consider secular political parties in 
Arabic countries. Secularism is not limited to 
political and intellectual movements. Inevitably, 
political parties include in their vision of society 
the relation between the political and the religious. 
The Wafd party, created in Egypt in 1919 during 
the struggle for independence, was one of the first 
Arab parties to call for the separation of poli-
tics and religion. Given the rise of Islamism and 
the political climate of the contemporary Arab 
world, most parties have removed this idea from 
their program. Today, Wafd adopts a vision that 
approves of the status quo implemented by the 
political regime—in other words, Islam as the offi-
cial religion of the state. Because of this, the Wafd 
contend, religious values are essential for develop-
ing necessary social virtues. 
Many contemporary secular parties have dif-
ficulty in clearly defining their identities. These 
parties are not militantly secular, à la Mustapha 
Kemal Ataturk, or ideologically committed to a 
French-style laïcité. They simply do not embrace a 
political platform inspired by religious ideals. This 
is why we should refer to them as secular rather 
than secularist. 
Religious Norms in the Public Sphere39
Caught between an authoritarian power that only 
allows for a very narrow margin of action and the 
radical Islamism for which secularism is synony-
mous with irreligion, secular parties generally 
lack a social basis or means for action. Neverthe-
less, secularism continues to claim certain politi-
cal and intellectual elites who continue to advo-
cate for a society based on the principle of sepa-
rating politics from religion. This is the position, 
for example, of Saïd Sadi in Algeria. Sadi explicitly 
defends secularism in the program of his politi-
cal party. According to Sadi, the population of the 
Maghreb is able to freely practice its religion. For 
him, secularism is not a problem for society but 
for the political world.
Sadi’s variety of secularism is not inspired by 
the French model but rather by the social reali-
ties of Algerian society and the founding text of 
the Algerian state. Among these social realities is 
that Algerians have separated the practice of reli-
gion from civil and/or political responsibility. The 
problem of secularism remains political because 
it depends on the will of political powers. This is 
why, for Sadi, secularism is central to the project of 
a modern society. 
For the Islamist parties, and even for certain cur-
rents of Algerian conservatism, secularism is evi-
dence of a political and cultural plot. This view 
is indicated by the vocabulary they use, includ-
ing terms like “The Party of France,” the “secu-
lar-assimilationist,” and “secular communists.” 
Islamist parties both distrust and reject the idea 
of secularism because they consider it a product of 
Western culture and therefore incompatible with 
Islam. For this reason, they also reject any form 
of social and political modernity that they see as 
destructive of cultural and religious values. 
Only certain parties on the left, Marxists in par-
ticular, defend secularism with pugnacity and 
consistency. Those parties, to which several intel-
lectuals belong, are not so much parties of believ-
ers but rather “mass parties,” to use the typology 
of Maurice Duverger. Their project is seen as con-
flicting with the politics of current governments 
as well as with the Islamist ideology. Unlike the 
Ba’athist parties in Iraq and Syria, which came 
to power through violence, the Marxist parties 
aspire to a radical social change through a popular 
movement of liberation. For the communist par-
ties in Lebanon and Egypt, in particular, secular-
ism can only be achieved in the context of a larger 
egalitarian project—in other words, a global cri-
tique of the social order. The struggle is not easy 
for the Marxist parties and other secular parties. 
They have to fight on three fronts: Islamists, the 
current political powers, and public opinion. For 
Farag Foda, who was killed in 1992 for his secu-
lar ideas, the influence of Islamist governments in 
the Arab world (and Egypt in particular) led to the 
weakening of the secular parties (which are very 
far from the masses) as well as to the ostracism of 
liberal and secular thinkers who raise questions 
about issues like the veil or Sharia. 
Does secularism have a future?  Even if it has an 
impact on religious and cultural aspects, the lib-
eral movement has quickly lost its momentum. 
The rise of Islamism since the 1920s does not show 
the failure of secularism, but rather its decline. 
This pattern does not mean that secularism has 
lost its power so much as its grip on Arab thought. 
The secular activism that drove political parties, 
civil society, and intellectuals is remarkable and 
important for its challenge to radical Islamism. 
What we consider a secular solution is, in reality, 
a reconsideration of certain social and political 
problems about the relation between politics and 
religion. What is at stake is the future of a particu-
lar project: that of a tolerant and pluralistic soci-
ety, a neutral and modern state.
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SESSION III
THE CASE OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
DEBATING THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS 
SYMBOLS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN 
POLAND, 1989-2010
GENEVIÈVE ZUBRZYCKI
In an essay on the Mojave Cross published on the 
website The Immanent Frame,43 Winni Sullivan 
pondered why crosses present such difficulty for 
the modern secular nation-state. Sullivan ques-
tioned the degree to which religious myths and 
symbols have been supplanted by those of nation-
alism. “Has secularization failed?” she asked. Sul-
livan posited that religious symbols’ ability to con-
nect the universal and the particular is at the root 
of their success. Yet the ambiguity of the Mojave 
Cross and the commentaries made by various 
judges evaluating the case pointed to the layered 
religious and secular meanings of the symbol of 
that site, and in U.S. society more generally. Per-
haps a more expansive definition of civil religion 
can trace how the same symbol moves across reli-
gious and secular contexts, depending how it is 
deployed. 
In Poland, for example, the cross is and is not reli-
gious, although it is always—or almost always—
sacred. This ability to pivot in different directions 
may help to account for the cross’s social force. 
Like the U.S., Poland is a religious society. About 
96% of the adult population declares belief in 
God, and 70% attend religious services at least 
43 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Cross: More Than 
Religion?, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2010/05/05/
more-than-religion/
once a month.44 Unlike the United States, how-
ever, Poland is ethnically and denominationally 
homogeneous. It is 96% ethnically Polish and 95% 
Catholic, at least nominally.45 This lack of reli-
gious pluralism has not diminished debate about 
the place of religion in the public sphere. Indeed, 
this issue has been hotly debated since the fall of 
communism and the construction of a legitimate 
national state. A new context has therefore forced 
the reexamination of things that had been taken 
for granted under communism. Poland and other 
former communist countries in Eastern European 
offer an interesting vantage point from which 
to think through the changing meaning, social 
power, and political valance of religious symbols 
and practices. These cases might even illuminate 
the on-going revolutions in the Middle East.
Some of the debates that have punctuated the 
post-communist period include: Should Poland be 
united under the “sign of the cross” (as many on 
the right have argued)? Should the state embrace 
confessional neutrality? Should there be an invo-
catio Dei in the 1997 Constitution? Should crosses 
be present in classrooms, state institutions, or 
broadly conceived public spaces? The answers to 
these questions were quite obvious under com-
munism: “no” from the party state; and “yes” by 
everyone else, including believers, non-believers, 
and many Jews because the cross, in the commu-
nist context, introduced a different perspective 
than the one propagated by the regime. Its pres-
ence, in the public sphere, de facto created plural-
ism.  With the fall of communism, the signification 
of the cross and religion shifted and their presence 
in the public sphere needed to be re-examined. 
44 Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej. 2011. O 
religijnym i społecznym zaangażowaniu Polaków w 
lokalnych parafiach. Warsaw : CBOS.
45 Główny Urząd Statystyczny. 2012. Raport z wy-
ników.  Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i 
Mieszkań. Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.
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These questions became especially salient in the 
debate surrounding the controversial erection 
of hundreds of crosses just outside Auschwitz 
in 1998 and 1999. Ultra-nationalist Poles chose 
the cross to mark Auschwitz as a place of Polish 
martyrdom, as opposed to the place of the Jewish 
Shoah. This effort was part of a broader strategy 
to articulate an explicitly Catholic vision of Polish-
ness, a vision that had slowly but surely been erod-
ing since 1989. 
In my book46 I develop and analyze both axes of 
this “war of the crosses.” Today, I am discussing 
the second axis of the conflict, that concerning the 
place of the cross as a symbol of Polish national 
identity.
The erection of the crosses garnered significant 
support from the four corners of Poland and 
beyond, but it ultimately backfired since most Poles 
no longer saw the cross as a sign of freedom and 
dissent from an atheist party state and a totalitar-
ian regime. For liberal intellectuals from the left 
and center, the cross now stood for the rejection of 
the principles of the Rechtsstaat, where particular 
allegiances are relegated to the private sphere. For 
liberal Catholics, the cross had become a sign of 
intolerance towards others, used as a provocation 
contrary to the Christian meaning of the symbol. 
For many members of the clergy and episcopate, 
the crosses at Auschwitz were a shameful expres-
sion of Polish nationalism and anti-Semitism. It 
took several weeks for the Catholic Church and its 
hierarchy to try to contain the situation. At first 
it stood on the sidelines, arguing that it did not 
have the monopoly over the symbol of the cross 
since it belongs to the entire community of Chris-
tians. Once the schismatic Brotherhood of St. Pius 
X took over the site and started celebrating masses 
claiming to represent the true “face” of Catholi-
46  The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion 
in Post-Communist Poland (U. of Chicago Press, 
2006). 
cism and to defend the true face of Polishness, the 
episcopate finally intervened on two fronts.
First, it issued a pastoral letter forbidding Catho-
lics to erect more crosses at Auschwitz, asking 
those who had brought them to retrieve them. 
Second, it attempted to restrict the semantic orbit 
of the cross by emphatically promoting a “correct 
theology of the cross” in various venues. Although 
some Catholics continued to bring crosses to the 
site throughout the fall and winter despite these 
explicit demands, the war of the crosses was basi-
cally ended once the church took a firm stand. But 
it took about three months for the church to inter-
vene. 
That very summer, however, the Łodz court ren-
dered judgment in a related civil case that had 
been filed a year before. A self-proclaimed atheist 
had sued the city for displaying a cross at a city 
hall, arguing that it infringed on his well-being. 
The claim was based on Article 25 of Law 2 of the 
1997 Constitution of the Polish Republic, which 
concerns the religious and philosophical neutral-
ity of public organs. Yet the suit was rejected by 
the regional court as it ruled that the cross, as a 
traditional symbol in Polish culture, had been 
objectified to the extent that it did not constitute a 
threat to anyone. The Court of Appeals upheld the 
regional court’s decision, arguing that in the Pol-
ish patriotic tradition the cross expresses a specific 
set of moral and historical values:  
Personal well-being cannot be under-
stood […] without reference to the tra-
dition, culture and historical experi-
ences of the collectivity in which physi-
cal persons live and function.  In addi-
tion to its religious meaning […], the 
symbol of the cross has been inscribed 
in the experiences and the social con-
sciousness of the Polish Nation—as a 
symbol of death, pain, sacrifice, and 
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as a way of honoring all those who 
fought for freedom and independence 
in the struggle for national liberation 
during the Partitions and during the 
war against invaders.  The symbol of 
the cross has for centuries designated 
the graves of ancestors and the places 
of national memory.  In non-religious 
collective behavior, [the] meaning of 
the cross as an expression of respect 
for, and unity with, the liberators of 
the Fatherland even has precedence 
[my emphasis] because other universal 
means to express respect have not been 
developed. […]47  
Moreover, according to the court, the cross was 
expressly related to secular state institutions. 
In addition to its religious meaning, 
the symbol of the cross in Polish soci-
ety expresses moral order on which the 
idea of the state and society is based. 
Throughout history the cross has been 
in the Polish tradition linked with the 
legislative and judiciary powers. This 
fact does not in itself prevent dialogue 
among people representing different 
worldviews.48  
The religious semantics were overshadowed in 
both courts’ decisions by the secular and civic 
connotations of the cross. However, its secularity 
made it no less sacred.
Does this case suggest a diminution of the public 
centrality of religion, with the cross deemed tol-
erable because it had been sufficiently secularized 
(and thus not evocative of religious sentiments)? 
Or did it present a hypertrophy of religion with the 
cross becoming so omnivorous and all-encom-
passing as to devour the Rechtsstaat entirely? 
47  Orzecznictwo sądów polskich, 1999:488.
48  Id. 
Perhaps the cross’s religious meaning—however 
occluded as “merely” cultural—is the champion 
left standing, not only as Auschwitz, but also over 
the nation as a whole? 
Twelve years later, in the summer of 2010, Warsaw 
became the site of yet another war of the cross. 
Self-proclaimed “Defenders of the Cross” pre-
vented the relocation of the wooden cross stand-
ing in front of the presidential place. The cross, 
erected at the site in the days following the tragic 
death of President Kaczyński in an April 2010 
plane crash, was supposed to be moved from the 
presidential palace square via religious proces-
sion to a nearby church. “Defenders of the Cross,” 
however, aggressively prevented the church-led 
ceremonial relocation, which they understood as 
a profanation of the symbol and of the nation. 
For several weeks, the site of this new “war of the 
cross” became the playground for proponents of 
the cross and also the stage for protest against the 
religio-nationalist and anti-Semitic Poland that 
the cross has come to signify since the fall of com-
munism—a signification that was acquired partly 
trough previous controversies such as the war of 
the crosses at Auschwitz.
In addition to serious endeavors (like petitions 
against the presence of the cross at that specific 
site and for a stricter separation of religious and 
political spheres in Poland), parody and mockery 
of the “Defenders of the Cross” was quite effective. 
People took to the streets to show the absurdity 
of the “crusade.” “They wanted the circus? We’ll 
give them a circus!” announced a Facebook group 
coordinating a counter protest. Within hours 
more than 7,000 Facebook users confirmed their 
participation in the happening. Radio Maryja, a 
right-wing conservative radio station that many 
consider a sectarian movement, countered the ini-
tiative by appealing to its listeners, especially its 
male listeners, to counter-demonstrate against the 
counter-demonstrators. The streets of the city were 
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flooded with people, some praying and protesting, 
others picnicking and partying. The Facebook ini-
tiative had specifically asked people to show up in 
front of the cross without any religious or national 
symbols (you could see posters with Hello Kitty, 
clowns and slogans such as “we are Polish too!”). 
For them, the debate about that cross was not only 
about the place of religious symbols in the public 
sphere but also about the meaning of the symbol 
and the right of secular people to also claim to be 
Polish. 
It took several weeks for the authorities to finally 
relocate that cross. Barricades had to be installed to 
prevent the “Defenders of the Cross” from monop-
olizing the site and inviting chaotic responses. 
Once order was restored, the cross finally found 
its permanent home in a local church nearby. Its 
meaning, however, had been altered. As a result 
of these two “wars of the cross,” the cross is no 
longer a symbol of the unity of civil society, or of 
the union between Polishness and Catholicism. 
Rather, it highlights deep tensions in Polish soci-
ety about the meaning and place of Catholicism. 
The cross still stands, but as a symbol of conflict. 
What broader lessons can we learn from the Polish 
case and from these two specific events? I opened 
by mentioning Winni Sullivan’s question about 
whether the failure of national symbols to replace 
religious ones suggested the failure of civil reli-
gion and secularization. “Civil religion,” follow-
ing the Durkheimian tradition, refers to the social 
sacralization of a given group’s symbols. Accord-
ing to this view, civic or state symbols like the flag 
acquire religious significance and are worshipped 
by citizens as totems. The Polish case points to 
a different and somewhat overlooked process. 
Because of Poland’s specific or peculiar political 
history, it was not political ideals, institutions, 
and symbols that were sacralized and became 
the objects of religious-like devotion (like in the 
paradigmatic French Revolution model). Rather, 
religious symbols were first secularized and then 
resacralized as national symbols. The cross in 
Poland is an example of what I call sacred secu-
lar symbols. It is sacred not only because of (or in 
spite of) its Christian semantics, but because since 
the 19th century it has traditionally represented 
Poland. In the place of religion yielding to nation-
alism or nationalism becoming a religion, here 
religion becomes nationalism.49  
In cases where national identity is experienced 
and expressed through religious channels, the 
estimation of religious decline or ascent in rela-
tion to nationalism is a quixotic mission. When 
the religious is secularized and then resacral-
ized in national form, the relationship between 
national symbols and religious symbols is partic-
ularly difficult to tease apart for social scientists, 
not to mention judges. This ambiguity, this ability 
to pivot into different directions, may be the source 
of civil religious power for the cross in Poland and 
for analogous symbols elsewhere.
The national sacralization of religious symbols, 
however, is meaningful and garners consensual 
support only in specific contexts (as we discussed 
in the case of Egypt for example). It has been 
fiercely contested even in overwhelmingly Catho-
lic Poland since the fall of communism and the 
building of an independent state. Such symbols 
could certainly be “secularized” again. Such a pro-
cess would involve returning to a more distinctly 
religious or theologically orthodox interpretation 
of Catholicism in Poland. The de-politicalization 
of religion has indeed been the objective of many 
Catholic groups in the past two decades. The 
agenda they propose is to restore the “truly” sacred 
status of what has become in their view merely a 
national religion. After Catholicism’s long public 
career, many Polish Catholics now lobby for its 
privatization.
49  I elaborate this point further in the conclusion of 
The Crosses of Auschwitz (2006) 
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II. “RETURN? IT NEVER LEFT.” 
EXPLORING THE “SACRED” AS A 
RESOURCE FOR BRIDGING THE GAP 
BETWEEN THE RELIGIOUS 
AND THE SECULAR
MATTHEW FRANCIS
This paper is co-authored work with Professor Kim 
Knott, University of Lancaster. 
Here is an outline of what I’m going to talk about. 
First, I will critique the secularization thesis, 
which is the dominant paradigm for explaining 
religious secular relations. I will provide a critical 
discussion of assumptions underlying this thesis 
and the contemporary discussion of religion in 
the public sphere. 
Second, I will explore how the sacred as a concept 
can signal deeply held values on both sides of the 
religious/secular distinction. I will also provide a 
resource for locating the sacred within religious/
secular ideologies. Here, I describe a matrix of 
markers that can be used to identity and capture 
data relating to these deeply held values.
Third, I will provide some example of how the 
sacred within contemporary debates can be 
mapped out. I will concentrate on the Rushdie 
affair as an example of the persistence of references 
to the sacred in religious and secular discourse, 
one that also throws into sharp relief the religious 
and secular struggles within British society. Rec-
ognizing the sacred as both secular and religious, 
we argue, opens up constructive potential to seri-
ous democratic debate between differing ideologi-
cal camps. I conclude by offering some examples 
of the value of this approach for policy makers and 
analysts.
The withdrawal of religion from the public sphere 
has been understood to mark a decline in the 
influence of religious values and institutions on 
society. Whether this decline is a result of the 
waning of religious belief, or the retreat of beliefs 
from the public sphere to the private world of 
individuals, has been contested. However, despite 
varying positions on the continuing resilience of 
some forms of religious beliefs, the arguments are 
generally framed in relation to the secularization 
thesis. Outside the academy, the secularization 
thesis has been accepted by popular European 
discourses in government, in the media, and also 
to a lesser extent in the United States. Assumption 
about the dominance of secular ideals is so popu-
lar that the return of the sacred in domestic and 
international arenas typically elicits surprise, even 
among academics as shown in this workshop’s call 
for papers. 
Institutions, values, ideas, places, and people are 
assumed to fall into either one or another cate-
gory—church or state, faith or reason, belief or sci-
ence. Whether in the American constitution, the 
French educational system, or the British National 
Health Service, this separation leads to the mar-
ginalization of religion in the public sphere. Like-
wise, transgressions that threaten these boundar-
ies are seen as impositions that should be forbid-
den: e.g. the opposition to public displays of reli-
giosity in the clothing of nurses in the National 
Health Service in Britain and to school pupils in 
France.
Within these debates lies an idea of what consti-
tutes religious and secular forms. However, we 
argue that the idea of religion as a reified concept 
can be seen to have its place within the develop-
ment of European Christianity, such as in the 
distinction between religious and secular voca-
tion. As such, the religious/secular binary is a 
relatively recent and clearly Western construction. 
According to this binary, religion is comprised of 
religious institutions along with their traditions, 
beliefs, practices, and adherents. The domain of 
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the secular includes everything that falls outside 
of this definition. 
We argue that these categories should not neces-
sarily be seen as dichotomous. Furthermore, we 
argue that the boundary separating these cat-
egories has rarely been impermeable in practice, 
instead being revised through struggles and move-
ments. For example, Tony Blair, the former British 
Prime Minster, rarely discussed religion despite 
the established status of the Anglican Church in 
the U.K. and despite his own faith. Conversely, 
George W. Bush, the head of a government with 
strict separation from any particular religious 
institution, frequently invoked God in matters of 
state. Rather, we argue that religion and secular-
ism should be located as separate camps within a 
single epistemological field.
By drawing on the concept of the sacred, we aim 
to problematize the discursive distinction between 
these two camps and thus to trouble the notion of 
a “return to the sacred” in contemporary moder-
nity. Instead, we argue that the sacred never left 
modernity, and that a proper exploration of this 
concept provides an explanation of its appar-
ent return and, indeed, a clearer understanding 
of the relationship between religious and secular 
thought.
In the case of the Satanic Verses controversy, the 
debate between the opposing camps was depicted 
as a struggle, with each side vying to assert the 
undeniable truth of its position and the uncom-
promising nature of its opponents. Interestingly, 
both invoked the language of the sacred and of 
non-negotiable values. Such language and val-
ues were not confined to the religious camp and 
supports our argument that, irrespective of any 
decline in religious belief or belonging, the sacred 
had not disappeared from a modern European 
society. Strong Muslim positions were pitted 
against equally vociferous secularist ones in a dis-
cursive struggle fought out in the public media. 
Both sides drew on the language of the sacred to 
indicate the importance and non-negotiability 
of their case. Each side repeatedly referred to the 
gulf or boundary between the two positions. Such 
boundaries can lie dormant, invisible to outsid-
ers until they are threatened with transgression. 
(Here I might refer earlier to Professor Roy’s dis-
cussion of how crosses can seem like part of the 
furniture, until noticed.)  In the case of the Satanic 
Verses controversy, views about the sanctity of the 
Prophet Mohammed were deeply held but quietly 
expressed until suddenly challenged. Muslims 
were seen as rising up in protest in ways that sur-
prised many secularists within the U.K. But their 
response also led liberal secularists to come out in 
defense of Rushdie and his freedom as an author 
to express himself. In short, secularists realized 
the sanctity of their own position as a result of this 
threatened transgression.
The concept of the sacred that we utilize here 
finds its genesis within a Durkheiman notion of 
“things set apart and forbidden,” although we’ve 
developed it in the context of recent spatial and 
cognitive approaches to the study of religion. This 
observation is supported by the theoretical con-
tributions offered by neo-Durkheimian anthro-
pology, for example, in the cognitive cultural 
account of the Finish scholar Veikko Anttonen. In 
his discussion of the sacred as a category bound-
ary, Anttonen argues that the sacred is not con-
fined to the religious context. Rather, it acts as a 
category boundary, binding together those inside 
the boundary while, at the same time, separating 
them from those outside of it. This understanding 
of the sacred, unlike the religious/secular distinc-
tion, is not a construct of modernity and indeed 
cuts across the modern religious/secular dichot-
omy. 
The claim that one’s position is non-negotiable 
can be made by any exponent according to the 
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beliefs and values inherent in the worldview to 
which they subscribe. When such a position is 
strongly articulated, when a sacred boundary is 
transgressed, then differences are realized and 
dichotomist responses become apparent—as in 
the case of Muslim and secularist protagonists in 
the Satanic Verses controversy.
Understanding where these non-negotiable 
boundaries lie is essential for policymakers and 
analysts in order to understand the potential 
within society for conflict and avoid it. We offer 
a matrix of markers that can be used to assist in 
this process. Focusing on the public discourse of 
groups, these markers can be used to identify and 
capture data relating to key variables, such as the 
expression of dichotomous worldviews or external 
legitimating authorities that may signal conflict 
and even suggest capacity for violence. Utilizing 
this approach may assist in identifying the sacred 
territory of various ideological positions, help in 
intervention and conflict mediation, and assist in 
policy formulation in areas such as public order, 
radicalization, and community cohesion. We 
developed these markers in earlier research for the 
British government’s Home Office, which high-
lights gaps in understanding the move to violence 
in religious beliefs. From this initial formulation, 
the markers have been refined through case stud-
ies. During this process of refinement, we coded 
into the markers statements by particular groups 
(taken from interviews, treaties, and propaganda). 
We developed new markers to account for new 
areas of examination. It is an iterative process and 
the list of markers is not fixed. 
I will highlight only a few markers that are rel-
evant to the Rushdie case. One marker is a 
“dichotomous world view,” which we define as an 
oppositional world view or cosmology. Another 
is “external legitimating authority,” defined as 
a world view justified by appeal to legitimating 
authority external to or transcending the situation 
in which the statement is made. So it could refer 
to God, religious scriptures, traditions, or values 
such as fundamental human rights. 
Let’s apply the “dichotomous world view” marker 
to some specific examples. This marker captures 
values that expound a “them and us” mentality 
and suggests a worldview influenced by a struggle 
between opposing forces, such as God versus the 
devil, good versus evil, enlightened versus unen-
lightened, or believer versus non-believer. A group 
expressing itself in this way tends to see itself as on 
the side of good, and a clear distinction is made 
between those within the group and those with-
out. These distinctions are evidence of the kind of 
non-negotiable values that groups believe differ-
entiate themselves from others. 
The following quotation of Salman Ghaffari, the 
Iranian Ambassador to the Holy See at the time 
of the controversy is a good example of how he 
sees the struggle as one between all those in the 
religious camp against those in the secular camp. 
An interviewer asked, 
In the appeal you made to the Pope on 
February the 15th, you described the 
Pope as a defender of spirituality and of 
religion. Are you thinking perhaps in 
terms of a kind of holy alliance between 
the Catholic Church and Islam against 
modern unbelief? 
Ghafari answered as follows: 
This holy union has existed from the 
beginning. Islam has always hoped for 
this collaboration. Our history shows 
that Islam and Christianity can live 
together like brothers. Let us leave aside 
the ideological conflicts of the past. We 
hope that Christianity with the help of 
Islam can carry this world towards God 
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and toward faith, preventing all oppres-
sion. 
Ghaffari’s sentiments suggest a dichotomous 
worldview, dividing and indicating a struggle 
between those who have faith and those who do 
not. Even though Islam and Christianity are com-
monly presented in mutual distrust and opposi-
tion, the marker of the dichotomous worldview 
suggests unlikely partnerships and values. 
The liberal secularism has also upheld a dichot-
omous worldview, as exemplified in an editorial 
published by the center-left New Statesman maga-
zine. 
We are embattled in the war between 
cultural imperatives of Western liberal-
ism and the fundamentalist interpreta-
tions of Islam, both of which seem to 
claim an abstract and universal author-
ity. On the one hand, there is the lib-
eral opposition to book burning and 
banning based on the important belief 
in the freedom of expression and the 
right to publish and be damned. On the 
other side, there exists what has been 
identified as a Muslim fundamentalist 
position. 
And the different camps demonstrate their self-
defined divisions on how they view the world, 
divisions marked by values relating to the sanctity 
of the Prophet in Islam or to freedom of expres-
sion. Although we demonstrate these values in 
relationship to the Rushdie affair, they still play 
crucial roles in contemporary debates, such as the 
Danish cartoon affair. 
The “external legitimating authority” marker has 
been defined in such a way that it also captures the 
legitimization from non-religious sources. This 
marker captures justifications attributed to God or 
another legitimating authority in justification of 
violence. In terms of non-negotiability, this aspect 
is not stressed much more than the command to 
kill expressed by Khomeini and explained by the 
Iranian journalist Amir Taheri: “sometimes true 
believers must act even before any harm is done 
to Islam. The prophet is quoted as saying, ‘Kill the 
harmful ones before they can do harm.’” Rushdie, 
too, invoked an external legitimating authority in 
this case freedom of expression, which, he wrote, 
“is at the very foundation of any democratic soci-
ety” and “is an essential part of any democratic 
system that people who act within the law should 
be able to express their opinions freely.”
These examples show how the matrix can be (and 
these two markers in particular) applied to the 
Rushdie affair. In operationalizing the sacred, the 
matrix can identify and focus attention on the 
public values of the groups to which it has been 
applied. The Rushdie affair not only provides 
examples of Islamic religious values (which are 
publicly expressed in many countries, not just in 
Britain) but also suggests that secular values can 
have the same non-negotiability. We argue that 
this case supports our claim that the sacred has 
never been absent, even within secular ideologi-
cal systems. At the same time, it demonstrates a 
new method of analyzing the presence of religious 
norms in the public sphere. 
Recognizing the sacred as both secular and reli-
gious opens up constructive potential for serious 
democratic debate between differing ideological 
camps. In the above examples, we draw on the 
values expressed by liberal secularist defenders of 
free speech and those that held Islamic values. By 
doing so, we highlight what is distinctive about 
the eruption of the sacred in public discourse 
(within both religious and secularized environ-
ments) and how such instances may contribute to 
the construction and maintenance of non-nego-
tiable identities. This matrix of markers is a meth-
odology that can contribute to public understand-
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ing about the importance of sacred beliefs and 
values for people’s identities. It can also deepen 
our knowledge of secular society, its beliefs and 
values, and particularly its relationship with reli-
gion. It shows how beliefs can be interrogated and 
challenges the assumptions about the relationship 
of religion and the secular with reference to the 
sacred.
In conclusion, the matrix model we suggest allows 
those interested in the ideological norms of groups 
to explore sacred boundaries. It is apparent that 
the greater understanding that this methodology 
brings about with respect to the importance of 
sacred beliefs and values to the identity of groups 
would have been of public benefit. Such an under-
standing could have helped bridge the gap in dis-
course between the liberal secularist and Muslim 
communities that clashed over the Satanic Verses. 
It also deepens an understanding of the nature of 
religious values within secular systems, as well 
of the similarities between systems—in terms of 
adherence to matters of sacred concern—that are 
generally seen only in oppositional terms.
We suggest that this matrix has utility not only 
in academic studies of the religious norms in 
the public and private spheres, but also in policy 
applications.  Through application of the matrix, 
the above benefits could help shape policy to be 
sensitive to areas of potential ideological non-
negotiability.
III. WEARING THE FULL VEIL IN 
EUROPE: HOW THE RELIGION 
OF SOME BECAME THE PUBLIC 
CONCERN OF OTHERS
VALÉRIE AMIRAUX
Introduction 
Over the course of the last thirty years, the pub-
licly visible “otherness” embodied by the Muslim 
population in the member states of the European 
Union (EU) has sparked movements of transna-
tional panic, mainly driven by the fear of the col-
lapse of “national cohesion.”50 Threat, invasion, 
barbarism, inadequacy, incompatibility… the ter-
minology by which this panic is expressed varies 
depending on the context and the circumstances. 
Generally, however, these fears, shared interna-
tionally, always become more pronounced when 
women are at the center of their focus, a phe-
nomenon equally evident in the language used 
in reference to other communities of belief, such 
as Mormons, Amish, and Jews. Islamic women’s 
attire, whatever the terminology used to describe 
it—veil, scarf, and, more recently, burqa, to des-
ignate a garment fully covering the body—is pre-
sented as an increasingly delicate problem, an 
issue at the center of legal battles and the subject of 
virulent political controversy in France, Belgium, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United King-
dom. The Islamic headscarf (and, by extension, 
the Muslims who wear it) has thus come to repre-
sent all the negatives associated with the presence 
of Islam in Europe, embodied by a demonizing 
iconography whereby the dark silhouette of the 
veiled woman, whether fully veiled or not, now 
functions as a globalized memento mori. 
50  (Morgan, Poynting 2012; Lentin, Titley 2010)
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These occurrences of local friction, tension, dis-
agreement, and sometimes violence, have emerged 
in different contexts, regardless of the national 
conventions with regards to immigration poli-
tics, the relationship between church and state, 
and the wider construction of national identity.51 
They are part of a racializing configuration about 
which I wish to develop three lines of argument. 
The first hinges on the unintelligibility of certain 
manifestations of belief in secularized European 
public spaces, including the critical weakness of 
arguments that refer to “religion.” The second 
develops an analysis of the racialization of the 
indicators of religious belonging, whether real or 
supposed, and which most specifically affect the 
Muslim population of the EU. The third finally 
proposes some speculative readings of the public 
experience of the different crises arising from the 
visibility of Islamic religious signs and the capital 
attached to their visibility. 
I. Is Religion intelligible in secular Europe? 
In Europe—France being the prime example for 
the purposes of this essay—religion remains most-
ly unintelligible to politics and to the public imag-
ination owing to the historical, constructed belief 
in the absolute opposition between the rational 
modernity of the public sphere and the intimate 
and private experience of religion.52 Since the end 
of the 1980s, secularized public spaces in the EU 
have taken a radical turn in terms of the public’s 
attitude towards certain visible expressions of re-
51  In addition to the ban on wearing the full veil in public, which is the topic of this piece, we may also cite and recall the Danish caricatures, the laws on blasphemy, the Rushdie affair, religious tribunals and family law, the wearing of the Islamic veil in public schools, the construction of minarets, but also, beyond the Muslim minority, questions of polygamy, 
new religious movements, public financing of reli-gious schools, sects, abortion, et caetera. 52  (Fitzgerald 2007)
ligiosity by the Muslim population, approaching 
them as cultural, social, and political pathologies 
that must be fought, most notably by legal means. 
The latest episode of this saga is manifest in the 
different attempts at banning, in public spaces, the 
wearing of garments that partially or fully cover 
the face (of which the burqa is the prime exam-
ple), in the wake of the ban on the wearing of the 
veil in educational institutions.53 On the whole, 
these bans seem to generate as much consensus 
among the politicians as they do in the court of 
public opinion.54 Islam, a minority religion, is now 
a shared topic of controversy across the EU, par-
ticularly when it comes to the visible expression of 
certain forms of religiosity. The proliferation of re-
lated debates and legal disputes reveals the fact of 
a Europeanization that relies on spreading “anti-
Muslim bigotry” or “European Muslimania” (fed 
by the fear of the “Islamization” of Europe.55 These 
garments, worn in conviction and belief and for-
bidden from being displayed in public, function 
effectively as transnational “synecdoches”56 that 
simultaneously evoke the pervasiveness of dis-
course on the failure of multiculturalism and con-
firm the relevance of secularism as a rational mo-
dality for organizing the peaceful co-existence of 
religions. The banning of such garments indicates, 
all at once, the “securitization” of cultural markers, 
the questioning of the moral and political loyalty 
of Muslim European citizens (whether converts or 
not), the impact of external politics on national 
spaces, and the efficient circulation of discourse on 
the “Islamic menace,” often to the point of absur-
dity.From a legal perspective, religion enjoys, on 
the one hand, constitutional protection under the 
53  Of course, nuance must be made to differentiate between contexts. Outside the EU, in Switzerland, the National Council decided, on September 28, 2012, not to proceed with an initiative launched by the canton of Aargau proposing a ban on garments that partially or fully cover the face.54  (Pew, July 2010)55  The expression anti-Muslim bigotry is taken from Ford 2011; the expression European Muslimania from Goldberg 2010.56  (Jiwani 2010: 65)
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right to freedom of religion in all member states of 
the European Union, and, on the other, protection 
under the right to equal treatment. Racial and eth-
nic origins are protected under several provisions 
relating to equality, especially in terms of protec-
tion against discrimination, at national, Europe-
an, and international levels. And yet, while both 
French and European law consider it unaccept-
able to discriminate on the basis of religion, most 
of the cases brought forth on discrimination are 
based on race and ethnicity. The issue of discrimi-
nation on the basis of religion is legally unique in 
that the law understands it in both a positive way, 
under the idea of guaranteed freedoms, and in a 
negative way, under the umbrella of protection of 
groups and individuals from all forms of discrimi-
nation.57 The cases brought before the European 
Court of Human Rights [ECtHR] have primarily 
been about questions of the autonomy of religious 
communities vis-à-vis states and their neutrality. 
Many authors have highlighted the “secularist” or 
“secular” nature of the ECtHR’s decisions: how all 
that relates to religion should remain contained 
within, intimate and invisible. The unmistakable 
interference (the State intervening in an individ-
ual’s freedom of religion) then leads to the ques-
tion of the legality of said interference. Legally, the 
notion of a “margin of appreciation” is invoked, 
implicit in which is the idea that the State is best 
placed to decide such a thing. The “margin of ap-
preciation” is a concept that was developed by the 
Court in its judicial practice and effectively means 
that, in certain situations, States are more or less 
granted latitude to assess the extent and form of 
their obligation to the terms of the Convention,58 
and that States are better placed (and better 
equipped) to decide on certain cases that cannot 
be tried at the Court, most notably in cases that 
are “culturally sensitive.”59Generally speaking, in 
Europe, religion is seen in terms of its institutional 
manifestations rather than as a practice or an ex-
perience that is lived on a day-to-day basis. Re-
ligion is a concept that covers not only religious 
57  (Calvès 2011)
58  (Nieuwenhuis, 2005)
59  (Hoffman, Ringelheim 2004; Marshall 2008).
observance, but also spirituality (beliefs and prac-
tices) and the social significance of the impact of 
religion on other sectors of society. However, for 
the courts and the government, believers are es-
sentially practitioners of a cult.60 A definition that 
is based on practice or experiences obliges us to 
look more closely at the different ways in which 
believers express their beliefs in practice in their 
everyday lives61 without necessarily recognizing 
them. This general inability to recognize religion 
outside of its institutions is expressed particular-
ly eloquently in the silence and inaction regard-
ing the headscarf and the full veil on the part of 
anti-racism groups, an issue I will come back to 
in the second part of this paper. The difficulty of 
understanding the whole concept of “religion” is 
part of a larger, general failure to make sense of 
religious belonging outside of its accompanying 
symbols, through practical accomplishment.62 It 
is this non-symbolic aspect of religious garments 
and the gestures that accompany them that I want 
to address now, for it seems largely ignored, if not 
almost entirely disregarded, probably because it 
forces the observer to come too close to a reality 
that “secular, enlightened and modern citizens” 
and liberal enthusiasts generally prefer to keep at 
a good distance.63
The specificity of religious and cultural symbols, 
such as women’s clothing, brings the European 
public to a confrontation: with the nature of the 
link between the simultaneously positive and neg-
ative normative aspects of the discourse on justice 
60  This epistemological challenge is an essential, daily task in the lives of judges, lawyers, civil servants, doctors and social workers, who are often called upon to determine whether or not people have the 
right to wear a headscarf, file a complaint against religious discrimination (as opposed to ethnic), to obtain refugee status, to close their shops on particu-
lar days, to divorce, etcetera. Defining religion is not just a theoretical exercise: for many social workers, particularly those within the court system, it is a daily requirement.  
61  (Bender 2003; Lichterman 2005)
62  (Claverie 2003; Benhabib 2002)
63  (Parvez, 2011).
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and equality (stopping discrimination and guar-
anteeing liberties); with our capacity to think and 
react, in a reasonable manner, towards this reli-
gious dimension; and with the moral foundations 
that underlie this capacity for reflection and rea-
sonable action. The complex challenge that arises, 
and that European societies at this time are fail-
ing to meet, is to be able to develop definitions of 
equality and social cohesion that practically take 
into account individual religious belief. Public dis-
cussion on the question of “Islam and Muslims” 
adds to this challenge by presenting secularism 
as a principle that needs to be reaffirmed and de-
fended in its capacity as a fundamental European 
value, constituting both a path to integration and 
an indispensible norm for regulating social life. 
Secularism, in this sense, is increasingly regarded 
as the foundation for national identity—or, at the 
very least, considered inextricably linked to it—as 
evidenced by, among other things, the recent state-
ments by the leaders of the French National Front 
and the organization’s nationalist slant of late, as 
well as in the reasoning of the ECtHR during the 
Lautsi case.64 If, in multicultural societies, antidis-
criminatory policies can be considered one of the 
essential organizational pillars for peaceful coex-
istence between competing systems of interpreta-
tion (for example, religions) or between conflict-
ing values (for example, the antagonism between 
the neutrality of the state and religious freedom 
of the individual), the impulse to restrict religious 
freedom (limiting the right to wear a headscarf in 
certain specific situations) actually expresses the 
need to limit the visibility of religious practice. 
The paths to secularization taken by the differ-
ent member states of the EU (established national 
church, French-style secularism, concordance 
between church and state) and the way in which 
each one of them defines “disorderly public con-
64   During a second ruling (2011) referring to a first decision dating from 2009, the Court puts forward the concept of “majority religion” to justify the more visible presence of Catholicism in the school envi-ronment without it being categorized as a process of indoctrination (ECtHR - Lautsi v. Italy, Grand Cham-ber 18/03/2011).
duct” reveal why European judges generally agree 
with limiting the right to wear a headscarf, or, to-
day, a “burqa.” The Court supports the most re-
strictive member states in these decisions, mainly 
citing the latitude accorded to the state to provide 
its own interpretation of the situation and its own 
position on how best to maintain public order, as 
well as the perception of this position by the popu-
lation at large. The main analytical framework that 
supports the prohibition of wearing the headscarf 
or the full veil can therefore be summarized as 
follows: “we stand by our values.” In other words, 
the protection of liberal values, those historically 
considered the most sacred (freedom of thought, 
freedom of expression, equality between men and 
women), means that society can tolerate restric-
tions on only so many of them before it is forced to 
answer back. The various decisions of the ECtHR, 
therefore, validate the idea that public space, as a 
place of citizenship, is not subject to the require-
ment of absolute neutrality, but that individual lib-
erties can and will be curtailed in the name of the 
minimum requirements for social life as these are 
defined by sovereign states.
 The failure to intellectually understand Muslims in 
a reasonable manner undoubtedly stems from the 
kinds of representations that Europe has produced 
about Islam and Muslims throughout its history 
with them. For Mahmood, who shared the con-
troversies raised by the Danish cartoons in order 
to analyze the normative encoding of the “secular” 
incapacity to understand religious insult, the mor-
al impasse can be explained by the paradigmatic 
polarization around the “conflict between secular 
necessity and religious threat.”65 This rupture be-
tween secular liberal values (freedom of expres-
sion, the empowerment of women and their bod-
ies) and Muslim forms of religiosity reflects the 
normative view that Europe has of religion: one 
specific form of the religious subject (and not of 
the agent) is ultimately tolerated. There is finally no 
room for “Muslims as Muslims.” The binary model 
of secular vs. religious also explains how the veil is 
ultimately seen as antithetical to gender equality, 
65  (Mahmood 2009: 65).
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to the emancipation of women, and to secularism. 
Thus, “the veil has itself become an iconic sign of 
difference, but a sign reified to such an extent that 
its strategic use, within Western understanding, 
completely obscures and overrides the intentions 
and motivations of the actors/agents who define 
it.”66 The reduction of the wearing of the veil to a 
strictly personal decision (chosen by the wearer) 
ultimately becomes the only way to consider it, 
precisely because of the unintelligibility of religion 
in public space, which does not consider religion 
to be a proper choice for a reasonable individual. 
In fact, legally, “the dignity and equality of women 
constitute the two foundational pillars of most 
arguments in favor of the prohibition” of the gar-
ment in question.67 These symbolic or functional 
interpretations of religious gestures hold up only 
insofar as to be able to validate the idea that per-
sonal beliefs (those of Muslims who cover) can be 
metamorphosed into something that can be legally 
determined. The limits of European social and po-
litical imagination vis-à-vis all that is religious are 
also made manifest in the inability to consider the 
physical and material realities of daily piety and 
worship—things like symbols, but also ideas such 
as forms of engagement—their perspective having 
been shortened considerably by the secular liberal 
gaze.68 As Mahmood has highlighted, this manner 
of conceiving religion has become as normative as 
the relegation of the question of race to the sphere 
of pure biology. 
66  (Jiwani 2010: 66).
67  (Ford 2011).
68  (Bender 2003; Lichterman 2005; Parvez 2011).
II. The racialization process of muslims in Europe
If for several decades the situation of Muslims in 
the Western world was considered the more or 
less happy evidence of national traditions of in-
tegration, the September 11 attacks marked the 
beginning, on the one hand, of European states 
developing a more politically active institutional 
framing of Islam as a religion, and, on the other, a 
European convergence on characterizing Muslim 
citizens as personae non gratae. How could such 
distinct citizenship regimes and traditionally op-
posed “models of integration” (interculturalism, 
multiculturalism, republicanism, assimilation-
ism) have such similar public discussions on the 
topic of Islam and Muslims in Europe? These dis-
cussions relate, of course, to wider social issues 
(social, political, ideological, and economic), but 
they also openly challenge multiculturalism as a 
normative horizon as well as the ability of secular 
liberal democracies to effectively secure a peaceful 
religious pluralism in Europe. In all these discus-
sions, we are presented with a dichotomous view 
of Muslims who are characterized as either bad or 
good, loyal or disloyal, moderate or extremist: Eu-
rope’s representation of Muslims is that of a Janus 
with two faces—trustworthy (like us) or untrust-
worthy (unlike us). This representation frames, as 
Goffmann would say, first at a primary level and 
then as a proper master frame, the public discus-
sion on Islam and Muslims in Europe as an issue 
of public politics. This has now become the marker 
against which Muslim behavior ought to be evalu-
ated, in a way that is often completely objectified 
(that is, made to sound objective) by the main in-
termediaries of this vulgate, usually through the 
use of supporting data or evidence, in such a way 
that promotes the expression of animosity towards 
those who continue to adhere to practices judged 
foreign and archaic, with this whole discourse 
maintained by an international newsfeed, as we 
have recently seen with the release of the film The 
Innocence of Muslims. This framing allows for the 
expression of Islamophobic racism embedded in 
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concrete tests of discrimination. With this map in 
place, the criminalization of the wearing of the full 
veil becomes only the tip of the iceberg of a much 
larger problem, one in which it seems that racial-
ization is the central axis of publicizing. Developed 
in such a way as to be sensible and intelligible to 
the indirectly concerned public, the problematic 
situation that follows the public presence of “ille-
gitimate” Muslim religious gests  acquires a factual 
and moral objectivity that is restrictive and allows 
for the emergence of a public that remains distant 
from the direct experience of the trouble caused 
by the visibility of the religious. There is no need 
to even encounter a woman wearing a “burqa” in 
order to be distrustful of the garment as the situa-
tion is not one of co-presence, but of co-relevance 
between actors.
Religion therefore traces a cultural demarcation 
between different groups of citizens in the popula-
tion who then have an efficient marker to distin-
guish between desirable and undesirable citizens 
(and this based on their values and beliefs) as well 
as a way in which to explain the manner in which 
one group is perceived by the other. Since the end 
of the 1990s, Islamophobia was considered for a 
time as useful to understanding these phenomena. 
Fifteen years later, anti-Muslim bigotry has only 
become more pronounced—with the conditions 
for the emergence of a Muslim “popular devil”69 
about to reach a breaking point—and consolidat-
ing, through a somewhat independent process, a 
new identity category, only reinforced after Sep-
tember 11, that groups everyone who seems “Near 
Eastern, Arab or Muslim” under one umbrella. 
The development of this new category clearly cre-
ates a “racialization that equates all the members 
of this group with terrorists and strips them of 
their identity as citizens.”70 I would quickly point 
out here that in parallel, most notably since 2001, 
several European states (Germany, Belgium, 
France) have committed themselves to supporting 
the development of a “civil Islam” by establishing 
collaborations with national Muslim federations 
69  (Werbner 2005: 6)
70  (Volpp 2002: 1575).
or associations, thus allowing Islam, as a religion, 
to be either recognized or represented within 
government. In many of these initiatives, the pro-
motion of an official representation of Islam was 
conceived as a concerted effort to fight against the 
temptation towards radicalization that threatens 
Europe’s Muslims rather than as a political strat-
egy to ensure the representation and protection of 
civil liberties for a group of believers. The frame 
of reference here are programs such as those pro-
moted through “church-like institutions,” which 
also illustrate how liberal governance may be ex-
ercised through paying lip service to religious di-
versity. 
Speaking of race when it comes to Muslims sug-
gests that there exists a set of conditions result-
ing in their stigmatization and social denigration. 
Variable, polysemous, it also depends on other 
factors and adjusts to different circumstances. 
For example, the very fact of calling the full black 
veil a “burqa” illustrates the variability of racial-
ized signifiers: the Afghan woman veiled in her 
blue burqa is considered a specific symbol of the 
Taliban’s oppressive brand of Islam, but also, on a 
transnational level, of the victim of a foreign cul-
ture.71 The ideological impact of these multiple 
overlaps of meaning is so huge that in Iceland, 
far from the EU, minority MPs in 2010-2011 an-
ticipated the possible prohibition of the burqa on 
the island before the garment had even made an 
appearance there.72 Associating the image of the 
veiled Muslim woman, oppressed by men and 
requiring rescue (as extensively studied in post-
colonial theory), with the Taliban (who, in fact, 
claim their observance of Islam while practicing 
a cruel brand of misogyny) emphasizes a repre-
sentation of Islam in which moral qualifications 
and racial assignations become entangled, with 
the moral aspect allowing non-Muslims to place 
Muslim privacy under the microscope of public 
scrutiny. The criminalization of the wearing of the 
full veil shunts Muslims into a separate category 
where they are defined by their incompetence at 
71  (Jiwani 2010)
72  (Reykjavik Grapevine, February 2011)
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making the right decisions in a secular liberal con-
text (covering up instead of uncovering, submit-
ting instead of becoming empowered). The para-
noia engendered by their presence in public space 
operates as an automatic reaction within a logic of 
suspicion, supported, in the case of the full veil, 
by the idea that the motivation for action (the de-
sire to cover up in accordance with belief) is not 
the real reason behind it (Islamicization, invasion, 
submission). The suspicion here is far easier than 
the fact that the individual Muslim in question is 
subsumed by a broader category (Islam, Islamism) 
that makes the logic behind the action difficult to 
read and facilitates the entanglement, without dis-
tinction, of different dimensions of otherness (re-
ligious, racial, socio-economic).73  The wearing of 
a headscarf or full veil, exterior signs of belong-
ing to Islam, facilitates the categorization of hu-
man beings along the lines of incarnate qualities 
and “secular incompetence” with a view to their 
exclusion.
The prohibition on wearing the full veil alternates 
incessantly between explicit and implicit forms of 
racialization. This serves to alienate both women 
and men, imprisoning the former in the role of 
victim and the latter in that of the oppressor. The 
French law banning the covering of the face in pub-
lic imposes a fine for two people:74 the person who 
covers her face and the person who has allegedly 
compelled her to do so. This double sanction can’t 
help but echo the discussion around bills about 
prostitution, which propose to penalize both the 
client and the prostitute. While the behavior and 
situations are radically different, both tracks of 
legal reasoning clearly operate along a line whereby 
there is a moral evaluation of actions undertaken 
by autonomous individuals. If we consider veiled 
women within a more intersectional perspective, 
they appear to be the joint target of both state and 
nation, but also the main protagonists in a network 
of social relations that multiplies the probability 
that they will be seen as illegitimate social actors, 
regardless of the role they themselves wish to play 
73  (Casanova 2008: 72).
74  (Articles 3 and 4 of the law of October 11, 2010)
(mother, co-educator of children, citizen, artist, 
etc.). The process of racialization is therefore 
tinged not only by the notion of race, it becomes 
racist in the fact that it directly affects the bodies 
of veiled women, their garments being considered 
as part of their bodies. 
Fed by the incendiary discourse of certain me-
dia outlets, as well as public figures, anti-Mus-
lim rhetoric is becoming normalized across 
all of Europe, especially in France. The public 
expression of hostility or “discomfort” in the 
presence of Muslims is gaining both legitimacy 
and popularity. A double dynamic has prob-
ably paved the way for this phenomenon: on the 
one hand, the “euphemization” of Islamophobia 
and the discrimination experienced by Muslims 
(this does not exist; this is no different from 
other forms of ethnic discrimination; we do not 
have enough data to draw conclusions); and, on 
the other, the dissemination of explicitly racist 
remarks by leading political figures and media 
personalities. In this double context—notable 
during the public debates between September 
2009-January 2010 on national identity, but by no 
means exclusive to those debates—it is interest-
ing to note that there are still very few anti-rac-
ist groups or associations engaged specifically in 
fighting discrimination against Muslims.
The ban on the headscarf and the full veil in the Eu-
ropean context may be examined under a number 
of different angles. Most public discussion centers 
on the political polemics and potential prejudice 
that a religious garment (even if freely chosen) 
might incite within society, always within the ref-
erential frame of social cohesion and loyalty to 
national values, highlighting the tension between 
the protection of individual rights fundamentally 
guaranteed by the Constitution and secularism it-
self. By contrast, the explicit link between the ban 
and other policies “designed to accelerate the inte-
gration of minority groups in the prosperous and 
dominant segment of society and to adopt a utili-
tarian approach to the question of accommoda-
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tion” remains largely ignored.75 The ambiguity of 
the concept of accommodating religious needs is 
actually one of the implicit foundations on which 
the whole idea rests, for these accommodations 
granted to members of minority groups constitute 
a form of legitimation of their practices and give 
them “legal support, which designates them as es-
sential constituents of said group.”76 Ford proposes 
to restrict the legal recognition of those needs of 
the group that are more likely to expose individual 
members to discrimination. Thus, the state will no 
longer confer legitimacy nor additional weight to 
any single practice: the goal will simply be to ac-
curately discern and respond to any unlawful ob-
stacles that might impede full participation in the 
labor market and in civil society. 
III. The Public Texture of the “Burqa” and 
Differentiated Capitals of Visibility 
The legal prohibition of Islamic feminine garments 
can therefore now be seen as a necessary element 
of corralling the behavior of individual Muslims 
and protecting national and cultural mores. The 
panic that has seized European public opinion 
spreads by osmosis, regardless of any direct per-
sonal experience with full veils, which themselves 
seem to have the gift of omnipresence. It is there-
fore easy to draw a map of the Islamic threat, in 
the service of an iconography of fear representing 
different images of deviance from the republican 
ideal, where male and female figures are equally 
characterized by behaviors deemed hostile to Eu-
ropean states. This solidification of representation, 
the one we have come to at present, contributes to 
fixing the parameters of what we may refer to as 
a field of vision. Everyone knows what a “burqa” 
looks like. The garment is immediately recogniz-
able, independent of the context in which it ap-
pears, and recognizable despite the fact that you 
or I may have never been to Afghanistan and en-
75  (Ford 2011).
76  (FORD, 2011).
countered one in real life.77 They are, in this and 
all respects, comparable to celebrities, whom N. 
Heinich recently proposed to study in terms of 
visibility, designated as the ability to be seen by 
others, e.g. an “objective quality of people, very 
unequally distributed according to the capital of 
visibility.”78 This recent work is particularly rele-
vant to reading the “burqa” as a social phenom-
enon, which consistently draws the gaze of those 
who do not wear it (Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike); it is excrutiatingly obvious and forces per-
manent exposure to the view of others. I would 
like, in the final section of this chapter, to offer 
some thoughts on the inclusion of the “burqa” in a 
public culture of visibility, taking a few steps back 
from strictly racial and religious issues. 
Recognizable and classifiable by everyone, though 
by often-inadequate terminology, the “burqa” is 
also possessed of a comprehensive, global visibil-
ity on the international level. This public show be-
comes an exhibition by virtue of the asymmetry it 
reveals between the spectators (society as a whole) 
and the covered women being observed: it forces 
into hyper-visibility that which one wishes to keep 
hidden, without consideration for the privacy of 
the one exposed to the gaze of others. This phe-
nomenon of the full veil’s unfolding visibility shares 
many things in common with that of the media 
coverage that follows stars around, so that we end 
up only able to recognize the person in question 
through their reduction down to certain expected, 
eccentric signs, as in the case of some famous pop 
stars for example. The most salient common point 
here is that this visibility operates principally at a 
distance, by proxy, but also at the intersection of 
aesthetic and political issues.79 Visibility, in its re-
lational, strategic, and procedural dimensions, has 
77  The widespread use of the term “burqa,” for exam-
ple, puts a readily understandable name, immedi-
ately recognizable in all languages, to a phenomem-
non, thus creating instant cognitive recognition. 
78  (Heinich 2012: 493) The concept of “capital” here refers to the idea of visibility as property: something some have while others do not. 
79  (Brighenti 2007).
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two main consequences: first, recognition, and 
second, control. This relation of visibility is asym-
metrical in most cases (to see and be seen are two 
different processes), with “intervisibility” remain-
ing largely imperfect. Here, the difference between 
celebrities and other people enjoying the capital of 
visibility that N. Heinich speaks of, the “burqa,” 
as a garment, and by extension, the women who 
wear it, possess a capital of visibility (we all recog-
nize it as a burqa) that is almost exclusively nega-
tively connoted. This asymmetry of identification 
highlights a huge gap between the huge number 
of those who see and recognize (you and I) and 
those who are seen and recognized (Lady Gaga 
and the “burqa”). In fact, just as in the case of the 
singer, the “public performer,” the recognition of 
the “burqa” is rarely informed by any real recog-
nition  based on direct and personal contact: our 
capability of recognizing the garment as is, that is, 
for what it is and what it does, does not rely on 
direct experience (co-presence) nor on the privi-
leged relationship between two people (acquain-
tanceship) that might together allow for the en-
gagement of any sort of reciprocity. The “burqa” 
is recognized without needing to be directly ex-
perienced. Just as in the case of stars or icons, the 
representations that circulate in the media create 
visibility for the burqa and the women who wear 
them, but this is uniquely negative. Disembodied 
by the effect of its transnational ubiquity (a fail-
ure of proximity) and by the absence of reciprocity 
(all women in “burqas” are recognizable but they 
do not in turn recognize all those who recognize 
them), the “burqa” seems an obstacle to personal 
relationships. It does not allow for union. The de-
cision to legislate against “concealment of the face” 
gives the collective a hold on its political future, 
despite the fact that the consequences of that de-
cision, most notably in terms of the distribution 
of rights and responsibilities between the involved 
parties (the women who wear the burqa and the 
multitudes of the engaged public), have not been 
systematically envisioned in terms of the nature of 
the initial “trouble,” that is, the remote experience 
of visible religious otherness. 
Conclusion 
How does the religion of some become the public 
concern of others? Whether in the form of con-
troversy over the wearing, in public, of certain 
religious attire or symbols (turban, hijab, kip-
pah, kirpan, burqa), the institutional organiza-
tion of some minority sects (buildings of places of 
worship, formation of representative ministries, 
institutional recognition) or even the conflictual 
interaction between the agents and users of pub-
lic services, the public discussion of anything to 
do with religion straddles many different layers of 
analysis, both in the EU and elsewhere. 
Examining the widespread movement to prohibit 
and criminalize the wearing of the burqa in differ-
ent member states of the EU, this text now returns 
full circle to the public drama that has grown out 
around the framing issue, that is, the process of 
publicizing the religion of some orchestrated by 
others. If European public opinion is actually 
prisoner to a binary representation of Muslim 
religious practices, considered inadequate and 
threatening for Western liberal democracies, the 
thrust of this reading lies in the fact that “religion” 
remains a largely unintelligible concept to public 
opinion, which strives to censor some elements 
of visibility. In so doing, the Europeanization of 
restricting the visibility of certain signs of individ-
ual belonging to Islam becomes part of a process 
of racializing Muslims, where the criminalization 
of the wearing of the full veil in public space is 
only the most recent episode. At the intersection 
of several categories of experience (aesthetic, sen-
sory, symbolic, political, private), the social pres-
ence of the full veil becomes a public issue where 
the capital of visibility is inversely proportional to 
the recognition of those who wear it. Framing the 
question of the prohibition of the full veil (com-
monly designated as a “burqa”) as one of publicity 
and visibility allows somewhat for the stripping 
away of the ideological component of a debate, 
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which, in actuality in France, is the subject of 
political deadlock.
From a legal perspective, it means that the 
demands for equality made by Muslims in the 
EU take place within a context where religious 
freedom is no longer considered an absolute. Reli-
gions are cultural and historical variables as well 
as social and cultural systems of interpretation. 
The persistent, historical mistrust vis-à-vis certain 
particular expressions of diversity, even when rel-
egated to the strictly private sphere of individual 
life, exposes the implicit nationalism that under-
lies the discourse on identity and violates the cul-
tural and ethnic borders it claims to wish to pro-
tect.   
I.STANDARDIZATION OF THE EXERCISE 
OF THE ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS AUTHOR-
ITY IN FRANCE
ROMAIN SÈZE
What I’m presenting today stems from the prep-
aration of a Ph.D. in sociology about imams in 
France, prepared at the École des Hautes Études 
en Sciences Sociales, Paris.
While contemporary Islam is more often analyzed 
as an institution rather than as a daily practice, 
I would like to approach an institution that is 
not too well known as an object of research: the 
decades-old imamate in France from a bottom 
up perspective by examining the daily religion 
of imams. Since September 2006, I have visited 
around 30 mosques, where I took part in various 
activities. I have also interviewed about 30 imams.
I’d like to show the key role of imams in institu-
tional change not by using my own observations 
as a political scientist but by referring to debates 
on the sociology of religion.  Keeping in mind 
two specificities of Islam in France (and in the 
West), namely Islamic pluralism and the experi-
ence of the minority condition, I will try to show 
that imams maintain their legitimacy and exercise 
their authority by positioning themselves at the 
crossroads of multiple influences that inter-pene-
trate with globalization. In so doing they become 
agents of Islam’s formatting. 
This phenomenon appears first from their prac-
tices of domination. When religiosities do not fit 
any more into a common horizon of sense, they 
are intellectualized (i.e. explained and justified).
Studies about priests and pastors in France show 
that they reinvent the exercise of their authority 
by integrating this dynamic. It’s legitimate to sup-
pose that the Islamic magesterium does so as well. 
This first hypothesis clarifies several reports, and 
I’ll discuss two cases.
The first case concerns conversions. In most 
mosques, imams impose a preliminary training 
on people who want to convert. This denotes a loss 
of relevance of the declaration of shahâda as a rite 
of passage. It also indicates a rejection of ritual-
ism, which is a consequence of the disappearance 
of religious evidence. Imams remedy this loss by 
imposing training on converts. They reinvent the 
rite of passage by intellectualizing it.
In the same way, most of the sermons that I heard 
were original products. The emotional strength, 
the art of public speaking, and the rhetorical 
flourishes that traditionally characterize sermons 
tend to be eliminated. This simplification is a 
choice that imams make in order to be understood 
by the faithful who may have different origins 
and use different languages. Rather than be elo-
quent, imams prefer simpler and more accessible 
speeches. The art of public speaking is incompat-
ible with the dynamic of explanation of religiosity. 
Displays of encyclopedic knowledge figure more 
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prominently in sermons. Imams reinvent the lit-
eracy’s genre of sermons by intellectualizing it.
Religious leaders do not exercise their authority 
violently because they cannot. Rather, the two 
cases I identify here, among others, suggest a fur-
ther conclusion: that domination is not practiced 
by violence, but rather through intellectualization. 
The process of the institutionalization of Islam in 
France has given rise to the phenomenon of the 
“imam-islamologist.” This process is part of the 
creation of an original exercise of Islamic author-
ity, similar to the de-clericalization of the priest-
hood and to recent evolutions of the pastorate in 
France. As such, the institutional integration of 
the Islamic magesterium should be understood 
using the same categories and paradigms that we 
use to understand other religious authorities.
This first hypothesis suggests a second. This way 
of practicing domination involves a reposition-
ing of imams as religious authorities. In France, 
imams have progressively become the leaders of 
their local communities and, in the absence of a 
central legal authority, have been placed in a posi-
tion to reinvent orthodoxy. There are two other 
challenges that other religions face also in the 
West: the experience of the minority condition 
and intra-religious pluralism. My second hypoth-
esis is that imams build their legitimacy at the 
crossroads of these multiple borders, while also 
repositioning themselves as religious authorities. 
For the sake of brevity, I’ll demonstrate support 
for my hypothesis by focusing on sermons and 
consultations. First, imams tend to use more 
ambiguous speech patterns in their sermons when 
addressing more controversial issues. For exam-
ple, on the topic of the status of women in Islam, 
the same imam strongly condemns feminism as 
a primary driver of trouble in the West, while at 
the same time arguing in favor of the sharing of 
housework between husbands and wives. His ser-
mon insists on the primacy of the respect toward 
women, without defining it. This kind of ambig-
uous construction, often interpreted as double 
speech, is a response to the imam’s need to address 
a plural congregation (one driven by divisions) 
as well as a surrounding society in which Islam 
is stigmatized. Beside this ambiguity in their ser-
mons, imams use a semantic of consensus. In gen-
eral, the sermons that I observed often insisted 
that values like love, respect, tolerance, and mercy 
should override other considerations. These pat-
terns indicate that imams are repositioning them-
selves as religious authorities, in the face of plural-
ism.  
Second, my observations of the counseling func-
tion of imams (on issues such as dating during the 
Ramadan fasting period) provide further support 
for my hypothesis. Rather than adopt a “magis-
terial” posture or position themselves as the only 
holders of the truth that they impose from above, 
imams build their legitimacy by mediating claims 
of the faithful. In doing so, they try to reinvent a 
democratic horizon for an acceptable consensus.
Ambiguous constructions of sense and the pri-
macy of the consensus semantic field in imams’ 
sermons, as the search for democratic consensus 
in imams’ consultations, are different aspects of 
the same positioning of the Islamic magisterium, 
which adjusts to individualism and pluralism, to 
secularization and globalization. In many ways 
this process is comparable to that of the Catho-
lic Church in the 20th century, as analyzed by the 
sociologist Daniel Hervieu-Léger.80 It also resem-
bles the process of democratization in the evolu-
tion of Catholic and Protestant theologies in the 
second half of the 20th century. It is what Mon-
signor Rouet, a French Archbishop, called “frag-
ile Christianity.” By extension, “fragile Islam” 
would seem to be a feature of the integration of 
the Islamic authority in common paradigms with 
80  citation
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other religions but with the specificity (among 
others) that it is elaborated from the bottom, by 
the daily practices of imams who fit and retrans-
late in legal and theological terms transformations 
of the contemporary Islam. 
So the imams, who both lack appropriate train-
ing and are often stigmatized, are agents of Islam’s 
formatting in a position between a simple evolu-
tion of religiosities and a repositioning of Islam 
in itself. They question Islamic institutions and 
summon them to react: will a democratization 
of Islamic theology and jurisprudence be able to 
answer to this democratic exercise of authority? 
The answer remains to be seen. 
My analysis suggests not so much a conclusion as 
some practical considerations. The two hypoth-
eses of an “Islam islamologist” and of a “fragile 
Islam” show how France’s imams are becoming 
agents of Islam’s formatting. It is because they act 
on the border of the plurality of influences which 
interpenetrate with globalization that they acquire 
this key role in institutional change. It is as such, 
if we open ourselves honestly to “positive secular-
ism” (an expression still dear to some French pol-
icy makers), that it is interesting to wonder about 
imams’ “utility” and potential for social cohesion.
Without being alarmist, it is nevertheless impor-
tant to be attentive to the situation we are witness-
ing today—in France, at least. It is a rejection of 
Islamic markers considered as foreign in the pub-
lic sphere and, at the same time, a growth in the 
use of Islam as identical reference81 and a mul-
tiplication of pockets of toughening. This tension 
generates a potentially explosive situation that 
imams have a real potential to defuse and that it is 
possible to exploit (for example, by training them 
in mediation or by accompanying their expression 
in the public sphere).  
81   (P. Haenni, 2009)
France’s imams began to arouse the interest of 
public authorities and opinion in the 1990s, when 
they appeared to be conduits for introducing into 
France the conflicts that still trouble the Maghreb. 
This mistrust towards imams remains, even 
though imams are proving to be decisive agents 
of the normalization and integration of Islam. It 
would be wrong to ignore this potential for social 
cohesion. It is high time to bet on these “danger-
ous social actors.”
II.LIMITS OF RESTRICTING ISLAM: 
THE FRENCH BURQA LAW OF 2010 
CHRISTIAN JOPPKE
One can read almost anything into debates about 
the burqa. What I’m going to say about the cam-
paign that led to its legal prohibition in France is 
quite different from the other angles by which it 
has been addressed here today. I read it not as an 
exercise of reverse Talibanism or as ridicule: one 
may shake one’s head about the disproportion-
ate measure of gunning down by national law 
an ultra-marginal phenomenon that concerns by 
far under 0.1% of France’s Muslim population. I 
propose a third angle to look at this. This whole 
campaign shows the extraordinarily high legal 
and constitutional hurdles that have to be taken in 
order to make this prohibition possible. 
This paper went through several incarnations. I 
thought I had finished it by March 2010 after the 
Conseil d’Etat said “no” to a general, across-the-
board prohibition of the burqua because it was 
deemed incompatible with the constitution and 
with European human rights norms. The broad 
theme of my analysis was the limits to excluding 
Islam in the liberal state. I had concluded that even 
this most extreme form of Islamic dress must, in 
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the end, be tolerated, however we may disagree 
with and dislike it. 
Well, the story moved on. By July 2010, I had to 
rewrite my paper because a law was passed that the 
concerted legal opinion in France had thought to 
be impossible just a few months ago. This was the 
outcome of the parliamentary commission headed 
by a communist deputy, André Gerin. They had 
wanted that law from the start, but the dozen-plus 
lawyers testifying before the commission had said 
that it was not possible. So I am investigating the 
extraordinarily high legal and constitutional hur-
dles that had to be taken in order to make this ban 
of the burqua possible
The first thing to see here is that the context of 
the campaign was not to roll back the institu-
tional accommodation of Islam in France that had 
already occurred.  Such accommodation included 
the funding of mosques on a kind of priority note 
in order to redress historical disadvantage, not 
through the cultuelle but cultural angle, and the 
availability of long term leases (bails emphéo-
tiques) making it affordable to buy land from the 
French state for building mosques. In the words of 
Nicolas Sarkozy, Islam is to be and has been estab-
lished “on a floor of equality with the other great 
religions.”
Jonathan Laurence, an American observer from 
the Brookings Institute, said that negative rheto-
ric and “repressive measures that have put Mus-
lim communities on the defensive belie a broader 
trend toward greater religious freedom and insti-
tutional representation.”82 So there is a double 
reality going on here, and the burqa reality is only 
one. Of course, it’s the one that is mediatized, 
that is more visible than the hidden institutional 
accommodation of this religion. 
82  Jonathan Laurence, The Emancipation of Eu-
rope’s Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority 
Integration 6 (Princeton University Press, 2012) 
The interesting thing is that, because the burqa 
campaign is not meant to remove Islam from the 
fabric of French and European society, the cam-
paign is presented as more political than religious 
in nature. The argument is made that the burqa 
is not part of Islam. You don’t find a prescription 
for full body veiling anywhere in the core doc-
trine of Islam. So it is a political phenomenon, 
not a religious phenomenon. One might even say 
that the campaign against the burqa is actually the 
final moment of institutionalizing and recogniz-
ing Islam in France. To reject the integral veil is 
to respect Islam, as former Immigration Minister 
Eric Besson put it before the Burqa Commission.
That is the context. Now to my main interest here: 
the flawed legal basis for the burqa ban. This event 
provides a fascinating window into the judicial-
ization and constitutionalization of politics. It’s a 
case of judicialized politics or, as Martin Shapiro 
once put it, a politics that is conducted through 
the medium of legal discourse. So the Burqa Com-
mission saw many lawyers testifying to the same 
effect: a ban was not legally possible. At one point 
one exasperated commission member retorted 
that we must liberate ourselves from the clutches 
(décisions) of justices.
What were the possible legal and normative argu-
ments in favor of the burqa ban? First, of course, 
laïcité. However, this argument doesn’t work for 
two reasons. First, laïcité is a principle that applies 
to the state and not to private persons. Laïcité con-
cerns only state institutions that must be neutral 
and laic. It is not something that you can impose 
on ordinary people on the street. The second rea-
son laïcité had to be quickly discarded as a ground 
for the burqa ban is that the wearing of the veil 
was taken to be a political phenomenon, rather 
than a religious one. Laïcité applies only to the 
regulation of religion, and so cannot be used to 
prohibit something that is political in nature. 
Religious Norms in the Public Sphere61
The second possible response was to say the burqa 
violates human dignity. That became the main 
impetus for the ban. Now, dignity is a very com-
plex concept. Immanuel Kant defined dignity as 
the condition of being an “end in itself” and not 
just a value relative to some other purpose, which 
Kant called the price of that thing. 
Human dignity, whatever it is, can be understood 
from both a subjective and an objective point of 
view. From a subjective point of view, human dig-
nity is exercised in the freedom of choice of the 
individual, which distinguishes us as humans 
from the animal kingdom. 
The objective reading of human dignity is a bit 
more complex. Here you could see dignity as an 
objective image of humanity that may be brought 
against the individual even if she violates this dig-
nity against herself, which is not possible with the 
subjective reading of dignity. Here dignity merges 
with freedom of choice, and that can be violated 
only by a third party. 
Of course, those in favor of restricting the burqa 
needed to invoke an objective reading of dignity. 
The commission members acknowledged that the 
burqa is chosen by those who wear it. They did 
not jump to the argument (quite prominent in the 
headscarf restriction a few years earlier) that those 
who wear the burqa are responding to coercion 
by male relatives in their suburban environments. 
From what little we know about the sociological 
reality of the burqa, it is freely chosen. As such, 
a subjective understanding of dignity weighs in 
favor of the burqa because the choice to wear the 
burqa is an exercise of dignity.
Why, then, was an objective reading of the burqa 
discarded? First, because it would push the state 
into the pursuit of an ethical project, in violation 
of commitments of political liberalism that even 
the French state has to respect. Secondly, if you use 
an objective reading of dignity you cannot make 
a difference between the public sphere (in which 
you rule out a practice) and the private sphere (in 
which you let it go). If it’s really an objective vio-
lation of the person inflicted by the person her-
self against her own best interests, then you have 
to follow that all the way through, not just in the 
public realm but also in her private life. You must 
make a total prohibition of the thing if it objec-
tively violates dignity. Thirdly, and not least, dig-
nity has been understood in legal terms in a sub-
jective, not objective way. So the human dignity 
argument is, in the end, a defense of the burqa, 
and not a basis for prohibition by the French state.
The last possible argument against the burqa 
was to say it violates public order. As a legal con-
cept, “public order” can be understood in differ-
ent ways. The most elementary way is in terms of 
security. The argument would be that the burqa 
violates public security. However, on that ground, 
you can only arrive at the partial prohibition, say, 
in airports and train stations, where under the 
cloak of the burqa one could carry guns. You don’t 
get an across-the-board prohibition on the basis of 
public order interpreted as security. 
A second dimension to the public order argument 
is framed in terms of public morality. Interest-
ingly, the lawyers before the Burqa Commission 
said that this argument was not possible. There 
was once a time when mayors in French beach 
towns would prohibit walking on Main Street 
in bathing trousers or with a provocative bikini. 
These restrictions were upheld by courts for the 
sake of public morality. But this kind of policy has 
died out in France. Today such prohibitions are 
no longer thinkable because the state is no lon-
ger an ethical watchdog, but rather must retreat 
from regulating ordinary ways of life. Of course, 
this moralized public order argument would ulti-
mately become the rationale for the law. 
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That seemed to be the state of affairs in March 
2010. The smartest lawyer before the commission, 
Denys de Béchillon of the provincial Université de 
Pau in the French Pyrenees, offered the best pos-
sible conclusion. He said, “I don’t like the burqa. 
It disgusts me. But I don’t believe that we have 
the tools and the political culture for prohibiting 
the wearing of such dress on the territory of the 
Republic.” 
Here enters politics, against the law. I had to 
rewrite the entire paper with a section discuss-
ing this topic of politics against the law. Sarkozy 
responded to the Conseil d’Etat verdict in March. 
His sentiment was that “we are politicians, we are 
not lawyers, we have to take political responsibil-
ity.” That became the entry into this last round, 
which would end in the successful passing of the 
total burqa prohibition in public. “We have to be 
ready to take judicial risks,” the Prime Minister 
of France, François Fillon exclaimed in late April 
2010. 
So one has to read the eventual passage of the law 
as a political backlash against a perceived dictate 
of the legal system. I think a lot of Muslim integra-
tion in Europe has been achieved through a silent, 
legal route. People were not aware of all these 
court judgments that were, in the end, very gen-
erous, very accommodating, very inclusive. Poli-
ticians stepped in and claimed the need to stop 
the reign of unelected judges, reasserting their 
responsibilities as democratic lawmakers. Yet the 
politicians still needed a justification. Ironically 
the Conseil d’Etat verdict against a total prohibi-
tion in March 2010 gave them a clue, namely, its 
claim that there is a non-material dimension to 
public order, a moral dimension, as I called it ear-
lier. “Public order rests on a minimal fundament 
of reciprocity and of essential guarantees of life in 
society.” “Reciprocity” became a key term, which 
is only appropriate in the land of Durkheim. The 
irony is there had been many legal cases and much 
legal theorizing on the first two elements of the 
republican triptych, which is of course liberty and 
equality. But fraternity had mostly been left out, 
so it was terra incognita, a white space that could 
be filled out with legal meanings and legal judg-
ments. If incest, polygamy, and public nudity are 
prohibited, why not prohibit the complete veiling 
and hiding of one’s identity, which is the exact 
opposite of nudity? 
This became the justification in the end. Reciproc-
ity belongs to the social fabric in public places. The 
burqa woman disrupts reciprocity because she 
sees, but does not allow herself to be seen. In that 
sense the burqa is “symbolic violence” inflicted on 
third parties, as Elisabeth Badinter said unironi-
cally. This was the justification of the law. I quote 
Sorbonne law professor Ann Lavande who said 
before the commission that “neither laïcité, nor 
dignity, nor public order could ever justify a gen-
eral and absolute prohibition” on the burqa. In 
a new hearing in the context of the parliamen-
tary preparations of the law, Lavande said that 
the immaterial dimension of public order is “an 
indispensable counterweight to the excesses of the 
absolute primacy of individual rights.” I wonder 
how Professor Lavande reconciles that statement 
with her previous statement before the Burqa 
Commission. 
Of course, the whole immaterial public order jus-
tification reintroduces “dignity” as the main jus-
tification of the law. A socialist opposition deputy, 
Jean Glavany, called out the trick: “You claim not 
to invoke the principle of dignity, but this is finally 
the only principle that is written into your legal 
text.”
So enters the Conseil Constitutionnel. Although 
one might have expected the Conseil to strike 
down the burqa ban, instead they sanctified it, 
finding that the burqa was manifestly incompat-
ible with the constitutional principles of liberty 
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and equality. This reasoning is a stretch, if not an 
impossibility. It conflicts with all of the testimony 
before the Commission. Who is on the Conseil 
Constitutionnel? Not professional lawyers, nor 
judges. Rather, it is conservative Union for a Pop-
ular Movement (UMP) politicians like Jacques 
Chirac, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, and Jean-Louis 
Debré. Now they are in retirement, and they get 
state pensions through being on this court. Of 
course, these UMP guys will not throw sand into 
the machinery of their own party in power.
However, and this will be my last word, there is an 
interesting religious proviso introduced into the 
caustic three-page judgment here, namely that the 
burqa prohibition “shall not restrict the exercise 
of religious liberty in places of cult that are open 
to the public.” Patrick Weil has written a brilliant 
editorial in Le Monde stating that this opinion 
“unveils the real, the religious object of the law.” 
At the very tail end of the whole campaign, the 
highest court in France saw a religious dimension 
to the burqa, whereas the starting point for this 
debate had been the assumption that the burqa 
was not at all religious, but political. This conces-
sion is quite significant. Take, for instance, the 
example of a woman in burqa who decides to go 
to Notre Dame church in the center of old Paris. 
Catholic churches have nothing against the burqa. 
Will the police interrupt the short, two-minute 
walk of that woman from her apartment to Notre 
Dame? 
There is a real problem created by the religious 
proviso in the Conseil Constitutionnel’s decision 
upholding the law against the burqa, which sug-
gests that the story has not yet come to an end. 
Arslan v. Turkey83 is an interesting decision by the 
Human Rights Court just after the burqa cam-
paign came into high gear. That verdict estab-
lished a distinction between restricting dress in 
83  Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2010). 
public institutions (which the state is allowed to 
do only if public servants are restricted by it) and 
dress restrictions in public places that are open 
to all (like streets or places that are addressed to 
simple citizens).
This opens up the possibility of an Article IX vio-
lation, a violation of religious liberty under the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). 
Now that the religious proviso has been put into 
a decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel, the 
Arslan judgment of the ECHR becomes directly 
relevant. If the court is consistent it cannot hide 
(as it has frequently done) behind the “margin of 
appreciation” clause. Then indeed this law may 
still be found in violation of the European human 
rights regime.
III. COMMENTS 
SARAH SONG
Let me first highlight some general themes before 
moving on to raise specific questions and com-
ments. These include the idea of sacred as present 
in both religious and secular forms; that religious 
symbols are both used and abused in the con-
struction and reinforcement of national identity 
and social cohesion; and the dissociation between 
certain religious markers, such as the burqa and 
religious faith. There is also a broader question 
about how our normative frameworks of the pub-
lic sphere can be rethought to be more inclusive 
of religion. A final commonality is a questioning 
of the appeal to security and public order, includ-
ing public morality, as a moral and legal basis for 
restricting religion in the public sphere.
First to Geneviève’s paper. In your presentation 
you talked about the cross, both in the presiden-
tial palace square and outside Auschwitz, which 
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is defended as a symbol of Polishness. The cross 
designates the place of national memory. You 
described this as  religious symbols being secu-
larized for the purposes of national identity and 
social cohesion. Then, you argue, the symbol is 
re-sacralized in secular form. I wondered if you 
could develop. I am curious to hear more about 
this notion of the sacred in secular form. You ref-
erenced the notion of civil religion, which made 
me immediately think of Rousseau’s discussion of 
civil religion and patriotism in the sacred and sec-
ular form. The question that comes to mind: are 
there meaningful differences between Rousseau’s 
notions and your arguments about the sacred 
and religious forms, at least in the case that you’re 
looking at?
Matthew’s paper proceeds by way of critique of 
the traditional view of religion and secularity as 
oppositional and dichotomous concepts, and then 
offers a re-conceptualization of the religious and 
secular by drawing on the concept of the sacred. 
I thought that Matthew and Geneviève’s papers 
had interesting overlaps. The sacred is a category 
boundary, he says, that sets things with non-
negotiable values apart from things whose value 
is based on continuous transactions. If we adopt 
this definition of the sacred, Matthew suggests, we 
see that not only are religious values sacred, but 
so are secular values (like, for example, the West-
ern liberal values of freedom of expression). So in 
the Rushdie case, both those who supported Kho-
meini’s fatwā against Rushdie and Western liber-
als, including Rushdie himself, who invoked ideas 
of freedom of expression and the idea of a demo-
cratic society are invoking non-negotiable values, 
sacred ideas.
I’m still not entirely clear what constitutes the 
sacred in your paper. You indicate that a sacred 
value is non-negotiable and abstract. Why can’t 
we say that in the case of both the religious and 
the secular? What is at stake between values and 
beliefs? What does this idea of the sacred add 
that isn’t captured by simply using the concept of 
value? Is the non-negotiability what matters? Is it 
the invocation of an extratemporal or non-human 
authority? 
A second set of questions emerges when compar-
ing the “secular” sacred with the sacred of the 
religious. Are there any interesting differences 
between the two? Rushdie and his defenders 
might say that the sacred of the secular is free-
dom of expression, for example, or the idea of a 
democratic society. These ideas have or aspire to 
have authority over a greater range of individuals 
across different religions. When they come into 
conflict with the sacred of the religious, should 
secular norms prevail? In other words, sacred 
ideas of the secular aspire to be more pluralistic, 
and this is supposed to give them greater author-
ity. This difference might help a Western liberal to 
distinguish between the sacred of the secular and 
the sacred of the religious.
Another question concerns your discussion of 
the marker, what you call external legitimating 
authority. In the case of religious belief, the legiti-
mating authority is God, for some, and is exter-
nal in the sense that the authority is external to a 
human community. But in what sense is the secu-
lar belief in freedom of expression or democracy 
external? The idea of certain rights being funda-
mental is abstract and may transcend a particular 
situation. So is it external simply because it tran-
scends the particular situation? Is external equiva-
lent to universal? But these ideas might be said to 
originate from human beings, so they aren’t external 
in the sense of invoking an extratemporal authority. 
On to Valérie’s paper, a central claim of which 
is that religion remains unintelligible to secular 
publics and therefore absent from public discus-
sions about the ban on the burqa in France and 
elsewhere in Europe. I wonder if you could say 
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more about why religion is absent. On the one 
hand, in France this absence is not surprising 
given the power of laïcité in French public life. On 
the other hand, the absence of religion in public 
discourse about the burqa is deeply counter-intu-
itive, since some women who do wear the burqa 
may view their decisions about what to wear as a 
religious practice. So how can the French debate 
the burqa or even the headscarf without conceiv-
ing these practices as religious practices? I think 
the discussion has already gotten at the answer: 
by disassociating religious faith and the burqa, 
you permit the burqa to stand for nothing that’s 
worth protecting, that’s only worthy of our scorn 
and our prejudice. It made me wonder if the disas-
sociation is a strategic one, or if the disassociation 
stems from other sources.
I was really interested in your point about silence 
and inaction on the part of anti-racist groups in the 
debates about the burqa. You suggest that one rea-
son why they’ve held back is that they don’t want 
to play into the narrative of the Muslim woman 
as victim who requires rescue, thus bringing gen-
der and concerns about women’s agency into the 
discussion. I wonder if you could say more about 
these anti-racist groups. In particular, are there 
other motivations for their not wanting to get 
involved in this debate, or is what I’ve just articu-
lated the primary motivation? Does their silence 
also stem from a genuine belief that the ban on 
the burqa is justifiable based on some concern for 
gender inequality in Muslim communities? 
I also wondered what French feminists say about 
the ban on the burqa. Are they mysteriously silent 
as well? When reading your paper I couldn’t help 
but think about the value of a comparative analy-
sis that looks at the racialization of Muslims in 
France, elsewhere in Europe, and in North Amer-
ica. My colleague Leti Volpp has written about 
the racialization of persons who appear Middle 
Eastern, Arab, or Muslim in the US post 9/11 and 
their identification as terrorists outside the circle 
of citizenship. I wondered if one important dif-
ference in a comparative racialization study is the 
French legacy of colonialism and its resonance for 
contemporary immigration in France, the vast 
relations between the metropole and the post-
colonial migrants and their descendants. You 
quickly noted the post-colonial relation but didn’t 
go into it. How does this play a role in explaining 
the absence of religion in public discourse around 
the burqa?
Romain Sezes paper takes us inside the exercise 
of Islamic religious authority. In contrast to the 
other papers and presentations, he does not look 
at the state or mainstream political, public dis-
course. Rather, he goes inside Islamic communi-
ties to look at imams as agents of the regulation of 
religiosities. His analysis shows us that, in think-
ing about the role of religion in the public sphere, 
we have to complicate our view of religion, how 
it changes and adapts in response to both global 
and local events. You talk about the blurring of 
the border between issuing advice and issuing 
fatwā, the changing role of the use of speeches to 
show harmony increasingly between the modern 
sciences and the Qur’an. You say that the specific 
goal of the imam is to attempt to create consen-
sus, but that the pluralism and democratization of 
the religious authority complicate this task. Could 
you say more about the sources of the democrati-
zation of theological and legal thought among the 
imamate in France? Is democratization a response 
to external conditions? Is it more of an internal 
process? Is it both?
Also, it seems that you are taking your analysis 
in a comparative direction. I wondered if your 
interviews in the U.S. context provide any further 
insights into the phenomenon of the imam Isla-
mologist?
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Finally, Christian’s paper begins by noting the 
institutionalization of Islam in France. He argues 
that the negative rhetoric against Muslims in 
France belies a broader trend toward greater reli-
gious freedom and the greater institutional repre-
sentation of Muslims. I wonder how this observa-
tion relates to Valérie’s claims about the broader 
trend of the racialization of Muslims in France. 
Christian suggests that it’s misleading to think 
about the French discourse around the burqa as 
part of a broader European assault on Islam and 
Muslims. For example, he points to the Swiss 
national referendum against the construction of 
new minarets, and observes there are no institu-
tional channels for the French to enact a similar 
sort of restriction. But what about at the level of 
individual attitudes toward poor Muslims? The 
French state may be intent on funding mosque 
constructions by handing out long-term loans for 
building sites, but do the French people broadly 
support such measures? When Valérie speaks of 
the racialization of Muslims, is she talking about 
individual attitudes concerning French national 
identity and culture and responses to Muslims in 
France, whereas Christian is talking about legal 
and political institutions and what restrictions 
on Islam are, in fact, possible? Christian suggests 
if you look at the broader context of institutions, 
it’s misleading to say that the ban on the burqa is 
driven simply by prejudice against Islam. Is that 
right? 
On the question of whether the burqa is a reli-
gious symbol, I was fascinated to read about Tariq 
Ramadan and the anthropologist Dounia Bouzar 
saying that the burqa and niqab are not an Islamic 
prescription. On the sociological account of burqa-
wearing, there are three non-religious motivations 
for donning the burqa: symbolic protest; the quest 
for social distinction; and hyper-individualism 
about ethnic origins and community. Are there 
really no women who wear the burqa out of reli-
gious conviction? This question gets at the disso-
ciation between a religion marker and religious 
faith. If some women view wearing the burqa as 
a religious practice, then the attempt to dissoci-
ate the burqa from Islam cannot succeed. My 
questions are: What’s behind this disassociation? 
Who’s driving it? Is this dissociation desirable? 
And is the attempt to dissociate the burqa from 
Islamic faith actually reinforcing the connection 
between the two among those who wish to don it?
Holding the practice of wearing burqas against 
the republican triptych of liberty, equality, frater-
nity, Christian says that liberty (and in particular 
freedom of religion) requires respecting the free-
dom of choice to wear the burqa. Here, there isn’t 
a compelling case that freedom is being violated, 
but rather the burqa runs again the other two 
parts of the republican ideal, equality (in partic-
ular equality between the sexes) and fraternity. I 
was really interested to learn that the burqa Com-
mission report cites the work of Emmanuel Levi-
nas on the face as the mirror of the soul, the site 
of humanism and individualism in the west—the 
entire face, not just the eyes or nose, has this qual-
ity of expressing the soul. Here I was reminded of 
Matthew and Geneviève talking about the sacred 
in the secular realm.
At various points in the paper, Christian hints 
that part of what’s behind the effort to restrict 
Islam is the never-ending project of nation build-
ing and national identity formation. One way of 
thinking about the total burqa ban in Belgium 
and “the front against Islam” more generally is as 
the best means available for political elites to unify 
and mobilize a majority of the Belgium electorate, 
which was dissolving into the French and Flemish 
speaking parts. As it is often the case, then, soli-
darity of the French Republic or the Belgium soci-
ety is constructed out of an opposition to another 
and the use of religious markers is a way to rally 
and solidify national identity. 
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I wanted to conclude by asking a question of all 
of the panelists and everyone in the audience. 
Earlier in the morning, Charles Hirschkind 
invoked Tocqueville, who’s a congenial theorist 
for thinking about religion and its relationship to 
the public sphere and democracy. I was thinking 
about Marx. There are several different models 
of thinking about religion in the public sphere. 
There is the separation model, which is what we 
sometimes refer to as the liberal neutrality model. 
There are moments where I think that Christian 
Jopke is very sympathetic to this liberal neutral-
ity model, especially what he said this morning 
about the Italian case of the cross in the public 
schools. There is an assimilation model, where the 
dominant religion or the dominant racial identity 
is instantiated in the state and all must assimi-
late into it (perhaps the Sarkozy and Berlusconi 
model). Then there is the Marxist model, which 
no one in this room probably adheres to, which 
states that genuine human emancipation consists 
in transcending religion altogether. There was a lot 
of talk this morning that the most desirable nor-
mative model seems to be a kind of pluralistic one. 
I took Silvio Ferrari’s comments, what he called 
inclusive neutrality, to be a kind of broadening of 
the liberal neutrality model, while making it more 
pluralistic. Peter Danchin was talking about value 
pluralism. I took that to be looking for something 
beyond liberalism, beyond the liberal neutrality 
model. This Marxist model wasn’t explicitly dis-
cussed in any of your papers, and I would like to 
hear more about the normative models implicit 
underlying your discussions of particular cases.
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SESSION IV
THE CASE OF NORTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES
I. MOSQUE CONTROVERSIES IN THE 
U.S.: EMOTIONS, POLITICS AND THE 
RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM  
PASQUALE ANNICCHINO
“Transcript from the session. For the full paper see P. 
Annicchino, N. Marzouki, Mosques Controversies in the 
U.S.: Emotions, Politics and the Right to Religious Free-
dom, in “Annuaire Droit et Religions”, 2012, pp. 153- 160.
On this paper, which I’m working on with Nadia 
Marzouki, deals with mosque controversies. I 
intend to address three main questions: Where are 
we now? How did we get to the political and legal 
debates we currently have? Where we are going?
The first thing is to map the issue. There are 2,000 
mosques in the US and, currently, almost 35 active 
political controversies involving mosques. Some 
are also legal controversies, with courts involved 
in deciding the issues at stake. Of course, there is 
great variance among many of the situations. I will 
try to discuss the structure of the ongoing debates, 
which is basically similar in all of these cases.
How did we get here? Let’s consider the national 
context in which these debates have surfaced. One 
notable factor is the rise of the Tea Party move-
ment. Research from the Pew Forum indicates 
that there is a clear religious dimension to the Tea 
Party. Other right-wing political movements can 
be seen to endorse the Tea Party movement, and a 
strong faction of the Tea Party movement is con-
nected with what was formerly called the Chris-
tian right or the Moral Majority.
The second factor is the intensification of oppo-
sition to Obama, especially in relation to health 
care policy. This opposition reflects the libertar-
ian section of the Tea Party movement, an element 
which basically opposes the welfare state and state 
intervention in the economy. Pew Forum research 
indicates a clear connection between the Christian 
right and this libertarian element of the Tea Party 
movement. We might also find similar dimen-
sions in European populist movements. 
The third factor is the spread of discourse con-
cerning the Christian roots of American identity 
and the threat that foreign civilizations represent 
to the survival of America. We can see evidence 
of these concerns particularly in the anti-Sharia 
proposals in some US states.
The framing of the debate surrounding the mosque 
controversies is summarized by the notion that 
“it’s not about rights; it’s about what is right.” There 
is a kind of selective blindness displayed between 
the legal and political arguments because the legal 
dimension of the debate is quite clear. There is no 
major legal issue, but there is a big political issue. 
Several approaches have been visible in this 
debate. The first approach is the religious free-
dom approach. This is well summarized by Wel-
ton Gaddy, the president of the Interfaith Alli-
ance. How do we approach the issue of building 
a mosque? During the New York mosque con-
troversy, Gaddy said that “in my experience, any 
sentence that begins ‘We recognize that this is a 
religious freedom issue, but…’ is usually followed 
by an attempt to circumvent the guarantee of 
religious freedom on the basis of discomfort and 
bigotry. To oppose this project because Islam is 
involved and Muslims are sponsors of it is a viola-
tion of the religious freedom guaranteed and pro-
tected by the First Amendment of the Constitu-
tion, period.”
Contrary to his approach, there is what might 
be called the “religious freedom, but” approach. 
This is apparent in Nathan Diament’s response to 
Gaddy: “There is a difference between rights which 
must be protected under the law, and courtesies, 
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the mutual respect and common decency that 
neighbors owe to one another. Yes, those behind 
the building of the mosque may have a legal right 
to do so, but should exercise self-restraint and not 
do so at this time.” In this approach, there is no 
questioning of the legal right, but the issue con-
cerned is what is proper to do, what is right to do. 
There has also been a third approach, one focused 
not on religious freedom but rather on private 
property rights, which I think is a very interest-
ing feature of the debate. This approach was rep-
resented by a speech given by Mayor Bloomberg 
in New York during the controversy. Bloomberg 
stated, “the simple fact is the building is a private 
property and the owners have a right to use the 
building as a house of worship, and the govern-
ment has no right whatsoever to deny their right. 
And if it were tried, the courts would almost 
certainly strike it down as a violation of the U.S. 
Constitution.” This kind of approach, interest-
ingly enough, is also followed by a section of the 
Tea Party movement which is represented by Ron 
Paul. Ron Paul was in favor of the mosque even 
though he has strong connections to the Tea Party 
movement. Therefore we must be very careful 
when attributing one kind of position to a partic-
ular political faction or political party.
There are also those from the Democratic Party 
who are against the mosque, so opposition is 
not just an issue for the GOP. Carl Paladino, 
for instance, argued against Andrew Cuomo’s 
position in favor of the mosque. Paladino said: 
“Andrew Cuomo supports the mosque. He says it 
is about religious freedom and he says the mosque 
construction should proceed. I say it is disrespect-
ful to the thousands who died on 9-11 and their 
families, insulting to the thousands of troops 
who’ve been killed or injured in the ensuing wars 
and an affront to American people. And it must 
be stopped.”
So as we can see, the political debate is not so eas-
ily classified according to traditional right and left 
positions; there are several nuances to be taken 
into consideration in the analysis. Nevertheless, 
as has already been stressed, there are clear con-
nections between these debates and the Tea Party 
movement.
From a legal perspective, a noteworthy issue con-
cerns the role of RLUIPA, the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act. RLUIPA, as 
some of you may know, is a law that was passed 
with unanimous bipartisan support in 2000. It 
was designed to facilitate the construction of 
places of religious worship. What is significant 
about RLUIPA in this context is Section 2(b)(2), 
which bars discrimination against any assembly 
or institution on the basis of religion or religious 
denomination. This is very interesting in relation 
to mosque construction because the construction 
of some mosques has been barred because of what 
appears to be religious discrimination. 
On the role of RLUIPA in this debate, the Obama 
Administration’s Department of Justice has given 
one official position, in relation to the Murfrees-
boro case. In an amicus brief submitted in the case, 
the Obama Administration tried to answer the 
main questions of crucial relevance to the applica-
tion of Section 2(b)(2) of RLUIPA. The most sig-
nificant of these was: is Islam a religion? This was 
of great importance to the political debate because 
a lot of people claim that Islam is not a religion so 
much as a political ideology. If Islam is a religion, 
then Islam and mosques are entitled to the protec-
tion guaranteed by Section 2(b)(2) of the RLUIPA. 
The response from the Obama Administration 
in the amicus brief was clear. To quote from the 
brief, “there is no question that Islam is a religion 
within the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause 
and related federal laws.” The brief went on to cite 
several cases from the US Supreme Court. Inter-
estingly enough, the Obama Administration also 
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quoted from a concurring opinion in McCreary 
County vs. ACLU whereby Justices Rehnquist, 
Thomas, and Kennedy wrote that “Islam is one 
of the three most popular religions in the United 
States.”  
So the Department of Justice’s position is clear. 
Any failure to treat mosques equally to churches 
in the application of zoning laws would be a viola-
tion of Section 2(b)(2) of the RLUIPA.
To summarize thus far, the political position 
is nuanced and we must be very careful not to 
reduce the issue to one of right-wing populism 
versus leftist, elitist movements. There are people 
who oppose mosques from the left, and there are 
those in favor of mosques from the right. The legal 
debate is quite clear. RLUIPA applies to Islam, so 
mosques are entitled to the protection offered by 
Section 2(b)(2).
Where are we going? First of all, there is com-
petition between the judicial sphere and the 
political sphere in the debate on the protection 
of Muslim Americans and their religious rights. 
This same competition has been noted in several 
other papers to date. Another interesting trend is 
the borrowing of arguments from the European 
extreme right for use in the debate on Islam, and 
vice versa. This was apparent in Geert Wilders’ 
speech in New York. Some of the developments in 
the political sphere have been responses to judi-
cial defeats. Representative Peter King’s hearings 
on Muslim radicalization seem to be an exam-
ple of this. Another trend is towards anti-Sharia 
amendments. These two elements lead the politi-
cal debate. 
A more interesting development is of what I call 
transnational populist networks. I have inter-
viewed several people working mainly in Ameri-
can and European think-tanks. This research has 
revealed very important transatlantic ties, both 
financial and intellectual. One clear example is the 
relationship between the English Defence League 
and Pamela Geller of Stop Islamization of Amer-
ica. It’s clear that efforts and political investments 
are passed from one side of the Atlantic to the 
other, that these groups have common positions 
and work to exchange ideas. This pattern repre-
sents the circulation of arguments and resources, 
the sharing of goals.
I want to conclude with a quotation from Mat-
thew Duss of the Center for American Progress. 
Duss writes, “Are there also radical Muslims in 
America right now trying to find ways to turn the 
US into a religious state? Most likely, yes, and we 
should be on guard against these. It’s worth not-
ing, however, that the Christian Right has failed 
at this for decades in a country where over 75% 
of people identify as Christian. So good luck with 
that, radical Muslims.” 
II. CATHOLIC RITUALS AND SYMBOLS 
IN GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS: 
JURIDICAL ARRANGEMENTS, 
POLITICAL DEBATES AND SECULAR 
ISSUES IN QUEBEC  
DAVID KOUSSENS
Although Quebec’s government institutions are 
secular, some symbols and practices inherited 
from the province’s Catholic history remain in 
many of them, such as in the National Assembly, 
hospitals, and city halls. While the Supreme Court 
of Canada has long defined the principle of sepa-
ration between church and state, the presence of 
crucifixes or Catholic rituals within these institu-
tions certainly challenges the reality of state neu-
trality. Drawing upon juridical and political data 
(i.e. jurisprudence and public reports such as the 
Bouchard-Taylor report), I propose to examine the 
dialectic relationship between juridical reasoning 
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and the recent political debates about the visibil-
ity of Catholic religious symbols and practices in 
government institutions. In so doing, I propose to 
show how the most recent jurisprudence questions 
the equilibrium between the historical heritage 
of the majority of the population and openness 
to religious diversity in the Province of Quebec. 
I will more precisely focus on two issues in this 
chapter: first, the legality of prayers being recited 
at the beginning of municipal council meetings; 
and second, the legality of crucifixes hanging in 
government institutions.
Concerning the prayers in Quebec Government 
institutions, the only existing legal text is a rule 
dated 1st April 1972 abolishing the recitation of a 
prayer before the opening of working sessions of 
members of parliament in the National Assem-
bly. In spite of this text, members of parliament 
perpetuated this practice, and it was only in 1976 
that the prayer was substituted with a moment of 
silence.84 If the recitation of prayers is now only a 
memory in the Quebec National Assembly, these 
rituals are nevertheless still practised in certain 
municipal council meetings, thereby questioning 
the neutrality of the management of municipal 
affairs. In the absence of a formal prohibition, the 
courts had to pronounce on the legality of these 
prayers in Government institutions. In a verdict on 
22nd September 2006,85 the Quebec Human Rights 
Tribunal (QHRT) based its argument on the prin-
ciple of equality between citizens and on the free-
dom of conscience and religion, both of which are 
guaranteed by the Canadian and Quebec “Charter 
of Human Rights and Freedoms” (CHRF), to ban 
the recitation of prayers at the council meetings of 
the city of Laval in the suburbs of Montreal. In this 
case, the plaintiff, Madame Payette, argued that 
84  Assemblée nationale du Québec, Bulletin, vol. 12, 
no 4, december 1982, p. 14
85  Tribunal des droits de la personne, Commission des 
droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse v. 
Laval (Ville de), 2006 QCTDP 17 (CanLII)
the Laval council was interfering in a discrimina-
tory manner with her right to the recognition and 
exercise of her freedom of religion and conscience by 
beginning the public sittings of the City Council with 
these ritual practices. The QHRT judged that:
the practice of reciting a prayer at the 
public sittings of the City Council of the 
City of Laval impairs Madame Payette’s 
right to the recognition and exercise of 
her convictions as a non-believer, and 
the right not to be forced to take part 
in a religious observance in which she 
does not believe and to which she does 
not adhere.86
In this decision, state neutrality is an implicit 
result of the constitutional guarantee of freedom 
of conscience and religion. In fact, the tribunal 
added that “the recitation of the prayer imposes 
a religious atmosphere and tone that produces 
a form of coercion contrary to the spirit of the 
CHRF and the dignity of non-believers or people 
who do not adhere to that religious ideal.” . This 
argumentation directly referred to a Supreme 
Court of Canada decision of 24th April 1985,87 a 
decision which ruled that:
Freedom of conscience and religion 
can primarily be characterized by the 
absence of coercion or constraint. If a 
person is compelled by the state or the 
will of another to a course of action or 
inaction which he would not otherwise 
have chosen, he is not acting of his own 
volition and he cannot be said to be 
truly free.
The public report presented by Gérard Bouchard 
and Charles Taylor on 22nd May 2008, during 
the controversy around practices of reasonable 
accommodation in Quebec, made the government 
86  Idem
87  Q. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 R.C.S. 295
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institution’s obligation of neutrality more explic-
it.88 The report recalled that neutrality is a norma-
tive requirement imposed on the state, thereby 
limiting the reasons that can be invoked to justify 
policies adopted. However, the report added that 
it would be too restrictive to impose on believers, 
whose faith must be expressed in ritual or sym-
bolic practices and behaviour, a duty of neutrality 
by avoiding displays of their faith when they use 
public institutions. Indeed, the report found that 
the individual and collective expression of free-
dom of conscience and religion must be authorized 
in Government institutions (schools, prisons, and 
hospitals, for instance). But these institutions can-
not embrace any of the numerous religious con-
victions, nor limit the expression of any of them. 
For this reason, the report recommended avoiding 
maintaining the recitation of a prayer at the public 
sittings of city councils simply because this now 
seems to have only heritage value. It argued that 
these practices clearly identify the state with a reli-
gion, usually that of the majority, and should be 
abandoned because the appearance of neutrality 
is a guarantee of the citizen’s—and notably mem-
bers of religious minorities’—confidence in the 
institutions. 
The Quebec Commission on Human Rights 
quickly endorsed the Bouchard-Taylor Report’s 
position. First, in a letter sent on 15th May 2008 to 
the Fédération québécoise des municipalités and to 
the Union des municipalités du Québec, the Com-
mission clearly affirmed that the recitation of the 
prayer at the public sittings of city councils was a 
threat to the principle of state neutrality. Second, 
the Commission had to give a verdict on whether 
or not this practice in the city council of Trois-
Rivières was compatible with the Quebec CHRF. 
88  Commission de consultation sur les pratiques 
d’accommodement reliées aux différences cul-
turelles. 2008. Fonder l’avenir. Le temps de la 
conciliation. Rapport, p. 143, http://www.accom-
modements.qc.ca/documentation/rapports/rap-
port-final-integral-fr.pdf
In a decision of 17th December 2008, the Commis-
sion ruled that the recitation of the prayer by the 
mayor of Trois-Rivières constituted the exercise of 
a religious practice which is incompatible, on the 
one hand, with respect for the freedom of con-
science and religion of citizens, and, on the other 
hand, with the obligation of state neutrality.89
With this decision, state neutrality expressly 
became the ground for the prohibition of a prac-
tice qualified as religious, and in a decision dated 
9th February 2011 the QHRT judicially reaffirmed 
this position in a case relative to Saguenay in the 
north of Quebec.90 In this case, which was widely 
debated in the Quebec media, the plaintiff, Mr. 
Simoneau, asked the tribunal to convict the mayor 
of Saguenay for reciting prayers at the city council 
meetings. He argued that these prayers were not 
cultural but religious practices infringing his right 
to be an atheist. 
In framing the decision, after deducing from the 
text of the prayer (“God, Guide us… God, Help 
us…”) that it was calling for divine intervention 
in the governance of the city, the tribunal also 
argued that it would be insulting for the mayor to 
deny the religious character of the prayer because 
the mayor himself was justifying the practice as 
a necessary “fight for Christ.” It is thus precisely 
because the recitation of prayers is not a cultural 
but a religious practice that it threatens the prin-
ciple of state neutrality. 
Unfortunately, the decision of the QHRT did not 
put an end to the mayor of Saguenay’s “fight for 
Christ.” On the contrary, the controversy quickly 
overflowed beyond the limits of the city. In Feb-
89  Commission des droits de la personne et des droits 
de la jeunesse, Louise Hubert c. Ville de Trois-
Rivières et Yves Lévesques, Résolution CP-529.18, 17 
décembre 2008
90 Tribunal des droits de la personne. Alain Sino-
neau et Mouvement laïque québécois v. Jean Trem-
blay et ville de Saguenay (2011), QCTDP 1.
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ruary and March, the mayor collected donations 
from across the country and decided to appeal 
against the tribunal’s verdict. In the context of an 
increasing visibility of minority group religious 
practices, and after the heated debates around 
practices of reasonable accommodation in Que-
bec, a number of individuals—mostly cultural 
Catholics—consider cultural diversity an affront 
to the Catholic heritage and its historical preroga-
tives. They associate secularism with shared val-
ues, which would include the secularized Catholic 
heritage. While it is certainly difficult to include 
prayers in this category, the question is neverthe-
less still asked and the Quebec Court of Appeal 
will have to come to a decision before the end of 
the year. Not only will it have to decide on the 
prayers but also on another litigious question: the 
legality of crucifixes in government institutions.
The question of the legality of crucifixes in gov-
ernment institutions is absent from the law. It 
was therefore the responsibility of the tribunals to 
evaluate, on a case by case basis, if the conditions 
in which crucifixes were installed in government 
institutions were compatible with the freedom of 
conscience and religion guaranteed in the CHRF.
In the first cases relating to the crucifixes on the 
walls of the audience rooms of tribunals, the 
judges did not directly found their reasoning on 
the freedom of conscience and religion and on 
state neutrality, but on another principle guaran-
teed by the CHRF: the citizen’s right to a fair hear-
ing before an independent and impartial tribunal.
In a decision dated 5th December 1991,91 the 
Supreme Court of Canada specified that “the 
requirement of impartiality has both an individ-
ual and an institutional aspect and both aspects 
are encompassed by the constitutional guaran-
tee of an “independent and impartial tribunal.” 
Therefore, whether or not any particular judge 
91  Q. v. Lippé, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114
harboured pre-conceived ideas or biases, “if the 
system is structured in such a way as to create a 
reasonable apprehension of bias on an institu-
tional level, the requirement of impartiality is not 
met.”
The Quebec Commission on Human Rights , 
in a decision dated 21st December 1994, directly 
referred to the Supreme Court of Canada’s argu-
mentation to pronounce on the legality of a cru-
cifix on the wall of the audience room of a tribu-
nal in Quebec. The Commission ruled that, even if 
there is no discrimination, the presence of a crucifix 
in the audience room of a tribunal may limit the 
citizen’s confidence in the impartiality of the Que-
bec juridical system. In this reasoning, the Com-
mission avoided pronouncing itself on the principle 
of state neutrality that should be required of the 
juridical system, but it may nonetheless have made 
such a pronunciation implicitly by ruling that it is 
the requirement of the appearance of impartiality 
that requires that certain traces of the religion of 
the majority must be abandoned. 
The question of the legality of a crucifix in a city 
council meeting room, in this case in that of the 
borough of Verdun in Montreal, was asked for 
the first time before the Quebec Commission on 
Human Rights on 11th June 2008.92 In this case, 
the Commission considered that the relevant cri-
terion for assessing the incompatibility of a reli-
gious symbol with the CHRF  was that of coercion. 
The Commission affirmed that “the single pres-
ence of a religious symbol in a government 
institution is not in itself incompatible with the 
Charters of Rights (CHRF) , unless this symbol 
acquires a coercive character because of the context 
of vulnerability of the persons who are exposed to 
it.” The Commission thereby validated the legality 
92  Commission des droits de la personne et des droits 
de la jeunesse, Mouvement laïque québécois et C.T 
c. Ville de Montréal-Arrondissement de Verdun, 
Résolution CP-521.3, 11 juin 2008.
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of the presence of the crucifix in the city council 
meeting room by considering that no vulnerable 
person attended the deliberations of the council 
meeting. It defined “vulnerable persons” as “cap-
tive, young or impressionable persons.” It can be 
inferred from this reasoning that religious sym-
bols installed in institutions frequented by per-
sons of this kind, that is to say prisons, schools, or 
hospitals, could be qualified as coercive symbols 
incompatible with the CHRF .
The same reasoning was endorsed by the 
Bouchard-Taylor report in 2008, which considered 
that a religious symbol, for instance a crucifix, is 
thus compatible with secular principles “when it is 
a historic reminder rather than a sign of religious 
identification by a public institution.” It added that 
“a symbol or ritual stemming from the religion of 
the majority does not infringe basic freedoms if 
it is not accompanied by any restriction on indi-
viduals’ behavior.”  In promoting such compatibil-
ity, the Bouchard-Taylor report proposed a form of 
compromise that has a number of traits in com-
mon with the concept of the “secular pact” initi-
ated by French sociologist Jean Baubérot. 
Using this concept, Jean Baubérot described how 
the French law on the Separation of Church and 
State in 1905 permitted the State to overcome the 
conflict between the “two Frances,” that is to say, 
between the Catholic tradition and the secular 
movement, by taking into account the old—and 
notably the Catholic—heritage to build the new.93
Why transpose this concept of the “secular pact” 
to the Bouchard-Taylor report proposal? Let us 
remember that the Commission was working in a 
very tense context. The Commission itself recalled 
that during the controversy around practices of 
reasonable accommodation in Quebec, accom-
modations were perceived as one-way processes. 
93  Baubérot, Jean. 2006. L’intégrisme républicain 
contre la laïcité, Coll. « Essai » Paris : Éditions de 
l’Aube, p. 170.
It was always the immigrants, who were regarded 
as the main requesters, who won. They were there-
fore perceived as people endangering Quebec’s 
culture and calling into question Quebec’s Chris-
tian foundations. In order to overcome the con-
flict, the Bouchard-Taylor report avoided ignoring 
these popular representations and preferred to 
integrate elements of the religion of the majority, 
which can be qualified as secularized elements, 
into the secular model proposed for the Province 
of Quebec.
But at the same time, the Bouchard-Taylor report 
also proposed removing the crucifix above the 
chair of the president of the National Assembly 
of Quebec—certainly the very embodiment of the 
constitutional state—and relocating this symbol 
in the Parliament building in a place that empha-
sizes its meaning as cultural heritage. 
This proposition was immediately rejected by the 
National Assembly, which unanimously passed a 
motion affirming Quebecers’ “attachment to their 
religious and historic heritage represented by the 
crucifix.” Nevertheless, the permanence of the 
crucifix in the Quebec National Assembly is no 
longer guaranteed and the most recent jurispru-
dence now refuses to consider crucifixes as hold-
ing heritage value that prevails over their religious 
character.94 
The case dated 9th February 2011 regarding the 
prayer in Saguenay has previously been mentioned. 
In the same case, the QHRT also ruled that even 
if the exhibition of crucifixes may be considered 
a cultural tradition, this does not have the effect 
of removing their religious character from these 
symbols or of guaranteeing that the institution 
does not impose a particular religious morality. 
By deducing an infringement of the freedom of 
conscience and religion of unbelievers or atheists 
94  Assemblée nationale, Procès-verbal de l’Assemblée, 
jeudi 22 mai 2008, no 87, 38è législature, première 
session, p. 840.
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from the religious character of the crucifix, the 
tribunal clearly affirmed that the case in Saguenay 
did not respect the principle of state neutrality. 
With this decision, the law relative to religious 
symbols in Quebec government institutions was 
clarified and, according to the QHRT’s argument, 
it cannot be doubted that the crucifix installed in 
the National Assembly also falls under the cat-
egory of religious symbols. However, the law has 
only been temporarily clarified. The QHRT’s deci-
sion was appealed by the mayor of Saguenay and 
also criticized in political circles. 
And, it should also be mentioned, by way of a 
conclusion, that on 9th February 2011, that is to 
say the day of the QHRT’s decision regarding the 
prayer and the crucifix, the National Assembly 
unanimously adopted a motion to block members 
of the Sikh community, who wanted to testify on 
a project of law relative to practices of reasonable 
accommodation, from entering the Assembly after 
they refused to remove their kirpans (ceremonial 
dagger).95 While the deputies justified this motion 
with security considerations, they also argued 
that the wearing of the kirpan in the National 
Assembly was an infringement of the principle of 
neutrality. 
Two unanimously adopted motions then: the first 
one in 2008 relative to the crucifix installed in the 
National Assembly and interpreted by the depu-
ties as a symbol of Quebec’s cultural heritage; the 
second, banning a religious symbol—the kirpan—
in the same assembly in the name of state neutral-
ity. The question of equilibrium between the his-
torical heritage of the majority of the population 
and openness to religious diversity in Quebec is 
thus obviously still open. 
95  Assemblée nationale, Procès-verbal de l’Assemblée, 
mercredi 9 février 2011, vol. 41, no 170, 39è 
législature, première session, http://www.assnat.
qc.ca/fr/travaux-parlementaires/assemblee-natio-
nale/39-1/journal-debats/20110209/30891.html#_
Toc285107869
III. COMMENTS 
MARIANNE FARINA
In looking at Pasqual Annichino’s paper, I was 
interested in these debates over the issue of build-
ing places of worship, especially mosques, in the 
United States. I thought it was important that the 
study maps the issues, getting the local context of 
these actors and actions. The study also marks the 
journey through the persons, the movements, and 
the rearticulation of the various views concerning 
these particular constructions. Appreciating the 
complexity of the local situation gives us the clear-
est perspective as to what’s being debated here.
Our religions have complex identities, and our 
symbols communicate many things. It takes a 
broad conversation to move away from what 
Charles Hirschkind called the tyranny of bilateral 
or bipolar conversations. We need other groups to 
get into the conversation about the political ver-
sus the legal in order to to complicate and prob-
lematize this tyranny. I think that, by bringing in 
their own perspectives, some of these groups will 
expand the conversation and help find more con-
crete solutions. I wonder what other groups you 
are investigating, because I think others (not only 
from the political and legal spheres) have some-
thing to contribute to these debates.
Another important issue for your analysis is the 
transnationalization of religions. I think the ques-
tion of the politicization of mosque construction 
is broader than just one incident. For example, 
debates over the presidency in Kenya in 2007 
also evince a transnational conversation between 
Protestant and Catholic groups over selection of 
the Kenyan president. So I think that this whole 
transnationalization of religions is an issue that 
is part of the indigenization of religions. Because 
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of our global identities, this transnationalization 
trend is one that’s always going to be present.
As for David Koussens’s paper. I just want to say 
that, given all this discussion about cross and cru-
cifix, I’m wearing one. There are important dis-
tinctions that I would like to make. As a theolo-
gian, I would say that the crucifix will have the 
image of Jesus and the cross will not have the 
image of Jesus. We must understand those dif-
ferences, especially when considering the notion 
(which has been repeated this morning) that the 
crucifix is compatible with secular principles and 
does not impose a particular religious identity. 
This sentiment makes every Catholic saint roll in 
his or her grave because the crucifix is supposed 
to say something. Wearing it is supposed to be a 
stumbling block and an obstacle to reason. So I 
think that we have to look at that. Now, our dis-
cussion of Quebec and issues concerning majority 
and minority rights has proceeded as if confes-
sional identities did not matter within this cat-
egory and also as if we did not have a multiplicity 
of confessional identities. I don’t just mean confes-
sion in the sense of faith, but also the confession 
of heritage, ethnicity, and race that are all in that 
category of minority-majority rights. When I can-
not express my confessional identity in material 
symbols or symbolic actions, is it not a threat to 
my own human rights? Does a policy of neutral-
ity violate my cultural and confessional rights? If 
so, is that a violation of my dignity as a person? In 
this debate, what rights get to trump other rights?
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SESSION V
THE CASE OF ASIAN COUNTRIES
I. CRACKS IN THE MOSAIC: THE RISE 
OF ETHNONATIONALIST GROUPS IN MA-
LAYSIA  
SOPHIE LEMIÈRE
In this talk, I’m going to give a case study on the 
rise of ethnonationalist groups in Malaysia. In 
order to understand the origins and challenges of 
this movement, it is necessary to give a bit of back-
ground first. 
Historically, Malaysia has been at the crossroad 
of civilizations. Contemporary Malaysia is thus 
a mosaic of language, culture, customs, and reli-
gion. It is often described as a multicultural and 
multi-religious country, where communities live 
in peace and harmony. But the growing space 
occupied by religions in the public sphere and 50 
years of ethnic-based politics have triggered many 
tensions. 
Since independence in 1957, the ethnic compo-
sition of Malaysia has dominated the country’s 
politics. Malaysia is a diverse country where 
about 60% of the population is Muslim. Islam is 
the official religion of the federation. The ethnic 
distribution is virtually identical to the religious 
composition. The largest part of the population 
in Malaysia is Bumiputera—I will come back to 
this identity later—then a large Chinese-descent 
minority, and a smaller Indian-descent commu-
nity. Most of the population is actually Muslim, 
so most of the Bumiputera are Muslims. Malay-
sia includes important Buddhist and Christian 
minorities as well. 
Malaysian society is divided along two parame-
ters: religion and ethnicity. The difference between 
Muslim and non-Muslim matters legally. Muslims 
are subjected to both Islamic and civil laws, while 
non-Muslims are subjected to civil laws only.  The 
ethnic criteria of differentiation creates two cat-
egories: Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera. Bumi-
putera means, literally, the “son of the soil.” The 
differences between the two categories mostly 
concern economical privileges.  Bumiputera is a 
virtual category with no legal basis and includes 
Malay, native Sabah and Sarawak (the two states 
in Borneo), and indigenous people from the pen-
insula called Orang Asli (translated as “the origi-
nal people”). 
So the concept of “Bumiputera rights” follows the 
adage “first come, first served.” Bumiputera are 
considered as the first inhabitants of the terri-
tory and according to this primacy they “should” 
be entitled to a bigger share of resources. Since 
Malaysian independence, the National Constitu-
tion has stipulated that Malays and the native of 
Sabah and Sarawak (i.e. Bumiputera) have a spe-
cial status regarding public services, education, 
land ownership, property acquisition, and busi-
ness, as well as state leadership positions. These 
preferences, coupled with economic policies of 
affirmative action started in the 1970s, mean that 
Bumiputera enjoy significant advantages in get-
ting government positions, university admission, 
loans, investment shares, and public contracts. 
Malaysia is actually one of the rare cases where 
affirmative action is directed at the majority. 
In sum, although Malaysians are unified under 
the banner of their citizenship, they are institu-
tionally and constitutionally segregated. Each 
ethnic community has its own vernacular school 
(Chinese, Indian, and Malay), its own religion 
(Christian, Hindu, Muslim, Taoist, etc.), and its 
own laws (Islamic or secular, you may call it sharia 
and civil law). The political landscape follows this 
pattern: most political parties are ethnic-based. 
The UMNO (United Malays National Organiza-
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tion) represents the Malays. The MCA (Malaysian 
Chinese Association) represents the Chinese. The 
MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress) represents the 
Indians.  In addition, Malaysia contains other 
parties that represent various indigenous popula-
tions.
So the impossibility of establishing a consensus 
over Malaysian identity has resulted in a polar-
ization of ethnic and religious communities. The 
current tensions between ethno-religious groups 
in Malaysia have been present since the indepen-
dence of the country (and even before), leading to 
several ethnic riots and “race-related” violence in 
1964, 1969, 2001, 2007, and 2010. Moreover, there 
has been an increase in religion-related violence 
since 2001. 
The lack of consensus over Malaysian identity 
has challenged the success of governments since 
independence. Today, Prime Minister Najib’s gov-
ernment faces the same issue of national identity, 
which is interestingly linked to religious member-
ship. In the case of France, the question is, wrongly, 
phrased by the government as: how to integrate 
Muslims?  Ironically, in Malaysia, the question is 
reversed: how to integrate non-Muslims?  
To what extent is a government able and allowed 
to influence and even shape the idea of national 
identity? Today, the population of the Malaysian 
state has been recast from its origins by migra-
tions, trade, and the colonial power. The original, 
indigenous people of the territories are today’s 
minorities. The Malays are seen as the “true” peo-
ple, while Indian and Chinese are still considered 
immigrants—indeed, they are still referred to by 
ethnicity as “Indian” or “Chinese.” 
In fact, Najib’s government did not intend to step 
into the national identity debate. It did not try to 
define or redefine Malaysian identity, but rather 
chose a cosmetic-community rebinding strategy. 
Launched in 2009, the “One Malaysia” campaign 
reaffirmed the beauty of Malaysian diversity and 
unity. It started with a gigantic multicultural, 
multi-racial and multi-religious aerobic exercise 
session through mixed traditions of dance on the 
main square with the prime minister and his wife. 
One of the sub-campaigns organized under the 
“One Malaysia” campaign was the “Satu Tandas” 
campaign often translated as “One Toilet.” This 
concept promoted the idea of having common toi-
lets for professors and students in universities and 
schools in order to get them closer. In April 2010, 
about one year after the One Malaysia campaign 
began, polling by the Merdeka Center found that 
46% of respondents affirmed that the “One Malay-
sia” concept was part of a political agenda to win 
non-Malay votes. 
In contrast, “ketuanan melayu,” or Malay 
supremacy, is the motto of ethnonationalist orga-
nizations. Ethnonationalist groups are often reg-
istered as NGOs and operate on the edge between 
civil society and the political scene. Religion and 
identity are used as axioms of this ethnonation-
alist movement, which aims at securing politi-
cal power and economic privilege for the Malay. 
Ethnonationalist groups act as right-wing lobby 
or pressure groups seizing the emotion of their 
counterparts to awaken ethnonationalist feeling 
through the “media coup.” This media coup strat-
egy can be seen as a way to attract media atten-
tion by organizing “bankable events” or releasing 
powerful or shocking statements. This strategy is 
seen in the context of the controversies related to, 
for example, religious freedom (Allah controversy 
or Lina Joy’s case) and elections. Public space is 
indeed a virtual space of debate through which 
these groups express their discourse in order to 
influence political parties, including the ruling 
party, and their constituencies.
Until the general election of 2008, most of the 
ethnonationalist groups remained marginal or 
underground phenomenon. In fact, most of these 
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groups are linked, sharing members and even 
leaders. The election in 2008 weakened the ruling 
coalition and revived the old fear of the possibil-
ity for non-Malays to take power. Several groups 
emerged out of the blue to voice this concern, 
often relaying racist discourse. 
Malay nationalism has been a vibrant component 
of Malaysian politics in the pre-war period, when 
Malayans lived under the rule of the British Empire. 
Nationalism was a key element in the discourse of 
anti-colonial movements, be they Islamist reform-
ists or secular traditionalists. Malay nationalism 
has always been embodied by the United Malay 
National Organization, which was created in 1946 
and remains the ruling part of the country today. 
Until the creation of the NGO Pribumi Perkasa 
Negara, or Perkasa, a Malay-right interest group, 
UMNO held a monopoly of the expression of sec-
ular, non-Islamist Malay nationalism. This hege-
mony was threatened by the results of the general 
election in 2008: “a political tsunami” that saw the 
success of the opposition coalition. These results 
(and the fear of losing non-Malay votes) prompted 
Prime Minister Najib Razak to announce reforms 
of the policies favoring the Malay. The election 
results and the political move of Najib wakened 
the old fear in the Malay community of being 
overthrown economically and politically by the 
non-Malays. This fear has been crystallized in the 
discourse of Ibrahim Ali, the president of Perkasa 
and an elected member of Parliament (Pasir Mas 
constituency, State of Kelantan). This NGO has 
been alternatively supported or criticized since its 
creation by the former minister Mahathir Moha-
mad, who remains the organization’s patron. Per-
kasa has given a new face to Malay nationalism. 
Perkasa is not the first ethnonationalist NGO, but 
it remains the most visible and active one on the 
political scene. Perkasa is not a mainstream orga-
nization. In fact, it seems to push extreme poli-
cies that had previously been promoted mostly 
by the UMNO. Perkasa’s rethoric concentrates on 
two main axes: the defense of Malay rights and of 
the religion of Islam. Perkasa is a newcomer in the 
Malaysian public sphere, yet it is also the biggest 
Malay NGO claiming more than 200,000 mem-
bers. 
Perkasa’s strategy aimed at countering the politi-
cal and economic reforms announced by Najib, 
which, they claimed, challenged the supremacy, 
economic privileges, identity, and religion of 
Malays. Perkasa encourages social and political 
upheaval, and non-Malay parties are calling for its 
ban. But the government seems reluctant to take 
action against the organization for fear of los-
ing Malay votes. In fact, the organization seems 
to benefit from the support of a fringe of the rul-
ing party, and may be seen as part of that party’s 
political strategy. 
So is vox Perkasa, vox populi? The question is 
whether Perkasa really embodies the voices of 
the majority of the Malays in Malaysia. The rise 
of Perkasa and other ethnonationalist groups has 
emphasized the decisiveness of the concept of a 
current Malaysian nation and identity. It reveals 
the shortcomings of the Malaysian system of gov-
ernance and highlights its ambiguities. In fact, it 
seems today that the government’s majority has 
been hijacked by the right-wing lobby and, sub-
sequently, that it has struggled to restore cred-
ibility and trust within the non-Malay constitu-
encies. Ethnonationalist NGOS like Perkasa are 
challenging the ruling party and reshaping the 
boundaries of religious and political pluralism in 
Malaysia through an attempt to outcast the secu-
lar non-Muslim and non-Malay voices. It is too 
early to determine the long-run impact of Perkasa 
and to determine whether the organization truly 
represents the voice of the majority of Malays or is 
just part of UMNOs political strategy. However, 
it seems that the organization holds strong bases 
in both rural and urban constituencies. The com-
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ing general election will certainly add crucial ele-
ments to the analysis. 
II. YOU SHALL GO TO HELL: LEGAL 
ARGUMENTS ON FORCED CONVERSIONS 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
MARCO VENTURA 
The theme of conversion is a huge topic, with 
nuanced implications for the interaction of texts, 
religions, and identity, as illustrated by Massimo 
Leone in his Religious Conversion and Identity.96 
Conversions in India are also a vast area of inves-
tigation. By means of anticipation of my history 
of religion in British, Indian, and South African 
Courts,97 this paper will offer a brief reflection 
on some documents, mainly court decisions. The 
paper is based on my visit to the Supreme Court of 
India in 2011.
I will start from the end by illustrating a crucial 
2011 judgment delivered by the Supreme Court 
of India. I will then briefly discuss the colonial 
background, which remains important to under-
standing the whole picture. Then, I will focus on 
post-colonial, independent India and on three 
different phases—the first in the 1950s, the sec-
ond  in the late 1960s and the 1970s, and the third 
at the end of the 1990s. I will finally offer some 
very brief conclusions. The case decided by the 
Supreme Court on 21 January 2011 is a famous 
case that goes back to 1999. An Australian mis-
sionary named Graham Staines was burned alive 
while sleeping in his car with his two minor chil-
dren in the region of Orissa. The culprit was ini-
tially convicted by the High Court. The convicted 
appealed the life sentence to the Supreme Court. 
96  (Routledge, 2003)
97  (Cascade Books, 2013)See the book also for fur-
ther case law, literature and sources in general.
In the Supreme Court’s judgment that upheld the 
sentence, drafted by Justice P. Sathasivam, two 
paragraphs are particularly worth quoting. The 
first one is paragraph 43: 
Though Graham Staines and his two 
minor sons were burned to death while 
they were sleeping inside the station 
wagon at Manuharpur, the intention 
was to teach a lesson to Graham Staines 
about his religious activities, namely 
converting poor tribes to Christianity.98
Remarks by the court were unnecessary and 
sounded like an indirect legitimation of the mur-
ders’ motives. One could ask whether there was a 
need for the court to specify that this murder was 
perpetrated in order “to teach a lesson,” as well as 
whether the wording here was appropriate.
Confirming the impression that the court itself 
wanted “to teach a lesson” on the danger of con-
versions, paragraph 47 dealt with the issue of con-
version:
It’s undisputed that there is no justifi-
cation for interfering in one’s belief by 
way of use of force, provocation, con-
version, incitement or upon a flawed 
premise that one religion is better than 
the other. 
The court’s opinion prompted widespread pro-
tests. In particular, the leading daily newspaper 
The Hindu published a column reporting a letter 
signed by members of the civil society, including 
the chief editors of the most important Indian 
newspapers. The letter indicated that “leading edi-
tors, media and groups of the civil society from 
across the country have signed a statement taking 
strong exception to the Supreme Court’s observa-
tion that the killers intended to teach the Austra-
98  Supreme Court of India, Rabindra Kumar Pal @ 
Dara Singh, 21 January 2011.
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lian missionary a lesson for preaching and practic-
ing conversion.”99 Arguing that the remarks were 
gratuitous, unconstitutional, and went against 
the freedom of faith guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion, the signatories asked that they be expunged. 
The signatories said the Supreme Court and other 
judicial forums were secular India’s last hope to 
preserve constitutional guarantees given to reli-
gious minorities and other marginalized groups.
Two days later, the Supreme Court redrafted the 
decision. Although no reason was given for the 
change, this was a clear response to the pressure 
by the press. How was it changed? Paragraph 
43’s infamous expression “teaching a lesson” 
was excised and replaced by a more straightfor-
ward statement: the “life sentence awarded by the 
High Court need not be enhanced.” Paragraph 47, 
which had the charged description of “unaccept-
able conversion,” was revised as follows: “there is 
no justification for interfering in someone’s reli-
gious belief by any means.” The problem was still 
there, but the decision was now drafted in a more 
moderate way.
In the meantime, The Hindu (in the edition of 24 
January 2011) also rectified itself—a curious case 
of double rectification by both the court and the 
newspaper. The Hindu amended its reporting by 
indicating that the statement of protest had not, in 
fact, been signed by the chief editors of all (or even 
the main) Indian newspapers.
The case illustrates two crucial features of the pub-
lic approach to conversions in India. On the one 
hand, conversions are negatively seen not only in 
the society at large, but also in many articulations 
of the state, like the judiciary—and the Supreme 
Court in particular. On the other hand, the anti-
conversion bias takes the shape of ambiguous and 
tortuous legal concepts, as eminently witnessed by 
the “no right to conversion” doctrine. The follow-
99  The Hindu, 23 January, 2011.
ing part of this paper will present a short history 
of the blurred legal approach to conversion as sub-
servient to the social and political uneasiness with 
inter-religious mobility. 
The discussion on conversions and crossing the 
boundaries of religious memberships in India is 
based on the colonial legacy and the paramount 
imperial strategy of dividing India into commu-
nities along religious lines. A famous rule of the 
Warren Hastings plan of 1772 stated that, “in all 
suits regarding marriage, inheritance, caste and 
other religious usages and institutions, the law of 
the Qur’an with respect to Mohammedans and 
the law of the Shaster with respect to the Hindus 
shall be invariably adhered to.” The forging of 
separate communities with separate laws for mat-
ters of family law was thus the result of the impe-
rial re-interpretation of Indian multicultural and 
multi-religious society.
After independence, the Indian constituent 
assembly and civil society engaged in a crucial 
debate on the place of personal laws in the new 
Indian legal system as well as on the reform of reli-
gious laws. Article 44 of the Indian Constitution 
envisaged the adoption of a uniform civil code: 
this was certainly a defeat of those who defended 
religious personal laws, but it was not a victory 
of those who wanted personal laws to be swept 
away either. Hindu personal law was reformed 
through piecemeal legislation in the mid-1950s. 
Against this background, in 1954 Justice Bijan 
Kumar Mukherjea for the Indian Supreme Court 
concluded that “the right to propagate religious 
views for the edification of others is recognized 
as a substantial part of Section 25 of the Indian 
Constitution on religious freedom.”100 The judge 
further established that “every person has a 
fundamental right under our Constitution not 
100 Supreme Court of India, Ratilal    
 Panachand Gandhi Vs The State of Bom  
 bay and Ors, 18  March 1954.
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merely to entertain such religious belief as may 
be approved of by his judgment or conscience but 
to exhibit his belief and ideas in such overt acts 
as are enjoined or sanctioned by his religion and 
further to propagate his religious views for the 
edification of others.”101 The Court added that it 
was “immaterial whether the propagation is made 
by a person in its individual capacity or on behalf 
of any church or institution.” 102 That same year, 
in Madhya Pradesh, the Niyogi Committee was 
instituted to investigate abusive activities of con-
version by Christian missionaries. The committee 
issued a landmark report in 1956 that established 
a basic criticism of conversions. The report found 
that conversions were induced by rich foreigners 
and missionaries from abroad, each of whom (in 
the course of pursuing an international agenda) 
brought in money to build facilities, hospitals, and 
schools in order to induce conversions. It found 
that those who converted were the weak and 
poor tribes, or “untouchables.” It also found that 
conversion was routinely performed by force or 
fraud. The report made “conversion” synonymous 
with “forced conversion.” This vision culminated 
in recommendation n. 5: “Any attempt by force 
or fraud, or threats of illicit means or grants of 
financial or other aid, or by fraudulent means or 
promises, or by moral and material assistance, or 
by taking advantage of any person’s inexperience 
or confidence, or by exploiting any person’s neces-
sity, spiritual (mental) weakness or thoughtless-
ness, or, in general, any attempt or effort (whether 
successful or not), directly or indirectly to pen-
etrate into the religious conscience of persons 
(whether of age or underage) of another faith, for 
the purpose of consciously altering their religious 
conscience or faith, so as to agree with the ideas or 
convictions of the proselytizing party should be 
absolutely prohibited.”
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
Indeed, the Niyogi Committee’s report contained 
the main arguments from which the legal discus-
sion of conversions developed in the following 
decades. As Gauri Viswanathan noted, “the Niyogi 
Commission’s landmark report set the lines of an 
argument that have continued to the present day, 
blurring the lines between force and consent and 
giving very little credence to the possibility that 
converts change over to another religion because 
they choose to.”103
The Niyogi Committee’s report yielded its most 
spectacular fruits in the states of Orissa and Mad-
hya Pradesh, both of which were heavily exposed 
to efforts of Christian missionaries for social rea-
sons. In 1967 and 1968, both states passed acts 
against forced conversion. Both of these acts were 
challenged before the local high courts. In 1972 
the Orissa High Court struck down Orissa’s anti-
conversion act as inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion and thus illegitimate. Based on significant 
testimonial evidence by the Christian applicants, 
the Orissa High Court agreed that Christian-
ity could not be propagated or expressed with-
out “mild threats.”104 In fact, witnesses reported, 
the following is normal practice for Christians: 
“The preacher says: ‘You (non-Christians) shall 
go to hell’ or ‘You shall not obtain salvation.’ The 
preacher also often says: ‘Wrath of God shall come 
down upon you’ or ‘God will be displeased with 
you.’”105 The Court also accepted that conversion 
to Christianity could be a deliberate attempt to 
escape poverty and social disadvantage: “people 
of the depressed classes in society feel that they 
are hated and despised by the well-placed section 
of people. People of the depressed classes embrace 
Christianity voluntarily as an escape.”106 Hence 
103 G. Viswanathan, Outside the Fold. Conversion,  
 Modernity, and Belief, (ed orig 1998, New   
 Delhi: OUP, 2001.
104 Orissa High Court, Yulitha Hyde and Others v.  
 State of Orissa, 24 October 1972.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
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the conclusion that for Christians religious free-
dom in India also implied a “right to conversion”: 
“The true scope of the guarantee under Art. 25 (1) 
of the Constitution (…) must be taken to extend 
to propagate religion and as a necessary corol-
lary of this proposition, conversion into one’s own 
religion has to be included in the right so far as a 
Christian citizen is concerned.”107 
One and a half years later the High Court of Mad-
hya Pradesh took the opposite view. The judges 
upheld the anti-conversion legislation, finding 
it perfectly consistent with those Constitutional 
principles that “establish the equality of religious 
freedom for all citizens by prohibiting conversion 
by objectionable activities such as conversion by 
force, fraud and by allurement.”108 Equality of reli-
gions, for the judges, can’t admit of a special treat-
ment for Christians.
These cases ended up in the Supreme Court, which 
gave a momentous decision in January 1977, a few 
months after the principle of India as a secular state 
had been included in the Constitution by Indira 
Gandhi during her emergency rule. The Court 
accepted that religious freedom included propaga-
tion of one’s own religion, but ambiguously stated 
that it “does not imply the right to convert another 
person to one’s own religion.”109 In this decision, 
Justice Ajit Nath Ray, a very controversial justice 
appointed directly by Indira Gandhi against the 
wishes of the Indian judiciary, wrote:
Religious freedom does not imply the 
right to convert another person to one’s 
own religion, but to transmit or spread 
one’s religion by an exposition of its 
107 Ibid.
108  Madhya Pradesh High Court, Rev. Stainislaus   
 v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 23 April 1974.
109  Supreme Court of India, Rev. Stainislaus vs.  
 State of Madhya Pradesh, 17 January 1977.
tenets. What is freedom for one is free-
dom for the other in equal measure and 
there can, therefore, be no such thing 
as a fundamental right to convert any 
person to one’s own religion.110
Given the impossibility of defining what “right to 
convert” means, the decision does not bring clar-
ity in theoretical and legal terms. It is however very 
clear in political and social terms: religious free-
dom protects propaganda, but not in an unlimited 
way. Christians, therefore, are kept under some 
pressure as much as their evangelization happens 
to be successful.
After the first phase of the 1950s, culminating in 
the Niyogi Committee’s report, and the second 
phase of the 1960s and 1970s, culminating in the 
1977 decision of the Supreme Court establish-
ing the “no right to conversion” doctrine, a third 
phase spans the late 1990s until the present.
In 1995 and 2000 the Supreme Court of India 
gave two momentous judgments on the same case 
of conversion to Islam aimed at enabling a man 
to take a second wife without divorcing the first 
according to the applicable personal law (namely 
Hindu law as codified by the state). The right to 
convert was thus adjudicated in the context of the 
application of religious personal laws and of the 
contentious debate on the adoption of a unified 
civil code, while reflecting at the same time ten-
sions between the Hindu and the Muslim com-
munities.
In the case Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India (1995),111 
a Hindu husband was not entitled to divorce his 
wife because there were no grounds under Hindu 
law. To evade this problem, the husband con-
verted to Islam and took another wife under Mus-
lim law. This was by no means new. Judges could 
look at a long line of cases from the 19th century 
110  Ibid.
111  Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, 10 May 1995. 
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onwards where even English people were engaged 
in much the same tactic. Justice Kuldip Singh was 
extremely critical of such practice: “There is an 
open inducement to a Hindu husband, who wants 
to enter into second marriage while the first mar-
riage is subsisting, to become a Muslim. Since 
monogamy is the law for Hindus and the Muslim 
law permits as many as four wives in India, errant 
Hindu husband embraces Islam to circumvent the 
provisions of the Hindu law and to escape from 
penal consequences.”112 The Court ruled that con-
version could not be used to simply shift between 
regimes of personal laws, as it was the case if hus-
bands embraced Islam in order to circumvent the 
provisions of Hindu law.
In the Supreme Court’s appeal judgment in the 
same case five years later,113 Justice Saiyed Ahmad 
reiterated that “religion is not a commodity to be 
exploited.” 114 Again, conversion was not accepted 
as a way to access different legal treatment, espe-
cially if this legal treatment resulted in reduced 
protections of fundamental rights (particularly 
women’s rights):
Religion, faith or devotion are not eas-
ily interchangeable. If the person feigns 
to have adopted another religion just 
for some worldly gain or benefit, it 
would be religious bigotry. Looked at 
from this angle, a person who mock-
ingly adopts another religion where 
plurality of marriage is permitted so as 
to renounce the previous marriage and 
desert the wife, he cannot be permitted 
to take advantage of his exploitation 
as religion is not a commodity to be 
exploited. 115
112 Ibid.
113 Lily Thomas & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 5  
 May 2000
114 Ibid.
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In her 1997 Booker prize The God of Small Things, 
Arundhati Roy wrote of Malabar untouchables 
who were “expected to crawl backwards with a 
broom, sweeping away their footprints so that 
Brahmins or Syrian Christians would not defile 
themselves by accidentally stepping into a Para-
van’s footprint.”116 Then the British arrived in 
Malabar and many Paravans, Pelayas, and Pulayas 
converted to Christianity. “As added incentive” 
Roy wrote, they were given a little food and money. 
They were known as the Rice-Christians.”117 A bit-
ter fate awaited them, in Roy’s depiction: “It didn’t 
take them long to realize that they had jumped 
from the frying pan into the fire. 
They were made to have separate churches, with 
separate services, and separate priests. As a special 
favour they were even given their own separate 
Pariah Bishop. 
After Independence they found they were not 
entitled to any Government benefits like job res-
ervations or bank loans at low interest rates, 
because officially, on paper, they were Christians, 
and therefore casteless. It was a little like having 
to sweep away your footprints without a broom. 
Or worse, not being allowed to leave footprints at 
all.”118
Emotions and conflicts on conversion are as 
strong in India as anywhere else, especially when 
society is multi-religious. As witnessed in the 2011 
rectification of the decision in the Graham Staines 
case, Indian courts have often interacted with the 
changing social context by means of decisions 
the political purpose of which is served through 
ambiguous legal arguments. Is this an inevitable 
price to pay for the continuity between colonial 
and independent India?
116 A. Roy, The God of Small Things (ed or 1997,  
 London: Fourth Estate, 2009) 73-74.
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III. COMMENTS
NARGIS VIRANI
I first want to examine Sophie Lemière’s discus-
sion of the new face of ethnonationalism. Malay-
sia has always been a very interesting case, espe-
cially in comparison with India. There are many 
levels of comparison in terms of multilingualism, 
multi-ethnicity, multi-religious groups. People 
always wonder what keeps India together. It’s still 
together as a functioning democracy, the largest 
in the world. But the case of Malaysia suggests that 
unity can be instituted in many different ways.
As I was listening to both the papers, one ques-
tion that came to my mind was: In Malaysia, how 
would the conversion issue (which Marco Ventura 
brought up in the Indian case) apply to the dif-
ferent groups? In Indonesia, I’ve looked at several 
fatwas, or non-binding legal opinions, stating that 
under Islamic Law a man is allowed to marry a 
woman of the People of the Book. Yet, over the last 
20 years, there are many legal opinions saying that 
a man may not marry a Person of the Book unless 
she converts (due to her responsibilities to bring 
about the next generation). Malaysia would be an 
interesting case where there could be conversation 
between the two papers on the topic of conversion. 
I was struck by the logo and the name of Perkhasa 
meaning light. The image seems very strong to 
explain the widespread appeal of their ideas.
Marco Ventura ended his paper with a theoreti-
cal formulation. I couldn’t help but think of Arjun 
Appadurai’s work on the fear of numbers. In both 
of these countries, there is a trajectory from colo-
nial to post-colonial phases. Particularly in the 
third, post-colonial phase you describe, I think 
that Arjun Appadurai’s work would be extremely 
useful for illuminating a paradoxical situation 
where the majority is always threatened by the 
minority. In most of the cases, you’re talking 
about minority rights, but several of the examples 
that we have seen (for example, France and Italy) 
involve a majority threatened by minorities. In the 
case of India, it is the Hindutva movement and the 
idea that the sizable yet still relatively small Mus-
lim minority (nearly 150 million, albeit no more 
than 15% of the country’s population) still poses a 
significant threat. Given this threat, the possibil-
ity of conversion is not merely a convenience, but 
also has been used for Muslim-bashing or as the 
law that compromises women’s right (as exempli-
fied in the Shaha Bano case in the 1980s where the 
political parties were divided.)
In discussing the colonial phase, I think it is 
important to say more about the landmark Hast-
ings decision, where every community in that 
census was forced to put themselves into a certain 
religious category, which was unheard of during 
Muslim rule. Several communities from local 
castes were converted to Islam by a variety of Sufi 
groups, whose identities maintained a certain flu-
idity for centuries, were forced to identify as either 
Hindus or Muslims under the British and thus 
were boxed and straitjacketed in ways that they 
had never previously experienced. Despite the 
fundamentalism on both sides, it was problem-
atic for several groups to identify themselves as 
one or the other because of shared practices and 
shrines that are visited in common (like the Ajmer 
Sharif and Haji Ali). I think it’s important to bring 
up how colonial times were responsible for these 
kinds of forced differentiations and identifications 
giving rise to the manifestation of some of the 
communalisms that one sees today.
In colonial times, especially in the Middle East 
(such as in Lebanon), the missionary movement 
was fraught with problems. It was clearly the case 
that the colonial powers were Christian and so 
the Christian missionaries didn’t just come with 
money from outside but from inside e.g. the East 
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India Company. Most of the best schools in India 
to this day are the missionary-run schools. I won-
der whether this kind of conversion would fall 
into phase 2 and phase 3 of your paper or more 
into the categorization of the rise of minorities 
and also the rise of fundamentalist (even if I hate 
this term) or more literalist movements. 
What struck me was that in Madhya Pradesh dur-
ing phase 1 the language of conversion by force was 
deemed appropriate. It struck me that the same 
discourse is being used in Europe today about the 
unacceptability of the hijab by force. This idea of 
exercising volition or will has been used by courts 
in different forms. 
In the case of ethno nationalism, Sophie Lemière 
has emphasized the ethnic side. What about (as 
discussed at length earlier today) the religious side: 
religious symbols turning into national symbols? 
Where would Malaysia fit into this debate? You 
mentioned religions with the Bumiputera being 
the national religion. How do ethnonationalism 
and religious nationalism intersect particularly in 
terms of that symbolic logo form?
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SESSION VI
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
I. NORMS IN THE MADRASA-SPHERE 
BETWEEN TRADITION, SCRIPTURE AND 
THE PUBLIC GOOD
EBRAHIM MOOSA
How norms are debated within and without the 
madrasa-sphere of South Asian institutions is my 
focus. In discussing this, I will reflect on the ques-
tion of tradition, scripture, and the public good. 
It is important to get a grasp of the madrasa nar-
rative in itself in order to understand one thread 
of South Asian Muslim traditionalism, namely the 
Deoband school. One might not always agree with 
this school, but to remain ignorant of its norma-
tive narratives in all their complexity is to inten-
tionally misunderstand this group. In doing so 
one will fail to grasp the differences and overlaps 
in discursive horizons between, say, the Deoban-
dis and their contemporary rivals, including mod-
ernist, revivalist, and Salafi trends, among others.
Talk about the Deoband school possibly drew the 
attention of Western policy circles and academia 
for the first time in the wake of 9/11. In that con-
text, key words like “Taliban,” “al-Qaeda,” and 
“madrasas” became the terms of the media’s rhe-
torical diet. Educated members of the public cor-
rectly associated the Deobandi movement with 
the “madrasas” of the South Asia. But the over 
generalization was to treat this network of semi-
naries with dread since it was yoked to Western 
security interests in South Asia, especially the Tal-
iban. Yet the Taliban is only one thread that finds 
legitimacy for its views in the Deobandi school. 
Internally, the Deobandi school is variegated and 
diverse and not everyone will identify with a Tali-
ban perspective.
I will look at how the Deoband School debates 
religious normativity in the public sphere through 
a sample of issues that illustrates how the public 
good is advanced within madrasa networks. 
Let me say something briefly about the institution 
called Deoband. In 1867, in the aftermath of the 
Indian rebellion against the British, a number of 
rural religious elites decided that they wanted to 
establish a school. For nearly a century, there had 
been a school based in Lucknow known as the Far-
angi Mahall school that served the needs of Mus-
lim India in terms of religious scbolarship. But a 
new idea of the madrasa emerged at the hands of 
a group of people, two of whom had studied in 
the British educational system in Delhi College: 
Muhammad Qasim Nanotvi and Rashid Ahmad 
Gangohi. They decided that they were going to 
establish a school in the north Indian town called 
Deoband. 
One purpose for establishing this school was to 
preserve the Islamic religious tradition and protect 
it from what they saw as the onslaught of British 
colonialism and Western culture. They knew the 
die was cast and that the Mughals were out of the 
political picture. It’s very interesting to look at the 
constitution of the school. The idea was that this 
institution should take money only from the Mus-
lim community, never from any government. The 
founders wanted this to be a community venture. 
They also wanted to preserve a version of Islam 
that was very different from their adversaries, the 
Ahl al-Hadith (or Salafis) who ignored the canoni-
cal tradition or madhhab (“doctrine”) approach to 
the study of Islamic norms and values.
The founders of Deoband tried to understand 
themselves as continuing the tradition that 
went back to Ahmad Sirhindi (1564-1642, a key 
religious figure during the time of the Mughal 
emperor Akbar). And they were equally charmed 
by the legacy of the Islamic scholar Shah Waliyul-
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lah (1703-1762) of Delhi. Both of these exemplary 
figures inhabited a rich metaphysical tapestry of 
Sufism and utilized Sufism to enhance both the 
inner life of the self and engagement with the pub-
lic aspect of life.
Now, of course, the Deobandis were not the only 
players in colonial India nor in what later turned 
out to be the Indo-Pakistan-Bangladesh nation-
state scene. Deobandis disagree with their rivals 
from the Barelvi school on the particular under-
standing of the conception of the Prophet Muham-
mad in his cosmic status. The Deobandis also dis-
agree with al-Hadis, who ignored the intermediate 
tradition after the Prophet Muhammad and take 
only the immediate generations after Muhammad 
to be the authoritative reference point for Islamic 
teaching. There are also twelve Shiite, Ismaili and 
Dawudi Bohra denominations on the subcon-
tinent all of whom will not be the subject of this 
presentation. 
I want to focus on the Barelvis because of their 
particular way of articulating themselves and 
talking about tradition. The Barelvis are basically 
populists because they support (or at least tolerate) 
pilgrimages to shrines and do not vocally object to 
popular religious festivals. 
By contrast, the Deobandis are more austere. 
Despite this austerity, the Deoband School too has 
great national and international presence for sev-
eral reasons. In the beginning of the 20th century, 
some people belonging to a great Islamic evangeli-
cal movement known as the Tabligh movement 
attached themselves to and identified themselves 
with the Deobandi tradition. The Tabligh move-
ment has a truly global presence, even if they 
have no post office box. And the Tabligh remains 
one of the most extraordinary and understudied 
religious movements. The Tabligh increased the 
visibility of the Deobandi. The Barelwis in their 
polemical literature treat the Tabligh movement as 
synonymous with the Deoband school. 
Compared to rival traditionalist networks, 
the Deobandi madrasas proliferated on both a 
national (in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) and 
a global scale. They have been strongly supported 
by foreign revenues (especially from people settled 
in the U.K., in Southern Africa, and in the Carib-
bean) in addition to Indian merchant capital from 
the big cities of Calcutta, Mumbai, and Chennai. 
The key idea that I want to introduce is that, far 
from being a political movement, or a militant 
group, or a network of madrasas—even though 
it manifests itself in the form of a network—the 
Deoband School sees itself first and foremost as 
an ethical and moral franchise. As an ethical and 
moral franchise it advocates a specific nomos 
(what they call a maslak) drawing from a vari-
ety of traditional blends of Islam. Their maslak is 
their identifying vocabulary. To explain what the 
Deoband School is requires that one identify the 
elements of their maslak.
Why did the Deoband School become so popu-
lar post 9/11? It is because Mullah Omar and 
some of the religious clerics in the Taliban move-
ment—not everyone in the Taliban movement is a 
cleric—were affiliated with the Deoband franchise 
in Pakistan. Mullah Omar studied at a Deobandi 
madrasa in Pakistan. Hence, the Deoband move-
ment became connected to the Taliban. 
I use the term “nomos,” made famous by Robert 
Cover in American juridical and ethical circles, 
as a useful provisional translation of maslak. 
Maslak refers to the normative universe that peo-
ple inhabit. More important than rules, principles 
of justice, and formal institutions are the narra-
tives that locate and give meaning to the law. If 
you read the Deobandi story correctly, the maslak 
is a set of narratives that drives the project. The 
maslak shapes and regulates the normative uni-
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verse of adherents to Islamic thought. In Cover’s 
words, “law and narrative are inseparably related. 
Every prescription is insistent in its demand to be 
located in discourse, to be supplied with history 
and destiny, beginning and end, explanation and 
purpose.” I could find no better description for 
what maslak means than Cover’s words. In Cover’s 
view, the force of interpretive commitment holds 
the normative universe together. I draw on Cover’s 
concept, then, to deepen our understanding of the 
Deobandi movement. I also use the words maslak, 
nomos, and nomos-sphere interchangeably.
What has intrigued me in my exploration of Deo-
band’s ethical discourse is its sustained commit-
ment to key elements of the maslak: this often 
involves a critique of its adversaries. One of its cri-
tiques focuses on the subversive capacity of West-
ernization and Western culture to undermine age-
old Islamic norms and values. Yet on issues related 
to the implementation of a range of scientific, 
technological, and economic practices inspired 
by Western science—like organ transplantation, 
brain death, women’s issues, and Islamic banking 
the Deobandi attitude is different. One can find 
surprising rulings issued by the same South Asian 
ulama that seem to validate Western commer-
cial, economic, and biotechnological practices. In 
other words, modern Western economic and sci-
entific practices are absorbed and accommodated 
via an Islamic nomos-sphere. That is to say, while 
there is a rhetoric of resistance to Westernization, 
in practice there is a logic of accommodation. 
But that accommodation happens according to 
a particular narrative. And we must understand 
this narrative in order to understand how the 
Deobandis justified and accommodated modern 
practices. The pragmatic outcome in the Deoban-
di’s ethical deliberation is striking. What is also 
evident is an accommodation of changing social 
norms, albeit at a very different pace. 
In order to show how tradition, scripture, and the 
public good are constructed within the madrasa-
sphere, let me introduce you to a key thinker in 
the Deoband School. I will describe how he imag-
ines and subsequently exfoliates the concept of 
tradition. Following Ludwig Fleck, I use the term 
“tradition” here to refer in one sense to a thought 
style. But tradition is something more: it is also a 
mode of living. 
The Deoband figure is Qari Muhammad Tayyab, 
who died in 1983. He was a former principal of 
Dar al-` Ulum Deoband, in India. Outside the 
thicket of the madrasa-world in the Indo-Pakistan 
continent, Tayyab’s name probably does not mean 
much. Yet by all accounts he was a paragon of tra-
ditional piety and learning of the Indian Hanafi-
Deobandi tradition. In post-partition India, he 
assumed a role of pontifical solemnity during a 
five-decade stewardship as principal of the famous 
Deoband seminary.
I draw on two works of Tayyab’s. One is Indepen-
dent Reasoning and Authority (Ijtihaq aur Taqlid), 
which was written sometime in the late 1960s or 
early 1970s. The second text is The Religious Ori-
entation and Ethical (Nomothetic) Temperament 
of the Ulama of Deoband  (‘Ulamā’-i Deoband 
ka Dīnī Rukh aur Maslakī Mizāj). This latter text 
especially is the lodestone of Deobandi teachings 
and is highly revealing.
Tayyab argues that all new events, contingencies, 
and challenges require a systematic taxonomy in 
order to reach what constitutes the universal. This 
is clearly a kind of Aristotelian method. Human 
beings are distinguished by their capacity to 
think, he argues, which elevates them above all 
other animals. The notions of “perception” and 
“understanding” form the centerpiece of Tayyab’s 
hermeneutic. “Understanding” is signified by the 
Arabic word “fiqh,” which is also the term used 
for the norm-making or norm-discovery process 
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in Muslim juro-moral thought. Tayyab’s under-
standing of fiqh, which draws on the medieval fig-
ure Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, is literally linked to 
the heart, to the pectoral region of the body. For 
Tayyab, both the mind and the affect on the body 
matter in order to arrive at the notion of interior 
“understanding.” In other words, understanding 
is not merely discursive. Rather, it is the product of 
a discursive tradition tied to human subjectivity 
and the inner needs of the human being. This dis-
tinction between “external” (zahir) and “internal” 
(batin) notions of understanding is important to 
the hermeneutic of the Deobandi tradition.
Tayyab also addresses the idea of renovation (taj-
did) in Islamic thought. In his view, any kind of 
revisionist engagement with Islamic thought must 
point in the direction of what he called “prophetic 
pedagogy,” or minhāj-i nubuwwat. Just as the 
Prophet Muhammad inaugurated an entirely new 
mode of thinking at the inception of Islam, one 
could only attempt to refashion Islamic thought 
by adhering to the same prophetic model. The 
prophetic model presents perfect moderation and 
balance as cornerstones of Islamic teachings.
Tayyab argues that grasping and mastering this 
prophetic pedagogy makes it possible to articu-
late Islamic thought in a whole new format. But to 
step away from the prophetic model even an inch 
is to invite doom. He warns that inaugurating new 
rules of Islamic thought would inevitably fail and 
result in disfiguring Islamic teachings. In Tayyab’s 
words, 
The only thing required today is this: 
based on an understanding of the pro-
phetic methodology, there is a need to 
formulate in the idiom and style of the 
day a new projection and appropria-
tion of Islamic thought. Only through 
this approach can one truly renovate 
Islamic thought. However, if we depart 
from the prophetic pedagogy in renova-
tion and forsake its tradition-based wis-
dom, then the result would to be to alter 
Islamic thought and subvert the entire 
process. Renovation of thought can be 
summarized in two brief phrases: our 
questions or topics (masā’il) should be 
ancient, but our arguments [in defense] 
should be new. Only by pursuing 
renewal in this manner can we fulfill 
the responsibility of divine stewardship 
(khilāfat-i ilāhī) and the delegation of 
prophecy.
Yet this Deobandi maslak is not fully comprehen-
sible unless one digs a little deeper into the mean-
ing of the term “prophetic pedagogy.” To refine 
my earlier brief description of a maslak one should 
add that a maslak is comprised of several sub-
narratives that constitute the overall compelling 
story or narrative. The key word behind maslak or 
nomos is story. First, the nomos involves an histor-
ical narrative—how Islam originated and how the 
version received by the Deoband tradition is the 
most correct one. Second, it involves a pedagogy 
of the self. The spiritual formation, as well as the 
pedagogical or ethical formation, of the madrasa 
student is absolutely crucial to the Deobandi’s 
nomos-sphere. The most important point of that 
pedagogy is the indispensable role of apprentice-
ship between student and teacher, which resembles 
the Sufi relationship between master and disciple. 
For the Deobandis, this apprenticeship (sohbat) is 
absolutely crucial. Without this apprenticeship, 
you cannot be a Deobandi in the true sense of the 
word. 
Like the Prophet Muhammad whose Companions 
imparted his teachings and knowledge to their 
successor generation, similarly every generation 
must have access to a living person and an actual 
community who mediates the teachings of Islam. 
In this lived community the Deobandis want to 
Religious Norms in the Public Sphere91
create a relationship between student and teacher 
that is even more profound and more significant 
than biological relationships. It transcends kin-
ship and creates an intellectual community more 
sacred than even a biological community. Abu 
Hanifa’s students in the 7th century were known 
as the Companions of Abu Hanifa, not as indi-
viduals known as Abu Yusuf or Muhammad al-
Shaybani. Deobandis argue that the relationship 
to the master is of great value. The relationship 
between student and teacher goes beyond merely 
the affective relationship. Apprenticeships in the 
formation of a scholarly community also gener-
ate a set of knowledge kinships. This knowledge-
based (epistemic) DNA is viewed as more intimate 
and sacred than family or biology. Reverence for 
the teacher supersedes all else.
This reverence is crucial to the transmission 
of both the tradition’s integrity and its correct 
understanding. Accordingly, Tayyab’s writings are 
absolutely bruising in their criticism of those who 
commit themselves only to the reading and inter-
pretation of texts. Such an approach, he argues, only 
offers a reader black lines on a book. You can read 
all kinds of books, he says, but you will still be lost 
if you don’t have a relationship with a teacher who 
can perform the book for you. Thus, the teacher is 
an exemplar that performs the book for the student 
through his lived experience. 
Tayyab’s writing here focuses on questions of 
tone, the very registers in which the student 
hears what the teacher is saying. His subject is the 
men’s madrassa, although there are also exclusive 
women’s madrasas. Through their experience and 
connection to the tradition, teachers can actually 
perform the books in ways that students can hear 
what they might not have heard on their own. 
Tayyab also engages in an extended discussion of 
how one should grasp the principles (usūl), uni-
versal axioms (qawa’id-e kulliyya), and precepts 
or maxims (dawābit) that underlie the teachings 
of Islam. For Tayyab, to be a Deobandi means: to 
articulate a nomos in which comprehensive inter-
pretive principles are blended with personal intel-
lectual mentorship and apprenticeship under a 
teacher.
Tayyab lists some 31 axioms or maxims that 
encapsulates the most important principles he 
advocated:
1. There is no Islam except in com-
munity. 2. There is no monasticism in 
Islam. 3. People should not be coerced 
to accept religion. 4. We do not dis-
criminate among any of God’s proph-
ets. 5. Do not harm, nor retaliate with 
harm. 6. All believers are a brotherhood 
(which I suppose includes women, too). 
7. All of humanity is a single brother-
hood. 8. Finally, whoever takes a life 
without justification, it is as if he had 
killed all of humanity.
There is a kind of checklist by which Tayyab oper-
ates. When Tayyab deals with the key issues, one 
must understand that pivotal to this nomos are 
two issues: 1. the teacher-student relationship; and 
2. universal maxims that you must comprehend 
and fully embody, as well as implement, in an 
interpretive framework. 
He also designates different zones of inter-human 
transactions that are known as mu` āmalāt (social 
intercourse) and mu` āshara (political and social 
life). These spheres of life overtly carry the imprint 
of their times and are mutable (they always alter). 
In these spheres, Shari a` provides an abundance 
of general principles (universal axioms) and a 
paucity of specific applications. In fact, the Shari a` 
mindset itself, he says, anticipates particular 
applications designed to serve the specific spheres 
of inter-human transactions (politics and social 
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life). They are time-sensitive applications and, 
therefore, are designed to change according to the 
vicissitudes of time.
However, a key issue for Tayyab is this: who can 
inaugurate this change in practice? No one can 
do this work of engaging with new contingencies 
unless you are someone who has embodied the 
tradition. Someone who encapsulates this form 
of teaching, this kind of pedagogy, and the uni-
versal maxims is licensed to effect change. If one 
choses any another route—such as the path cho-
sen by revivalist groups like the Jamaat e-Islami, 
the Muslim Brotherhood, or the Ahl-i Hadis—
then surely the result would not be a renovation 
in Muslim religious thought but rather, in Tayy-
ab’s view, it would be a complete abomination of 
Islamic thought.
What is important, in his view, is the character 
and capacity of the persons who embark on the 
project of reformulating Islamic thought. Two 
qualifications are crucially important: they must 
possess intellectual excellence and embody a com-
mitment to practice (rather than merely espouse 
theoretical commitment). The most important 
initiative, he pointed out, was the selection of 
persons of action who were visionary in matters 
of religion and occupied a status of “wisdom and 
insight” (faqīhāna sha,n) who fully grasp the pri-
mary and secondary aspects while embodying the 
true spirit of Islam. And they should behold the 
practical wisdom dispensed by God for which the 
formulation of this religion came into existence.” 
Now, this is a general of overview of the Deobandi 
maslak. I want to provide two examples of its 
application in order to highlight some variation.
The first takes place in South Africa, where Tayyab 
traveled to in the 1960s. At the time, the South 
African Muslim community understood the topic 
of bank interest (ribā) to be forbidden. Usually, 
such interest is prohibited by teachings in the 
Qur’an and Shari a`. During Tayyab’s trip, a prom-
inent businessman named A.M. Moolla asked for 
his views on the question of bank interest. Tayyab 
forwarded this inquiry to the Dār al-Iftā, the office 
that issued fatwās at the Deoband school in India. 
A year later, the fatwā arrived in South Africa. 
More important than the fatwā is the response it 
got from South African Deobandis. 
Here is some background on the subject. The 
ancient Hanafī authorities (one of the four pre-
vailing Sunni legal traditions) adhered to by the 
Deoband school permitted interest-bearing trans-
actions between Muslims and non-Muslims in a 
territory deemed to be an “abode of hostility” or 
dār al-harb. A dār al-harb referred to those ter-
ritories with which Muslims did not have a treaty 
or arrangement of demarcated territorial sover-
eignty. By contrast, interest-bearing transactions 
were prohibited in places where Muslims have 
established themselves politically, in dār al-Islam.
The Deobandi muftis in India who issued the 
fatwā stated the following: 
If the position in the Republic of South 
Africa is similar to that of a dār al-harb, 
that is an abode of hostility according to 
classical Islamic law, then the classifica-
tion of that country as a dār al-harb and 
the application of rulings with regard to 
dealings and interest between Muslims 
and non-Muslims could also be appli-
cable. According to your statement, 
Muslims are in a very small minority 
in the Republic of South Africa [and] 
non-Muslims are in the overwhelming 
and ruling majority. This, indeed, is the 
only basis for classifying it as a dār al-
harb. 
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The response of the South African Muslim leader-
ship, and particularly the South African chapter 
of the Deobandi school, can best be characterized 
as one of mild outrage and consternation. In a rare 
move, the mufti of the South African Deoband 
sector strongly dissented from the ruling issued in 
India. He was perplexed by how the fatwā char-
acterized South Africa in Muslim juridical terms. 
Muftī Ebrahim Sanjawli, speaking on behalf of 
his `ulamā group, doubted whether South Africa 
could be neatly classified as a dār al-harb. While 
some features suggested South Africa resembled 
an “abode of hostility,” other characteristics 
suggested that it was an “abode of safety,” a dār 
al-amān. South Africa, in Muftī Sanjawli’s view, 
was a liminal space, an intermediate territorial 
jurisdiction in classical Islamic legal terms. 
So here we see how a Deobandi speaks back to 
Deoband: the internal differences become appar-
ent. The South African version of the Deoband 
school basically argued that the ruling on the 
prohibition of interest was premised on Qur’anic 
teachings and, therefore, superseded and overrode 
any canonical interpretation. Basically, they said 
that the muftīs in Deoband misread the political 
context of South Africa in declaring it as a dār al-
harb. Rather, they argued, South Africa’s juridi-
cal status in classical Islamic law was one of dār 
al-amān, since Muslims have safety in that coun-
try even though they are a minority. The argu-
ment, then, was that Qur’anic scriptural imprima-
tur overrode the canonical imprimatur.  
This conflict illustrates something that has become 
more visible in Deobandi circles: that the canoni-
cal tradition is utilized side-by-side with the scrip-
tural tradition. This is the kind of practice that the 
Deobandis historically criticized the Ahl-i Hadis 
for doing, namely, referring to the Qur’an while 
ignoring the intermediate canonical tradition. 
This is a new emerging trend among those who 
overtly commit to the canonical schools. The jus-
tification used to do this is to square the canonical 
tradition with the scriptural teachings.
South African Deobandis were able to push back 
and maintain their position of not accepting inter-
est-bearing transactions in a Muslim minority 
context like South Africa as per the Hanafi canon-
ical tradition. 
My second example comes from India. In the 
summer of 2005, a heated controversy held Mus-
lim India in the spell of confusion. A section of 
India’s Muslim religious leadership were caught 
on the horns of a dilemma: they could either yield 
to the authority of canonical tradition (the teach-
ings of the Hanafi madhhab) by honoring a tra-
ditional Islamic legal edict related to sexuality or 
else alter the rule in the light of new realities.
The story involves a woman named Imrana, a 
mother of five living near the city of Muzaffar-
nagar in the state of Uttar Pradesh, who claimed 
that she was raped. She claimed that the rapist was 
her father-in-law. Little is known about the con-
text, but the details are not relevant to illustrate 
my point with respect to this case. The woman in 
question exposed herself to great risk by making 
the allegation. It had devastating consequences for 
her personal honor and social standing. 
Tragically, it was not the alleged crime that 
prompted widespread media coverage. Rather, 
greater outrage was provoked by the decision of 
a Muslim cleric, a member of the `ulama and a 
junior muftī, and the influential Deoband semi-
nary. This mufti ruled that Imrana was no longer 
married to her lawful husband. In the Islamic legal 
tradition, an offspring son or daughter can never 
lawfully marry, nor remain married to, someone 
with whom his or her parents have had sexual 
intercourse. Under these rules, Imrana’s husband 
could not remain married to her, because the hus-
band’s father had illicit sexual intercourse with his 
wife. 
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Not all Muslim authorities enforce such metallic 
reasoning: only a sexual encounter within a valid 
marriage can erect such moral barriers of consan-
guinity. If the husband’s father was validly mar-
ried to Imrana, only then would the son was pro-
hibited from marrying her. 
But the Deoband School pressed its position based 
on the Hanafi law school. They were not mindful 
that a rape had happened or that their commit-
ment to the tradition bordered on ideology. Many 
right-thinking people found it scandalous that a 
woman’s claim to have been raped did not matter 
to the moral calculus of the Deobandi ruling. 
Some other Indian Muslim jurists hinted at dis-
sent on the issue.  But they ultimately lost nerve 
and failed to say explicitly that rape was funda-
mentally different from adultery for the purposes 
of voiding a marriage based on consanguinity. 
The Ahl-i Hadis (Salafi religious authorities) who 
are also adversaries of the Deoband school, fol-
lowed the plain meaning of the imprimaturs of the 
scriptural authority as derived from the Qur’an 
and prophetic tradition. They argued that it was 
okay for Imrana to remain married to her husband, 
regardless of the tragic events that happened to her. 
Instead of reviewing the ethical and moral viola-
tion of Imrana in the light of the reality faced by 
women like her in India, the folks at the Deoband 
seminary found a scapegoat. They laid the blame 
for the fiasco at the feet of what they called sensa-
tionalist, pro-Western media as blowing the mat-
ter out of proportion and distorting the facts. They 
also upbraided Muslim critics of their ruling, dis-
missing them as pseudo-reformers, unqualified 
to venture an opinion in religious matters. Even 
worse, they lambasted critics for possessing the 
gall and the temerity to challenge the authority of 
religious scholars. 
The Deoband scholars claimed that Muslim critics 
who challenged their ruling were driven by mal-
ice, ignorance, and the goal of earning cheap pub-
licity. Thankfully, however, some of the Deoban-
dis essentially dissented and said that the question 
of rape mattered to the application of the rule.
This incident provides a glimpse into an issue at 
the center of the debate on Muslim ethics today. 
Male Muslim religious authorities are committed 
to implementing the canonical tradition of fiqh 
with integrity as an act of piety and religiosity. 
The question many people ask is this: can there 
be fidelity to the tradition when it results in what 
would by any account be a miscarriage of justice 
and fairness to a victim?
The story in the Imrana case evokes the words of 
the novelist and moral theorist William Gass and 
his interest in the work of Tolstoy We could take 
Tolstoy’s caricatured, but rationalist, figure of Pro-
fessor Katavasov, of interest to Gass, as a stand-
in for the Deobandis. To use Gass’s words in the 
Tolstoyan context, the Deobandis are like men “in 
love not with particular men or women, not with 
things, but with principles, ideas, webs of reason-
ing, and if he rushes to the aid of his neighbor, it is 
not because he loves his neighbor, but because he 
loves God’s law about it.” In many ways, this kind 
of application of tradition, where you love God’s 
law more than everything else, does indeed create 
problems in the dynamic of the Deobandi tradi-
tion. 
Let me sum up. Madrasa traditionalists invoke 
an ontological and metaphysical otherness. They 
invoke another order, one that accepts the limits 
of reason and defers to the wisdom of God. Any 
retreat to the irrational and the archaic merely 
reveals the limits of reason and the violence that 
reason imposes, especially when reason claims 
to make everything knowable and transparent. 
While the purposes of Shari a` are knowable, the 
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purposes and forms of the practices are not always 
within the ken of reason. 
Yet the madrasa tradition is deeply embedded in 
another kind of discourse of reason, an embodied 
reasonableness. The primary function of norm-
making and norm-derivation stems from a tra-
dition of fiqh, of insightful understanding. This 
could be construed as a pragmatic form of rea-
sonableness. Manazir Ahsan Gilani, a prominent 
figure of the Deoband school, explained that fiqh 
is discernment in order to appreciate the tradi-
tion. So fiqh, to some extent, is a rational disci-
pline.  However, fiqh is not governed by a secular 
rationality so much as it is one that is restricted 
and restrained by the limits of heteronomy and a 
commitment to a theistic order. Fiqh creates a par-
ticular kind of legality and ethicality that attaches 
the body to the soul and connects practice to con-
science. Sometimes, as in the Imrana case, fiqh 
turns into brutal technical reason. Often such 
enforcement occurs with a thunderous theological 
authority, in order to validate the truth. But it can 
be challenged from the margins of the tradition, 
as we saw in the case of South Africa or the minor-
ity rulings in the case of Imrana. Some of those 
who contest the mainstream madrasa-sphere 
would argue that when law and justice come into 
conflict, the law must give way to a higher reason, 
to justice, which is its primitive reason.
I am loath to deprive individuals, communities, 
nations, and societies of their agency, to proclaim 
that they are victims of exploitative and globaliz-
ing forces, although many critics are not so cir-
cumspect. Domination and hegemony are, in my 
view, never total and complete. Individuals, com-
munities, and societies devise overt and covert 
means of resisting even the most brutal attempts 
of deprivation. The point I wish to make is that 
Muslims everywhere make choices on a daily basis 
about the range of activities. These choices con-
cern not only their modes of income and dress, 
but also a variety of ethical and moral matters. 
Of course, their choices are not always autono-
mous. Obligations are foisted upon citizens of 
even the most liberal political orders. In both obvi-
ous and non-obvious ways, citizens and individu-
als are subject to rules, ordinances, conventions, 
and other demands from a variety of sources (like 
state, society, and community). The act of paying 
one’s utility bills, obeying traffic laws, showing 
courtesy to neighbors and strangers, and caring 
for parents or spouses or pets are all demonstra-
tions that we are not entirely autonomous in our 
choices. Autonomy is often partial. We respond to 
a variety of impulses in our most basic decisions, 
not all of them rational, even though most of the 
time we strive to reach reasonable and sensible 
outcomes. In the nomos-sphere of the Deoban-
dis there is a spectrum of positions to articulate 
Islamic norms in the public sphere: they operate 
from within a larger narrative (nomos) and can be 
both resistant to reality and accommodate reality. 
While the outcomes are important, more signifi-
cant is to examine how such juro-moral traditions 
validate their viewpoints. 
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SESSION VII
HOW TO FACE THE CHALLENGE OF RELIGIOUS
NORMS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE?
I. OLIVIER ROY
I was struck by a prominent thread throughout the 
presentations: namely, the attitude of the courts. 
From the Italian courts, to the Quebec courts and 
to the European Court of Human Rights, we see 
the forging of a common jurisprudence on the 
issue of religious signs and religious norms in the 
public sphere. The courts in all of these Western 
states articulate two legal principles, although 
their implementation of these principles varies 
based on local legal traditions, constitutions, his-
tories, and other factors. One principle is freedom 
of religion. In some countries, this principle is 
very recent. In Spain, for instance, the tolerance 
for Protestantism came only in 1967. The other 
principle is the separation of church and state. 
Of course, this principle has different meanings 
in Britain, Denmark, Italy, and France. But the 
basic idea that a state should not interfere with 
the life of the churches is widely accepted and well 
entrenched.
Reviewing the different court cases that have been 
mentioned by participants suggests a new princi-
ple developed in the last 10-15 years: namely, the 
predominance of a religion and/or culture, such 
that religious freedom does not entail equality of 
religions. Courts are giving legal basis for refusing 
a total symmetry in the treatment of all religions. 
This evolution is largely a response to public opin-
ion. The evolution of the Conseil d’Etat in France 
provides a clear illustration of this principle. In 
the early 1990s, the Conseil d’Etat opposed the 
ban of the scarf in schools. When Lionel Jospin 
asked advice, the Conseil d’Etat (as well as the 
Conseil Constitutionnel) told him that the ban on 
the headscarf would not survive judicial scrutiny. 
Twenty years later, it did. This clearly suggests an 
evolution. When the Conseil d’Etat introduced 
the concept, if I can call it that, of an “excessive 
practice of religion” for burqa-wearing women, 
the court suggested that wearing a burqa was not 
a “good religious practice.”  To judge a particu-
lar religious practice as excessive is to claim the 
authority to define which practices of religion are 
good (or at least acceptable). 
On this issue, we see two different approaches. 
In Italy and Germany (particularly Bavaria), for 
instance, the courts have supported the notion of 
a dominant religious culture. In France and Que-
bec, this principle is newer. Clearly, the courts have 
bent to the pressure of public opinion. And this is 
possible because today populist movements cross 
through the political spectrum. It’s no longer an 
issue of a Christian right versus a secular left. We 
see many cases (including the ascension of Thilo 
Sarrazin in Germany and Geert Wilders in Neth-
erlands) of populist movements that don’t have 
roots in the traditional fascist or extreme right. 
Some did (like Jean-Marie Le Pen in France), but 
clearly the present populist movements do not fol-
low the categories of right versus left, as they did 
for so long. 
Because this push to define “leading culture” or 
Leitkultur is untethered to its historical origins, 
the courts have become more responsive to this 
pressure. As indicated in testimonies from retired 
judges, they don’t see it as a pressure. They are 
quite happy to alter the concept of religious free-
dom and separation of church and state. So the 
first point is to appreciate the importance of popu-
list movements on court decisions about dominant 
religious culture and national identity. Appreciat-
ing this point is the key to rethinking notions of 
religious freedom and the separation of church 
and state. 
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A second and final conclusion can also be seen in 
the court decisions from Italy, Quebec, and Stras-
bourg that were mentioned yesterday. They do 
accept the concept of a dominant religion but on 
one condition: it should not be a religion but a cul-
ture. The crucifix is okay, as long as it’s not a reli-
gious expression. As in Quebec, you could have 
a crucifix in a courtroom if it doesn’t express the 
faith of the judges. This conclusion is paradoxical, 
as well as an unintended consequence. It is the 
product of a compromise made by courts between 
the separation of church and state (which deprives 
the court of the right to define good theology), 
religious freedom, and this concept of a dominant 
religion, culture and national identity. The para-
dox is that, by bringing back religion, the courts 
facilitate the secularization of religion by separat-
ing religions from what is the most important for 
many believers—namely, belief, faith, and creed.
This development is risky, as well as paradoxical, 
because it transcends the issue of religious free-
dom while invoking the issue of national identity. 
What is national identity? What are the conse-
quences of defining a national identity? Con-
sider a former left-wing (some would say extreme 
left-wing) website in France, Riposte Laïque, that 
shifted to the extreme-right and allied with an 
extreme right movement, Les Identitaires (“The 
Identarians”). When they are asked to define the 
content of identity, there is a very interesting text 
that says, “my identity is what I am” or (equally 
trivially) “I am my identity.” And they stop here.  
Yet they organize demonstrations in the street 
bringing what (for them) are the two signs of 
French identity—red wine and saucisson, pork sau-
sage. I am not opposed to either of these, but they 
appear rather shallow bases for identity. More-
over, they are exclusionary definitions of identity: 
they exclude Muslims and Jews. And politicians 
are not at ease: either they jump on the (shallow 
or exclusionary) identity bandwagon or else they 
refer to universal principles like freedom or laïcité 
that they are unable to define. This situation is 
made possible by ambiguities from the churches, 
and the Catholic Church in particular. The Prot-
estants (although it depends on which kind of 
Protestantism, of course), when in the minority, 
are reluctant to define religion as an identity and 
tend to emphasize faith. By contrast, the Catholic 
Church tends to see that it is a good first step to 
consider Christianity as part of our identity, but 
of course there should be a second step: to come 
back to church on Sunday morning. The Catholic 
Church has taken an ambivalent stance towards 
populist movements like Les Identitaires. It cannot 
buy the agenda of the populist, but it doesn’t want 
to disapprove of potentially powerful allies. 
Given these facts, the new approaches of courts 
and churches require us to fine-tune our own 
analytical approaches. We must ask what the 
courts and churches are doing and, furthermore, 
whether they appreciate (and welcome) the conse-
quences of their commitments. 
II. EBRAHIM MOOSA
In my comments, I want to follow up on what 
Olivier has said about the secular, politicians, 
the courts, and the religious. I have recently been 
reading the Polish thinker Leszek Kolakowski. I 
was struck by this one quote of his, and I wonder 
whether the picture that we have been painting is 
missing something. In his essay The Revenge of the 
Sacred in Secular Culture, Kolakowski says 
Since the profane is defined in opposi-
tion to the sacred [I would say that the 
“profane” he means is equivalent to 
what we mean by “secular”], its imper-
fection must be intrinsic and in some 
measure incurable. Culture, when it 
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loses its sacred sense, loses all sense. 
With the disappearance of the sacred, 
which imposes limits to the perfection 
that could be attained by the profane 
arises one of the most dangerous illu-
sions of our civilization—the illusion 
that there are no limits to the changes 
that human life can undergo, that soci-
ety is “in principle” an endlessly flexible 
thing, and that to deny this flexibility 
and this perfectibility of society is to 
deny man’s total autonomy and thus to 
deny man himself.119 
In some of our discussions, there has been a back 
and forth about the place of the sacred, the place of 
religion. We ask whether we eradicate the sacred 
if one religion is privileged over others. One of 
the interesting things in Kolakowski’s sensibility 
here is that the idea of the sacred helps us toward 
perfectibility. Engaging the sacred is a require-
ment for attaining perfectibility in our profane 
world. When we lose the sense of the sacred, then 
we reach a state of jeopardy, of deep civilizational 
illusion. 
As we press forward with our work, I hope that 
we are bold enough to press some of these philo-
sophical frontiers and challenge the philosophi-
cal assumptions that we assume within our work, 
whether in the humanities or the social sciences.
Here are two such underlying assumptions that 
I want to ventilate and perhaps explore further. 
Much of what we are talking about happens in the 
context of contending notions of liberalism. Often 
toleration, which is a hallmark of Western liberal-
ism, is premised on the idea that we can reach a 
rational consensus about the best way of life. Both 
toleration and the search for rational consensus 
arose in the West because people were divided on 
119  Leszek Kolakowski, Modernity on Endless  
 Trial 72 (Chicago, 1987).  Not 1990? Or later  
 1997 edition?
what was the best way of life. Because there was 
no single way, Europeans introduced the notion 
of toleration. Yet this has led to a paradox because 
within liberal societies there is a persistent view 
that their model is the single way for the best life! 
This assumption is completely in contradiction 
with the idea of toleration.
We should ask the same questions when talking 
about religious norms on a global scale or in dif-
ferent contexts. I think many of our international 
institutions, including the U.N., hit the hard ques-
tion when they push for a single (tolerant, liberal) 
way of life. Yet this push is both paradoxical and 
antithetical to the liberal ideal. 
There are two strategies for pushing the liberal 
agenda. On the one hand, you have the universal 
regime of John Locke and Immanuel Kant, whose 
more recent followers include F.A. Hayek and the 
later work of John Rawls. Locke believed that the 
best defense of toleration is that it enables us to dis-
cover the best way of life for humankind. The other 
strategy is Thomas Hobbes and David Hume, who 
advocated liberalism of coexistence. Their follow-
ers are Isaiah Berlin and Michael Oakeshott. For 
Hobbes, toleration is the only strategy for peace. 
This is a toleration that advocates a modus vivendi.
I think that we need to go back to that notion of 
liberalism of coexistence and ask ourselves what is 
the place of reason in human affairs. The imper-
fection of reason is what leads to the ideal of toler-
ation as a means to consensus. Because of reason’s 
imperfection, you can open up the conversation 
as people all over the world share a concern with 
this imperfection: not only in the West but also in 
the East.
Rational inquiry in norms does not yield con-
sensus on the best life. Rather, it shows that the 
best life comes in many varieties. In some of the 
court decisions that we have discussed, the judges 
and their philosophical tradition seem to assume 
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that there’s only one variety of the best life. This 
assumption is also consistent with the underlying 
values of these judges. The absence here of a good 
mode of liberal toleration is problematic.
The idea of a modus vivendi accepts that there are 
many forms of life, some of which are yet to be 
contrived. That’s why in Europe and North Amer-
ica, where there are so many different ways of life, 
we should be optimistic about these possibilities 
and recognize that no one life can be the best for 
everyone. The idea of human good is too diverse 
to be realized in one mode of life. So for the advo-
cates of multiple kinds of human flourishing, plu-
ralism is the ethical theory that underpins the 
modus vivendi.
One could say, for instance, that there are kinds 
of good lives that are neither better nor worse. 
Sometimes, they are incommensurably valuable. 
In some modes of life, people wear the niqab. In 
others, people prefer to wear the miniskirt. These 
modes are different and incommensurable. But we 
cannot deny that either mode is worthy in itself. 
They are differently valuable, because we cannot 
reach consensus on them and because rationality 
cannot settle the question of their value. Just as 
Charles Hirschkind discussed the tyranny of cat-
egories, I think we see here the tyranny of modes 
of life. 
In value pluralism, there is an affirmation that 
each side has access to moral knowledge. This 
requires giving up the notion of the truth of 
norms, of ethical truth. To allow that the good is 
plural is to allow the potential for conflict and that 
there is no one solution to such conflicts. We face 
hard questions—homosexuality, heterosexuality, 
bisexuality, monogamy, polygamy, serial polyg-
amy. How do we adjudicate these issues? Purdah, 
niqab, absolute personal liberties, blasphemy, and 
modesty: how do we reconcile these kinds of via-
ble claims?
To say that values are incommensurable is not to 
say that all ways of life have equal value. To value 
pluralism is to argue that there is a diversity of 
goods and a diversity of evils. Different ways of life 
can more or less find their own ways of achieving 
universal goods, of mitigating universal evils and 
resolving conflicts among them. We are now fac-
ing, in this bio-political stage of global politics, the 
tyranny of the singular.
III. NAOMI SEIDMAN
I have two students—one is working on Jewish 
laws around Hanukkah, and the other is work-
ing on U.S. Supreme Court decisions about pub-
lic displays around Christmas and Hanukkah. I 
thought, what would happen if their projects were 
combined? How would that illuminate how Jews 
think internally about Hanukkah and how the 
Supreme Court thinks about what Hanukkah is? I 
came up with some confusing findings.
At first glance, it looks as if we’re dealing with two 
distinct entities: on the one hand, Hanukkah as 
an internal Jewish religious practice; on the other 
hand, Hanukkah in the public sphere, and the 
question of how the public sphere accommodates 
or limits the public display of religion.
Yet this way of conceiving how religious practice 
interfaces with the public sphere maintains an 
artificial distinction between these two spheres, 
one that does not hold. At least in the humanities, 
we know perfectly well that dichotomies like these 
are problematic. To the extent that it makes sense 
to talk about two separate spheres, I am tempted to 
say that the thinking is fuzzier in the public, legal 
sphere than in the religious sphere. However, in 
religious studies departments and the humanities 
more broadly there is a near consensus that there’s 
no clear way to distinguish the public and private 
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spheres. And Jewish modernity is, in some ways, a 
symptom of the mismatch between the categories 
of public and private. Understanding Judaism as 
a religion is an invention of the modern secular 
era. A scholarly consensus views the 19th century 
as the time of invention of Judaism, as a precon-
dition for Jews to become citizens of France and 
Germany and other modern national states. What 
was defined in some loose way as a peoplehood 
became a religion at precisely the moment where 
Jews were becoming significantly less religious; 
for the purposes of incorporating Jews into the 
nation state, they were defined as a faith group, a 
religious group. What constituted that faith also 
needed to be invented in order for Jews to sat-
isfy the citizenship requirements as minorities in 
European states.
In this context and for these purposes, the main 
constituents of what was to be seen as the Jew-
ish religion were a translation of enlightenment 
thought into Judaism. You can see this transla-
tion of enlightenment thought in Max Lilien-
thal’s contention that “in the glorious words of the 
old prophet, this word of toleration must be our 
unswerving North Star.” The ideals of liberalism 
in modern European states thus became ancient 
Jewish ideals. And secularism itself became a par-
ticularly thick Jewish religious identification in 
ways that it has never been for the people who ini-
tially formulated it. Both the German and French 
enlightenments had moments that gave way to 
various kinds of nationalism but Jews clung stub-
bornly to the idea of enlightenment. Jews are the 
biggest champions of the separation of church and 
state, the most intensely “religious” liberals. So 
perhaps thinking about religion and secularism 
as separate categories doesn’t work in any case, 
but it certainly doesn’t work in the case of Jewish 
modernity.
Another symptom of this history is that the term 
“secular Jew” is a recognizable category, while the 
term “secular Christian” is considered as inco-
herent. Yet the backdrop of what is called “the 
December dilemma,” which pits the menorah 
against the Christmas tree, is really about internal 
contradictions in secular Christianity, a category 
that remains largely invisible.
The situation of Jews within “the December 
dilemma” is not only a symptom of a few different 
kinds of mismatch, the hard bargain that’s driven 
for Jewish citizenship in the modern nation state, 
but also a symptom of a larger incoherence within 
the modern secular nation state. This comes up 
very clearly in the (comical) Supreme Court deci-
sion about the crèche in the public sphere some-
where in Rhodes Island. In this case, which is 
commonly known as “the plastic reindeer case,” 
the Supreme Court argued that because America 
is part of Western civilization and the Christian 
story is deeply embedded in Western civilization, 
it was appropriate to have a crèche in a public 
space. This display was particularly appropriate 
because the crèche also had some plastic reindeers 
next to it; that served to make the crèche (also) 
secular, and so secured it a legitimate space in 
what was still ostensibly a secular public sphere. 
The issue of the Christianity of this secular space 
remained outside the discussion, rendered invis-
ible by the apparent distinction between Christi-
anity as a religion and the (false) religious neutral-
ity of American public space—guaranteed here by 
the plastic reindeers that helpfully fail to appear in 
the New Testament.
The Supreme Court’s equally incoherent discus-
sion of the Hanukkah menorah came three years 
later, in 1987. The Supreme Court ruled that a 
huge Hanukkah menorah put up by the Chabad 
(a Hasidic Group, also known as Lubavitch, which 
proselytizes secular Jews) was actually a secular 
symbol. Whereas they had ruled that a crèche 
inside the same courtroom building before which 
the menorah was erected was a religious symbol 
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and had to be removed, a Christmas tree outside 
the courtroom was a secular symbol. Because the 
menorah was smaller than the tree, it was secular 
because one could interpret the menorah in light 
of the tree. According to this logic, if the menorah 
had been larger than the tree, its religious charac-
ter would have rendered the tree a religious sym-
bol. There was also a rather hilarious discussion in 
which the Supreme Court discusses whether there 
could be a more secular symbol of Hanukkah 
than the menorah. Could it be “a dreidel” (four-
sided spinning top)? But then one of the justices 
pointed out that an 18-foot tall “dreidel” would 
look somewhat silly outside of a courthouse. Ulti-
mately, the court ruled that the menorah put up 
by the Chabad Hasidim was a secular symbol, and 
so permissible. Since then, there have been many 
menorahs in public spaces.
It was shocking for me to learn that the oldest piece 
of rabbinic legislation about Hanukkah actually 
says that the Hanukkah menorah is supposed 
to be lit in public. The law specifies that if you’re 
scared of the mockers and the non-Jews, then you 
can light it in the window of your house or even, if 
you are still too scared, on a table inside. This very 
early piece of legislation suggests that the proper, 
ideal size of a menorah might actually be the sort 
of 40-feet tall menorah put up by Chabad around 
the country, with cherry-pickers in order for the 
menorah to be lit with torches.
It is interesting to see that this rabbinic law was 
only fulfilled 2000 years later. Another thing that 
was interesting to me about this case is that Chabad 
Hasidim didn’t cite this piece of rabbinic legisla-
tion as part of a claim for accommodation to their 
religious law. Accommodationism runs somewhat 
counter to the way that Chabad normally oper-
ates. The Grand Rabbi of Chabad (known as the 
Rebbe) wrote to the Jews of Teaneck (most of the 
arguments about the right of Chabad to erect a 
huge menorah actually happen among Jews) that 
Hanukkah was a perfectly good American holi-
day celebrating liberty and religious freedom (the 
principles of America) and it should be celebrated 
publicly on American ground (no need of accom-
modation to specific religious laws here). And then 
the Rebbe asked whether the Jews that objected to 
this public display were afraid that people would 
know that there were Jews living in Teaneck?
Still another interesting aspect of this argument is 
that the Supreme Court case was between Allegh-
eny Country and the ACLU, but the ACLU law-
yers were mostly Jews. In some ways, the Supreme 
Court is adjudicating a dispute between one sort 
of Jews that uphold to the separation of church 
and state more than any other group as one 
major aspect of American Jewish identity, and 
other sorts of Jews who take the mantle upon 
themselves not so much of their right to practice 
Judaism but rather, in the letter from the Chabad 
Rabbi, of a different kind of Americanism.
In each of these cases, even the oldest, Hanukkah 
is not a test case for the distinction between reli-
gion as privately observed and the public sphere, 
but rather of the very viability and distinctiveness 
of these categories, in late antiquity as today.
I’d like to say one more thing about the so-called 
“War on Christmas,” especially as it is played out 
in the public sphere of Fox News. Here, the objec-
tions are not to Jews putting up Hanukkah meno-
rahs beside Christmas trees, or based on concern 
about the crowding out of Christmas symbols. 
Rather, the main objection voiced by commen-
tators is against people saying “Happy Holidays” 
instead of “Merry Christmas.” Some commenta-
tors have even called for a boycott of storekeep-
ers or corporations that don’t greet their custom-
ers with “Merry Christmas.” This issue was first 
raised by John Gibson on Fox News in the 1990s, 
and it recurs every holiday season. Fox News typi-
cally defends itself by stating that its campaign 
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is not anti-Semitic, but rather against secularism 
and atheism. But “Happy Holidays” itself, despite 
its pluralizing of the holidays to include, presum-
ably, Hanukkah and Christmas, in fact reinscribes 
Christianity as the major locus around which 
“holiday-ness” accumulates, since Hanukkah is 
actually a minor Jewish holiday. To secularize or 
pluralize the national calendar, a more major revi-
sion would have to occur, say in September, where 
the major Jewish holidays would be made to serve 
as a bundler around which Labor Day (perhaps yet 
another secular Jewish holiday, given the associa-
tions of Jews and the cause?) would obediently fall 
into place.
Another notion that is worth undermining (since 
that is what we do in the humanities) is that “the 
December dilemma,” which describes Jewish anx-
ieties about the paltry attractions of Hanukkah in 
contrast with Christmas, is a particularly mod-
ern historical dilemma. As people always stress: 
Hanukkah is a minor holiday in Jewish tradition. 
The only reason to make a big deal of it is its prox-
imity to Christmas. It is a way to compete with the 
Christian holiday: that’s why Jewish parents stress 
that there are 8 nights of celebration instead of 
one, with presents for the lucky Jewish kids every 
day instead of just once, etc. Against this, rabbis 
excoriate that Hanukkah (like Christmas) is fall-
ing prey to materialism, and the true religious 
meaning of the holiday must be recovered. 
But it never had this primal purely Jewish mean-
ing. The holiday begins as a resistance to Helle-
nism, one that very rapidly fails: The Maccabees 
themselves became Hellenists in the next gen-
eration. Moreover, resisting Hellenists through a 
festival celebrating a military victory is, itself, a 
Hellenistic notion. From its rabbinic incarnation, 
Hanukkah already had a performative aspect. It 
was about showing our menorahs to other 
people. The idea is that religion belongs to the 
private sphere, as Y.L. Gordon (a Hebrew poet 
in the Enlightenment period) says, “Be a man on 
the street but a Jew in the house.” The Jew in the 
house lights the menorah. But like the rabbis, who 
saw Hanukkah as a performance for public con-
sumption, we are now again Jews in the street and 
perhaps only in the street; there’s nobody inside. I 
think Hanukkah is good textual evidence of the 
performative and dialogical aspects of religion, 
the ways that even in our most intimate religious 
moments we are actually in conversation with 
others. In the rabbinic literature the term mockers 
is used to mean theater-goers, meaning that if you 
think this will look like a play don’t do it outside. 
On the other hand, the rabbis suspected that, at 
bottom, in its deepest sense, Hanukkah was a kind 
of public theater. So if we think we can manage 
a space of religion that it isn’t already infected by 
the great conversations, by the way people look at 
us and the way we look at others, then I think we 
have to find another holiday (or perhaps another 
religion).
IV. SISTER MARIANNE FARINA
Some of my remarks will try to pull together the 
threads and strands that we have been talking 
about so far. First, I appreciated the broadness 
of the European focus, in a sense that one or two 
countries were not seen as representing the whole 
European story. I also appreciated the analysis of 
the Asian countries. This kind of broad scope helps 
us to understand our local context. The discussion 
of cases and analyses of recent contests and nego-
tiations concerning religious norms in the public 
square illuminate the definition of religious pres-
ence, religious freedom, universality, the sacred, 
secularism, neutral space, and public space. Our 
discussions have also highlighted the importance 
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of addressing human rights claims and the com-
plexity of debates concerning minority rights, 
religious rights, and cultural rights. They allow us 
to identify the principles underlying the contro-
versies over religious national symbols, the con-
struction of religious structures, nationalization 
projects, and the politics of conversion. 
I see two challenges. 
The first is to create a broader interdisciplinary 
approach that will help uncover the inner work-
ings of national, civil, and religious identities. 
As Naomi Seidman just mentioned, we in the 
humanities like to mess things up by highlighting 
the complexity of what initially look to be simple 
notions. The second challenge, I think, is to fos-
ter various communities of discourse, so that no 
group (e.g. the populist) dominates the discussion. 
It is in these communities of discourse that we 
encounter the philosophical impasses, the histori-
cal limits, and the ethical dilemmas of our various 
identities. If we can take this broader interdisci-
plinary approach and involve various communi-
ties of discourse, we will be able to explore what 
we mean by religious plurality, religion, and what 
composes confessional identities: religion or faith, 
as Olivier Roy mentioned. 
It’s also important to understand what we mean 
by norms. Do we mean laws? Benefits? Values? 
Visions? Each of these represents a certain phil-
osophical approach to understanding norms. 
An interdisciplinary approach could benefit our 
important interrogation of the actions and prac-
tices in the intersection of the different spheres: 
common, public, and institutional. 
As the pluralism of civic life continues to evolve, I 
am reminded of the work of the Catholic theolo-
gian John Courtney Murray. Murray raised some 
important principles. First, the state cannot offer 
all the good that is needed for civilization in a 
pluralistic society. We have to look at all the other 
venues that offer us images of the good. Second, 
dialogue will help us to understand these thick 
descriptions of the good. Neither ontological nor 
utilitarian approaches can provide or elucidate 
these thick descriptions. Murray’s invocation to 
limit warfare and expand dialogue was part of 
what he saw as a contest between civility and bar-
barianism. Murray argued that a society becomes 
barbarian when people group together out of 
fear or because of force, when economic interests 
assume primacy over higher values, and when the 
laws of argument and debate break down. Because 
civility dies with the death of dialogue, civil asso-
ciations have a critical, rational deliberative qual-
ity that we have to promote. 
Murray also spoke about three sets of discussions, 
arguments, and conversations. One is the need 
for government action, cases, and decisions. The 
second is the concern of the commonwealth: who 
are the groups coming together to really discuss 
what are the public actions? The third is the form 
of constitutional consensus.
I would like to emphasize the second conversa-
tion: a conversation that allows for an approach 
that embodies and describes our goals and visions 
of the common good and how religious norms 
guide our practices in the public space. We must 
bring forward—by gathering information and 
disseminating findings—accounts of the ordinary 
ways believers as citizens contribute to the com-
mon good. What are the projects religious and 
social groups create? How do these efforts help us 
to understand the way religious norms operate in 
the public space? What are the practical implica-
tions of their understanding of religion and civil 
identity?
Here are two examples that illustrate my point, 
one from Asia and one from the United States. 
The first example involves the Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Caritas 
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Bangladesh as examples of the public groups that 
help define and describe what we are doing in the 
public square. In the United States (and specifi-
cally California), two such groups are the East Bay 
Housing Corporation Community and the Three 
R’s Project. The Three R’s Project—which stands 
for Rights, Responsibilities, and Respect—is an 
education project for religion and civil discourse.
I believe these two examples have created what 
I call a community of discourse to act in ways 
that communicate how vision, values, and norms 
operate in the public sphere. They do this not only 
in the creation of their projects but also in the 
composition of their leadership and the practice 
of fairness, equality, and inclusion. I believe these 
organizations remind us that it is fraternity that 
helps us to define liberty and equality. They also 
help us in discovering unmet needs. As I have seen 
in my 12 years work in Bangladesh, they help to 
problematize and make a complex understanding 
of what you mean by development. Development 
is not just one vision of the good. Caritas Bangla-
desh is a religious group that is really promoting 
an active pluralism in their approach and their 
discourse about what they are doing and how they 
conceive it. 
As for the East Bay Housing project, they are reli-
gious yet act with a civil alliance—which invites 
us to ask, “What does this alliance mean, and how 
is it shaped?” 
As for The 3 R’s project, they are promoting our 
understanding of religion and civil identities 
through education about civil society and reli-
gion, and questions regarding what it means to be 
a citizen and what it means to be a believer are not 
ignored. 
In conclusion, I would like to suggest that we 
expand the dialogue in a sense of a broader inter-
disciplinary approach (with philosophers, theo-
logians, as well as legal scholars, sociologists, and 
artists), we foster these various communities of dis-
course, and we bring people into these discourses 
through the various projects they are working on.
V. IMAM FAHEEM SHUAIBE
The title of this conference doesn’t dictate whether 
one should speak descriptively or prescriptively 
about religious norms and the public sphere. I will 
take advantage of this ambiguity to speak about 
my experience working with a congregation and 
also with activists of all stripes. By “activists,” I 
mean people who actively work to realize a vision 
of the good. In particular, I’d like to mention an 
organization that I am working with, called the 
Abraham Family Reunion. It is an aggregation 
of Christians of various stripes, Jews, and Mus-
lims who search out various kinds of activities, 
interventions, and methodological approaches 
for bringing about peace “locally” and ultimately 
peace in the world. 
Working with this group and leading a congrega-
tion as an Imam forces me to deal with everyday 
pragmatic, practical, and personal problems. I am 
also confronted with issues that come up within 
a congregation where a group of people tries to 
move in the same direction even though the natu-
ral dynamic of being human brings up conflicts 
and challenges to that process. In doing so, there 
is one central (though sometimes overlooked) 
core concept and it is the idea of our humanity. 
Our humanity explains why things happen the 
way they happen. It is because we are humans that 
we often have difficulties grasping things that may 
otherwise seem fundamentally obvious.
Therefore, a critical part of any prescriptive solu-
tion to the question of religious norms in the pub-
lic sphere is the definition of humanity. There is a 
philosophical sentiment that “to err is human but 
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to forgive is divine.” This sentiment seems pejora-
tive to our humanity, because it sets humanity in 
opposition to the divine. On one level, it is true 
that humans are faulty and error-prone. But there 
is another dimension of humanity, at least from 
the Islamic perspective: that God creates human 
beings, by nature, in the most excellent mould 
and structure. The Qur’an, which Muslims believe 
to be the revealed word of God, teaches that the 
human being is created in the mould of excellence 
and is not corrupt by nature. 
Human beings, Muslim and otherwise, perform 
and behave in ways that are destructive, unpro-
ductive, erroneous, irrational, unreasonable, 
greedy, and selfish. This, too, is a part of the human 
being. But while it is part of a person’s existence, it 
is not their nature. What should stand as a norm 
for human beings is the Qur’an. For Muslims, the 
ground of religious norms is the Qur’an. Then we 
introduce Mohammed who is the Messenger of 
Allah. The Qur’an says that He is also the most 
excellent model example to follow for any who 
believes in G-d and the Last Day. He is to be the 
ideal standard. At the time of the Qur’an’s revela-
tion, G-d tells Mohammed to tell the people - “I 
(Muhammad) am a human being just like you. 
I’m a flesh and blood human being just like you.” 
So the deification of Mohammed is inappropriate 
for Islam. The Islamic ideal is to follow the human 
behavior that Mohammed provides. His behavior 
is the norm for Muslims; it is the central point that 
Muslims are supposed to be orbiting around—and 
which Muslims believe is best for all humanity.
In light of this standard, we might wonder whether 
many contemporary Muslims are behaving 
according to the model that Mohammed repre-
sented. To the extent that they do not, then they are 
not reflecting the universal norms that are posited 
in Mohammed’s teaching and the teaching of the 
Holy Qur’an. When we talk about religious norms 
in the public sphere, I know that much of the con-
versation among scholars is around the cultural, 
the political, and the legal environment, some of 
the particular artifacts, and how these artifacts 
are accepted or rejected within that environment. 
As far as Muslim religious norms are concerned, I 
would like to go back to those definitions because, 
often, the practices of Muslims don’t conform to 
the Qur’anic prescriptions, which call for Mus-
lims to be more tolerant. Sometimes Muslims 
take artifacts, for example the kufi (short rounded 
cap) that I am now wearing, as having more sig-
nificance than they actually do. I put this kufi on 
more for the functional purpose of pressing my 
hair down than to convey that I’m a religious per-
son. Yet there are some who would take my wear-
ing this artifact as a sign that I have Taqwa (G-d 
Consciousness), that I really believe in G-d. 
One of my awakenings came when I went to Egypt 
in 2005 to study Arabic. When I got to Jumu’ah, 
there were only five other people beside myself 
who were wearing kufi caps. In the land of the 
Arab, you would expect everybody to be wearing 
the kufi. But no, because there it’s just a common 
thing that you go to the prayer then you go back 
to work. There is no need to proclaim your “G-d 
Consciousness” in a land that is nearly 100% Mus-
lim. 
However, in a culture like America’s, where the 
religious environment is more heterogeneous and 
issues of identity are more significant, the kufi has 
a different significance than in Egypt, where the 
religious environment is more homogeneous. In 
non-Muslim cultures we (both Muslims and non-
Muslims) charge these artifacts with more value 
and emotional force than the religion warrants. 
In Al-Islam, religion is not separated out as it is in 
the West. The true definition of Al-Islam as a way 
of life is Din, which (among many other things) 
means the totality of life. The separation of church 
and state is not a dimension of Islam. Coming 
Religious Norms in the Public Sphere106
from the West, it might be difficult to understand 
that Muslims don’t draw the distinction between 
the political and the religious in their lives. This 
misunderstanding leads to a fear and sometimes 
hostile attitude toward Muslims who don’t abide 
by or acknowledge this culturally dictated separa-
tion. This is a source of conflict. 
This conflict leads to a question of ethics. By “eth-
ics,” I mean the conflict between good and bad 
things that requires a choice. The Qur’an calls 
the Muslim to strive after what is best. But “best” 
can be relative to circumstances and situations. 
What is best in Morocco in 1975 might not be 
what is best in East Oakland in 2011. Yesterday, 
Dr. Moosa stated that unreasonably holding to 
a tradition could make that tradition an idol. If 
one does not understand the flexibility, the muta-
bility, and the utilitarian value of these edicts of 
the Qur’an, then one might hold unreasonably to 
them even though they are not the essential or 
immutable roots of the religion. This elevation of 
everyday artifacts into the warp and woof of a reli-
gion is another source of conflict. 
Another prescription is a call for dialogue. In the 
Qur’an, God says to invite people into dialogue in 
order to come to common terms. The definitions 
we use are essential. We may actually be talk-
ing about the same thing, or we might be talking 
about different things. But we should at least figure 
out what we’re talking about. Only in dialogue can 
we determine if we have a disagreement or sim-
ply a misunderstanding. The difference between 
the two is that a misunderstanding can be cleared 
up by more information, while a disagreement 
cannot be resolved by providing more informa-
tion. The only way to resolve a disagreement is by 
appealing to a higher authority. The need for this 
appeal implicates not only a religious dialogue but 
also a need for political and legal dialogues across 
cultural lines. 
About religious norms in the public sphere there 
is a verse saying: “Let there arise out of you an 
Ummah (Community).” It expresses the quest for 
a beloved, uniform life with peace on earth, good-
will towards men. It is an invitation for everybody 
to come to Ummah. This verse commands people 
to do what is universally good. Those values are 
trans-temporally, trans-spatially “Good.”  All 
normal people value love, truth (nobody wants to 
be lied to, even a liar does not want to be lied to), 
integrity, honesty, mercy, and justice. Those are 
values that are universally appreciated, no matter 
who you are or where you are.  The Qur’an invites 
us to have a common definition of what is univer-
sally good.  
I’ve had the good fortune of being with Dr. Farina 
and others on a panel on the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights. The idea behind that 
declaration is that we might come to agreement 
about what constitutes a human being and what 
rights are derived as a result of our existence as 
human beings. There are the 3 R’s that have been 
mentioned: rights, responsibilities, and respect. It 
means that I have to accept that as a human being 
regardless of my ethnicity, my nationality, or my 
political party, that all others are human beings 
(Republican, Democrats, gays, etc.) also.  And by 
the simple virtue of their humanity, there are cer-
tain rights, certain responsibilities, and a certain 
respect that derive simply because they exist—as 
human beings. If we can agree on that, then I 
think this world would be a better place to live in.
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TRANSATLANTIC NETWORK OF SCHOLARS
 ON MUSLIMS’ RELIGIOUS IDENTITY, 
SECULARISM, DEMOCRACY, 
AND CITIZENSHIP
I. WHEN HETERODOXY CHALLENGES THE 
PUBLIC PLACE OF RELIGION:  THE 
CASE OF ALEVISM IN TURKEY
ELISE MASSICARD
I will speak about Turkey. Turkey is often con-
sidered the first Muslim secular state. But in the 
past few years the relationship between state and 
religion has been widely challenged. Interestingly, 
it has been challenged from different directions: 
part of this challenge has come from the party in 
power, the Justice and Development Party, which 
has an Islamic background, but also by other 
movements. Today I will speak about the chal-
lenges brought by a movement demanding the 
recognition of heterodoxy, Alevism. 
There are estimated to be 12 to 15 million Alevisin 
in Turkey. Alevis enjoy no formal status, although 
they have increasingly demanded recognition. 
First, I will argue that these demands not only 
concern the status of Alevists, but also challenge 
institutional arrangements between state and reli-
gion in Turkey (especially the issues of religious 
pluralism and state neutrality). Second, the Ale-
vists’ challenge has, on the whole, failed to change 
this basic arrangement. Third, this failure has 
prompted Alevists to resort to alternative means 
of satisfaction, such as the judicialization of their 
claims and “extraversion,” especially towards the 
European Union. 
Let me first briefly describe who Alevis are. Alevi-
ness is both heterodox and syncretistic. It is char-
acterized by diverse influences, especially from 
Shi’a Islam (for example, the cult of Ali, the Twelve 
Imams, or the Fast of Muharram) and also from 
Islamic mysticism (it has strong esoteric features). 
However, the requirements of Islam actually bear 
little on Alevi life. For example, Alevis do not fast 
during Ramadan or perform the Islamic prayer. 
Instead, they have specific rituals, for instance the 
Cem ceremony. They have specific institutions 
and cultural practices which are hardly linked to 
Islam. There is an ongoing debate among Alevis 
about whether or not they are a part of Islam.
Alevis have been stigmatized as heretics in the 
Ottoman Empire since the 16th century, after the 
empire became a defender of Sunni Islam. Inter-
estingly, the non-recognition of Alevis continued 
in the Turkish Republic, even though some non-
Muslim groups gained the status of officially rec-
ognized minorities due to international pressure. 
One reason for this denial lies in the fact that Islam 
was accepted as a kind of national identity marker 
of Turkishness. This crucial place of religion in 
the nation-building process suggests that it is mis-
leading to speak about the separation of state and 
religion in the Republic of Turkey. Many people 
are misled by the official principle of laïcité, laik-
lik in Turkish, that has been in the Turkish Con-
stitution since 1937. Yet this term has a different 
meaning in Turkey than in France. In the Turkish 
context, it is more appropriate to talk about the 
domestication of religion by the state, since the 
state controls religions through the Directory of 
Religious Affairs, also called the Diyanet. This 
state institution manages both mosques and cler-
gymen, whom it nominates and pays. Moreover, 
until recently the Diyanet wrote the Friday ser-
mons that were read in the mosques all over the 
country, which allowed them to promote a kind of 
official religion. Thus, the Turkish state is heavily 
involved in religious affairs. 
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What is this official religion? It seems to be a mod-
ernist version of the Sunni Hanafi interpretation. 
Therefore, far from being religiously neutral, the 
Turkish state has endorsed and institutionalized 
one specific interpretation of Islam, denying all 
other interpretations in the process. In the terms 
that Silvio Ferrari introduced yesterday, Turkey 
has a dominant religion, although it is not spoken 
of as such. 
What is the place of Aleviness in this framework? 
The Diyanet considers Alevis as Muslims who 
have somehow been pushed aside from the true 
path. So institutions classify Alevis as a minor and 
mainly cultural subgroup of Islam, one not enti-
tled to any special treatment from other Muslim 
groups. For example, Alevi children must attend 
compulsory religious courses, which teach only 
the official religion. 
Since the 1980s, an Alevist movement has voiced 
demands for public recognition of Aleviness as a 
legitimate element of Turkish society and for equal 
participation in all spheres of life without facing 
discrimination. However, these claims challenge 
the official understanding of the relationship 
between state and religion, since they assert the 
recognition of religious pluralism and question 
the neutrality of the state. I will briefly mention 
three main related demands. 
One of the main demands is the official recogni-
tion of Alevi cemevis as worship places. In Turkey, 
most churches and synagogues enjoy this worship 
place status, which allows them to benefit from 
privileges like free electricity and water as well as 
the allocation of building sites. Alevi cemevis do 
not, having only the status of associations. This 
status makes them much more difficult to build 
and denies them access to public financing. As a 
result, many Alevi worship places are only half 
built.
A second demand regards compulsory religious 
instruction. These compulsory courses called 
“religious culture and ethics” do not teach about 
different religions. Rather, they teach Sunni 
beliefs and practices alone. In general, Alevis see 
this instruction as biased and assimilatory. How-
ever, they disagree about the best solution. Most 
Alevists oppose the existence of these manda-
tory religious courses and suggest making them 
optional or even abolishing them. Others argue 
that the content of these courses should be made 
more religiously neutral by, for instance, includ-
ing Alevi teachings (and possibly those of other 
religions as well). 
A third demand concerns the Diyanet itself. Ale-
vis blame the Diyanet for institutionalizing the 
Sunni interpretation of Islam. However, there is 
disagreement about how to resolve this complaint 
as well. Some Alevists support abolishing the 
Diyanet, and others demand that it integrates or 
represents Aleviness. Thus, Alevists claim equal 
treatment and the neutrality of institutions either 
through a really secular laic state exerting no 
control on religion—no Diyanet and no religious 
course—or by keeping this relationship between 
state and religion but by introducing equal treat-
ment and thus pluralism. 
The Alevist movement has achieved only some 
minor victories after more than 20 years of mobi-
lization. For example, state institutions no lon-
ger deny the existence of Alevis. However, on the 
whole nothing has changed about the institutional 
arrangements that frame the basic relationship 
between state and religion. For example, there has 
been no recognition of any official status for Alevi-
ness, nor the abolition of the Diyanet or an altera-
tion of compulsory religion classes. For instance, 
in 2006, there was a parliamentary debate on the 
content and meaning of the term “worship place.” 
Yet this debate reasserted the exclusion of Alevi 
cemevi from the category of worship places. 
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The only important change took place in 2005, 
when some Alevi teachings were introduced into 
the religious education syllabus. However, many 
Alevis saw this change as part of an assimilation 
strategy, since the syllabus traced the similarities 
between Alevis and Sunnis but did not mention 
the basic differences. In other words, this change 
was interpreted as a further attempt by state 
authorities to fold Alevis into mainstream Islam, 
rather than a relaxation of state control over a uni-
tary religion. 
This suspicion was further confirmed in 2007, 
when the ruling Justice and Development Party 
launched a policy called “Alevi Opening.” This 
policy included a variety of symbolic gestures, 
with ministers recognizing the discrimina-
tion that Alevis had suffered and Prime Minis-
ter Erdoğan promising to accommodate Alevi’s 
requests. However, very few concrete steps were 
taken. For example, the demand for recognition of 
Alevi cemevis as worship places was ignored. Fur-
thermore, the government has still not followed 
through on its commitment to further revise the 
content of compulsory religious instruction. 
One of the government’s most important sym-
bolic gestures was the organization of an iftar, the 
meal breaking the fast, during Muharram (the 
fast taken by Alevis). This program was organized 
on the model of the Sunni iftar during Ramadan, 
which is a very important and symbolic time of 
eating together. But the Alevi fast is quite differ-
ent, because people actually eat during the days 
(but no meat or other heavy foods). As such, there 
is no sense in making a big meal when breaking 
the fast for Muharram. Alevis saw this gesture as 
another example of government officials encour-
aging Alevis to follow the mainstream dominant 
model. 
Because of the failure to gain recognition of these 
claims through the political field, Alevists have 
turned towards extraversion and judicialisation. 
Alevi migrants in Europe, especially in Germany, 
demand the same rights to accommodation as do 
Alevists in Turkey. In 2000, a Berlin administra-
tive court granted them the status of a religious 
community and the right to teach Aleviness in 
public schools. So, accommodation demands were 
much more successful than in Turkey. Since the 
early 2000s, Alevists have subsequently resorted 
to European institutions as a way of leveraging 
Turkey’s European accession process into domes-
tic reforms. The European Commission has legiti-
mized Alevist demands in all its annual reports 
by implicitly recognizing Aleviness as a religious 
phenomenon within Islam. This has been an 
important step for Alevists, even if it has so far 
resulted in few concrete changes to the situation 
of Alevis in Turkey. 
Both in Turkey and abroad, Alevists have also 
channeled the conflict over the place of religion in 
the public sphere into the judicial arena. In Tur-
key, this judicialization has not been part of a pos-
itive struggle for recognition, but rather a nega-
tive struggle against calumny and discrimination. 
While some Turkish courts have been willing to 
hear these cases, most of these claims (especially 
those related to basic arrangements between state 
and religion) have not been heard. 
As a result of these denials, Alevists have begun to 
raise claims before the European Court of Human 
Rights. Two main cases are important here. The 
first, Zengin v. Turkey,120 deals with the exemption 
of Alevi children from compulsory religious edu-
cation. The second case dealt with the mention of 
Aleviness as a religious identification on Turkish 
ID cards which was compulsory until 2006 but 
then abolished. In both cases, the European Court 
ruled in favor of the Alevists. 
120 Hasan and Eylem Zengin v Turkey (2008) 46  
 EHRR 44
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Let me elaborate on the Zengin case. Here, an Alevi 
citizen requested that his daughter be exempted 
from lessons in religious culture and ethics. The 
claim was that these lessons violated the parents’ 
right to choose the type of education that their 
children will receive, which is guaranteed under 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 
petitioner also alleged that the religious course 
was incompatible with the principles of secular-
ism and neutrality, as it was essentially based on 
the teaching of Sunni Islam. Each of these claims 
was rejected or dismissed in Turkish courts. The 
citizen then went to the supreme administrative 
court and all his requests were dismissed on the 
ground that the course called “religious culture 
and ethics” were in accordance with the Turk-
ish legislation. On appeal, the European Court 
of Human Rights found that the syllabus for the 
religious course gave greater priority to Islam than 
to other religions and philosophies, and that the 
pupils did not receive teaching on the confessional 
or ritual specificities of the Alevi faith. Therefore, 
the court found, the religion course and ethics 
lesson were inconsistent with the objectivity and 
pluralism necessary for education in a democratic 
society.
This decision was taken up by some Turkish 
authorities, but not by others. The Council of 
State declared that the religion courses could not 
be mandatory in their current form and should 
be optional. However, the Diyanet criticized the 
Council and so far has refused to change the cur-
riculum.
Turkish authorities hardly implemented the deci-
sions of the European court until now. The judi-
cialisation of Alevist claims in Turkey through the 
European court took the form of questioning the 
authoritarian imposition of one official religion on 
the grounds of freedom of religion. Religious plu-
ralism has been invoked as a way to implement the 
neutrality of institutions.
In a way, this is a classical case of a minority chal-
lenging the dominant religion. What’s unique is 
that it takes place in a Muslim country in which 
the European Court of Human Rights is compe-
tent. It brings up again the question of the consis-
tency of the Court’s decisions and the heterogene-
ity of the situations it has to deal with.
One point I would like to raise is that disputes 
about the place of religion in the public sphere are 
channeled into the judiciary. What are the conse-
quences of this judicialization process? In Turkey 
we can say that the judiciary itself is very politi-
cized so there is a kind of blurring of the bound-
aries. 
Moreover, the role of Europe in this process is 
doubled-edged. One could expect that the sup-
port of European institutions would enhance the 
legitimacy of the Alevists’ claims. To the contrary, 
the support of these claims by European institu-
tions is widely considered in Turkey as dangerous, 
an illegitimate intrusion of foreigners supporting 
minorities against domestic authorities. Indeed, 
this intervention has led to strong resistance. 
Let me raise a last point: these issues are not just 
about Alevis, but rather about the basic arrange-
ments between state and religion. In this frame-
work, other groups (including Islamists) also 
criticize the relationship between state and reli-
gion in Turkey. Despite the fact that the Justice 
and Development Party (which comes from an 
Islamist background, but is not really an Islamist 
party) has seemed to challenge this relationship 
between state and religion, it has in reality acted 
to preserve the status quo. 
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II. THE SEPARATION OF CULT AND 
STATE IN COLONIAL ALGERIA
SORAYA TLATLI
The author has preferred not to include her presentation. 
The webcast is still available on the igov website (http://igov.
berkeley.edu/content/case-european-countries) and on You-
Tube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ka5X48-NAqM)
III. MEDIATING ISLAMIC NORMS
MUNIR JIWA
This presentation is a reflection on my work with 
the Religious Norms in the Public Sphere proj-
ect, rather than an academic paper. As part of 
this project, we were initially looking at different 
ways to think about what was then called Islamic 
norms, and this inquiry was expanded from 
Islamic norms to religious norms more generally. 
As an anthropologist by training who works on 
aesthetics with Muslim artists, I have been think-
ing about how framing and understanding reli-
gious norms within a legal framework alone not 
only makes these norms too prescriptive, but, 
more so, how these normative frameworks do not 
always account for the communities that I have 
been working with, especially in terms of how 
norms are constituted, articulated, and embodied 
among Muslims.
My initial project was also about how to expand 
beyond the stereotypical places where we find 
Muslims. Not all Muslims are found at mosques, 
and not all things Muslims do necessarily relate 
to Islam. There are many kinds of norms, pre-
scriptions, and ideas that regulate, shape, and give 
structure and meaning to our lives, not always 
captured by scholarship. This project has also 
raised more general questions about the produc-
tion and circulation of knowledge, the academic 
question of how we come to know and represent 
our subjects, and the disciplinary ways in which 
we approach our topics. Though I have learned a 
lot from the legal and political theories and meth-
odologies used in the Religious Norms project, 
how do these relate to and inform my own dis-
ciplines of anthropology and theology? Do these 
disciplines have anything to say to each other? Is 
one inquiry at the level of legal or political theory 
while the other at the level of practices? 
Since so much of the way in which Muslims enter 
and are imagined in the public sphere in America 
is through media/events, another question I am 
interested in is how and what we remember about 
events and the mediation of globalized events/
Islam through images. Our study of the normative 
practices of Islam and the reformulation or refor-
matting of religion, are often not only mediated by 
images, but the images themselves are embedded 
in this reformulation. So, as part of this project, it 
is important to look at the relationship between 
images, texts, contexts, and practices. 
I would like to introduce and then later return to 
my concept of the “five ‘media pillars’ of Islam” as 
the secular norms that frame much of the conver-
sations and politics of Islam and Muslims in public 
life: 9/11, terrorism/violence, Muslim women and 
veiling, Islam and the West, and the Middle-East. 
These five “media pillars” are so hegemonic and 
normative that to think of Islam and Muslims out-
side of these norms becomes almost impossible. 
To borrow from anthropologist Arjun Appadurai, 
this suggests a “metonymic freezing,” a fixivity of 
classification. So if one thinks of terrorism, one 
also thinks of Islam, and vice-versa. Not only do 
we categorize and attempt to represent Islam and 
Muslims in these ways, but we tend to fix them 
in such limiting categories and understand their 
lives only through these prisms. If one thinks out-
side these categories, one gets classified as either 
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apologetic or accused of not addressing the “real” 
(public) concerns relating to Islam and Muslims.
I also get the sense that religion itself becomes too 
reified in our analysis of it. We tend to focus on 
Islam and Islamic norms as the problem, and one 
of the strategies out of this seeming impasse is to 
Americanize or Europeanize the problem, rather 
than Islamicizing it. From a secular standpoint we 
tend to see religion and religious norms as restric-
tive, oppressive, and dogmatic, while taking secu-
lar norms for granted as natural, rarely question-
ing the secular regulations we are subjected to in 
our daily lives.
My initial project began with Muslim artists. I 
was interested in the ways that artists could lead 
to a reimagining of Muslim communities after 
9/11. Artists were often mobilized and represented 
by the U.S. government as “good Muslims,” secu-
lar, Sufis, not really practicing, a kind of “Islam-
lite” that was palatable for Americans, but my own 
research examined how these artists navigated 
the New York art scene after 9/11, as well as how 
they came to imagine themselves within the cat-
egory “Muslim.” Prior to 9/11, these artists (it hap-
pened that all the artists I have been working with 
were women) were categorized by ethnic, gender, 
national, regional, or art-historical categories—as 
African, Arab, Indian, Iranian, Malaysian, Paki-
stani, as women, as abstract-expressionist, mini-
malists, etc. After 9/11 they became “Muslim” 
artists, first externally by the New York art scene 
and then an identity they strategically negotiated 
themselves. We found that most of these artists 
didn’t self-apply this category, but began to use it 
because it allowed them more artistic opportuni-
ties, rather than because they had reflected more 
about what it meant to be Muslim. Interestingly 
and perhaps not surprisingly, through the process, 
many Muslim artists began embracing their Mus-
limness as a minority identification.
While my initial work with these artists was to 
understand how they navigated the secular New 
York art world through the category Muslim, my 
more recent research and work looks at how Mus-
lim artists navigate both the art worlds and their 
relationship to the Islamic tradition, and what 
their theological commitments look like. It dis-
places the idea of Muslim artists being secular in 
nature, or put another way, because they are art-
ists, they are likely to be more secular Muslims. 
Let me share an example. A few years ago, Jen-
nifer Taylor’s film, New Muslim Cool, was fea-
tured at the San Francisco film festival. The film 
is about Jason Perez (now Hamza Perez), a Puerto 
Rican American rapper and his spiritual journey. 
It was fascinating that, during the film festival in 
the Sundance Kabuki Cinema, Muslims prayed 
one of their five daily obligatory ritual prayers!  A 
senior staff member of the festival, who had never 
seen this happen before, not only welcomed it, 
but was curious to know why some people were 
praying and some were not! What was even more 
fascinating was that many non-Muslims in the 
cinema space could not imagine that these artists 
and film actors and the Muslims in the audience 
could be religiously observant—in the cinema! I 
think this may be both because one isn’t used to 
seeing prayers being performed in a cinema space, 
but also because the general thinking is that if you 
are an artist, Muslim artistic creativity only comes 
from abandoning ritual and religious norms. That 
is, one can only be creative as an artist in so far 
as one lets go of the so-called “Islamic” prohibi-
tions on (figurative) art work. These artists denied 
the dichotomy between artistic creation and their 
commitment to their faith (seeing themselves as 
practicing Muslims and artists). In fact among the 
Muslim artists at the film festival, they found that 
it was the norms of the art world that were restric-
tive and that their art practices were enhanced 
because they were religiously observant. 
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This example has pushed me to think more about 
the frames through which Muslims are repre-
sented. More theoretically, my own work seeks 
to elaborate on Judith Butler’s understanding of 
frames, and how we begin to understand ourselves 
through various categories and frames:
“The epistemological capacity to appre-
hend a life is partially dependent on 
that life being produced according to 
norms that qualify it as a life or, indeed, 
as part of life. In this way, the norma-
tive production of ontology thus pro-
duces the epistemological problem of 
apprehending a life, and this in turn 
gives rise to the ethical problem of what 
it is to acknowledge or, indeed, to guard 
against injury or violence…121 
The ‘frames’ that work to differentiate 
the lives we can apprehend from those 
we cannot (or that produce lives across 
a continuum of life) not only organize 
visual experience but also generate spe-
cific ontologies of the subject. Subjects 
are constituted through norms which, 
in their reiteration, produce and shift 
the terms through which subjects are 
recognized.122 
Turning now to the five “media pillars” of Islam 
mentioned earlier, I want to show how Butler’s 
conceptualization of frames and their norma-
tive reiteration produce a public recognition of 
Islam, often at odds with Muslim subjectivity.  If 
we attempt to understand Islam and Muslims out-
side these five categories and their scripts, we tend 
to find a disconnect between the public imagi-
121  Judith Butler, “On This Occasion…” in  Butler  
 on Whitehead: On the Occasion, ed. Faber,   
 Halewood, Lin (Lanham: Lexington Books,  
 2012): 13.
122 Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life  
 Grievable? (London: Verso, 2009) : 3-4. (?)
nary and Muslim lived experience, the likelihood 
of misrecognition, and even accusation of being 
apologetic for using alternative frames.
The first frame, “9/11,” tends to be the most domi-
nant temporal frame used to think about Islam 
and Muslims, most certainly in the United States. 
As Jean Baudrillard said in his provocative 2002 
publication, Spirit of Terrorism: 
When it comes to world events we had 
seen quite a few. From the death of 
Diana to the World Cup. And violent, 
real events, from wars right through to 
genocides. Yet, when it comes to sym-
bolic events on a world scale – that is to 
say not just events that gain worldwide 
coverage, but events that represent a 
setback for globalization itself – we had 
had none. Throughout the stagnation of 
the 1990s, events were ‘on strike’ (as the 
Argentinian writer Macedonio Fernan-
dez put it). Well, the strike is over now. 
Events are not on strike any more. With 
the attacks on the World Trade Center 
in New York, we might even be said to 
have before us the absolute event, the 
‘mother’ of all events, the pure event 
uniting within itself all events that have 
ever taken place.123
He goes on to say, 
This goes far beyond hatred for domi-
nant world power among the disinher-
ited and exploited, among those who 
have ended up on the wrong side of the 
global order. Even those who share in 
the advantages of that order have this 
malicious desire in their hearts. Allergy 
to any definitive order, to any definitive 
power, is – happily – universal, and the 
two towers of the World Trade Center 
123 Baudrillard, Spirit of Terrorism (2002): 
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were perfect embodiments in their very 
twinness of that definitive order.124
“9/11” not only becomes a temporal frame mark-
ing Muslim presence in the public sphere in the 
United States, but erases the long history and 
presence of Muslims in the Americas, forcibly 
brought over during the Atlantic Slave Trade, as 
Sylviane Diouf’s and others’ works remind us. 
It also erases the important history of African-
American Muslims in the United States, central 
to understanding Islam in America. In addi-
tion, 9/11 also becomes a way to think about the 
questioning of symbolic power—the twin tow-
ers as both symbols of global capital and a site of 
sacredness. For example, debates on the Park 51 
Islamic Community Center were often couched as 
questions of sensitivity, as if proximity of the so-
called “Ground Zero Mosque” would profane the 
otherwise sacred ground of the fallen twin towers. 
What is interesting here are the liberal markers we 
use to make Muslim public space thinkable and 
acceptable to a wider public: the mosque could not 
just be a mosque with, for example, a dome and 
minaret (though not theologically necessary). Ini-
tially, it only registered as thinkable because it was 
presented as a proposed community center, open 
to Jews and Christians, with an interfaith center, 
art exhibits, a culinary school, a swimming pool, 
a recreation center, and a memorial to pay tribute 
to those who lost their lives on 9/11. Even though 
the idea of Park 51 was modeled on the YMCA 
or Jewish Community Center, it was never quite 
accepted as a community center. Again, if it were 
just a mosque, and not an extended community 
center open to all, there would likely have been 
even more of a public outcry, and indeed there 
was once the “Stop the Islamization of America” 
group, headed by Pamela Geller, began calling it 
the “Ground Zero Mosque,” sometimes also called 
the “Victory Mosque.”
124 Baudrillard, Spirit of Terrorism (2002):  pp
Returning to my point about frames, public con-
versations are not only confined by their frames, 
but the discussions within those frames are fur-
ther scripted.  For example, in the case of Park 
51, there seemed to be a significant disconnect 
between the particular and localized conversa-
tions about the architecture and logistics of the 
building (how it aimed to be the greenest building 
in NYC, the designs and aesthetics of the building, 
what the recreation facility would look like, etc.) 
and the public understanding that was focused on 
the politics of the proximity of the “mosque” to 
ground zero.  If one only focused on the aesthetics 
of Park 51 or, for example, the recreation facility 
they were hoping to have in the center, the gen-
eral public would think these conversations to be 
odd or to have missed the larger, national conver-
sations about Park 51 in relation to 9/11, ground 
zero, and how shari’a law was taking over. These 
are the scripts and codes within particular frames 
to which I am referring. If I were to talk about 
Park 51’s green architecture, I would be seen as an 
apologist, as not dealing with the “real” and wider 
public issues, even though much of my own inter-
est in and work with the community center were 
concerned with these architectural and aesthetic 
details. 
The second frame used to discuss, think about, 
and represent Islam and Muslims in the American 
public is terrorism, violence, and fundamental-
ism. We can hardly think about Islam and Mus-
lims without thinking about terrorism, or asking 
Muslims to denounce terrorism. Jihad, Al-Qaeda, 
the Taliban, the burqa, and the madrasa are all 
English words now and most of the American 
public knows these only as English words without 
knowing their origins in Arabic and other lan-
guages. Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Guan-
tanamo, Abu Ghraib—these are all the frames 
and archives through which we think about Islam 
and Muslims, consistently connected to violence.
Religious Norms in the Public Sphere115
Talal Asad’s book on suicide bombing is instruc-
tive for its discussions on death dealing and the 
effects of different forms of violence—some forms 
of violence shock us while some do not, even as 
they destroy lives. Along the lines of Butler, I 
would argue that, in addition to Asad’s discussion 
on the scales of violence, our different responses 
to violence are also related to whose lives count as 
lives to begin with. I would argue that some forms 
of violence are acceptable to us when we perpetrate 
violence on others (as in their best interests and 
for the sake of freedom, democracy, and security). 
Yet, when these same forms of violence are perpe-
trated on us, we interpret them as the products of 
hatred, evil, religious fervor, and fundamentalism. 
Of course these forms of violence are also differen-
tiated by whether or not they are state-sponsored. 
To understand our differentiated approaches to 
violence and dealing with death requires studying 
these phenomena both in terms of power and in 
terms of classifying people (individual or collec-
tive) as subject or objects, as victims or perpetra-
tors of violence.
The third frame is Muslim women and veiling. We 
often talk about “Islamic patriarchy” as if patriar-
chy were intrinsic and limited to Islam and Mus-
lims. Our concern about women driving in Saudi 
Arabia, or rape in Pakistan, or saving Afghan 
women (from the Taliban-imposed burqas—itself 
having a long colonial history) seems misplaced 
and excessive given the rape of women every two 
minutes in this country, or the fact that women are 
exploited by and enslaved to a multi-billion dollar 
beauty and sex industry. There seems to be little 
national and collective outrage about these here at 
home. It seems then that the defining difference is 
that women in the West are free to choose (their 
exploitation) and women in the rest of the world 
(especially the Muslim world) are in need of such 
choices. 
The marking of different societies according to the 
rights it accords to its women and other minori-
ties is now extended to sexual minorities, which 
Massad, Puar, and others have written about.  As 
mentioned at the outset of this presentation, focus-
ing on legal categories at the level of the state alone 
often misses out on accounting for the great diver-
sity of lived experience, For example, the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan now recognizes the category 
of the third gender on national identity cards. 
Long seen as part of South Asian societies, hijras 
(as they are most often identified) are protected 
by the state and can choose the category of third 
gender to identify themselves (there are numerous 
examples of how Muslim societies have protected 
sexual minorities in various ways across time and 
place). Does this all of a sudden make Pakistan 
more “liberal” than the West, given such legal rec-
ognition? Can the West learn from Pakistan about 
gender and sexual minorities given that it would 
be hard to imagine recognition of this sort in the 
U.S.?
The ideas we hold about prescribing a condition 
to specificities and scripts based on the fact that 
they are Islamic or not tells us little about the way 
in which people live their social lives. The same is 
true if we focus on the hijab, or more specifically 
on Muslim women’s various forms of headscarves. 
Headscarves have been mobilized as a colonial 
strategy to secure entry into the Muslim world, 
just as the burqa was used to gain military entry 
into Afghanistan. Returning to my point about 
Pakistan’s third gender, notice how those trans-
gendered men, or men who cross-dress as women, 
don’t think twice about wearing headscarves—
that is not their focus. My point here is that Mus-
lim women and veiling have been taken up in the 
West as a major frame and focus, especially as it 
relates to rights discourse and legitimizing war, 
but significantly lacks the nuance of Muslim lived 
experience. Where gender advances have in fact 
been made in the Muslim world, they are often 
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ignored on procedural grounds as Muslim women 
look to the Qur’an and the Prophetic paradigm 
for liberation and living more piously. Saba Mah-
mood’s many excellent works help us understand 
these discussions in more detail, including the 
importance of rethinking categories of “freedom, 
agency, authority, and the human subject.”
The fourth frame is “Islam and the West” or the so-
called “Clash of Civilizations.” The idea that Islam 
and Muslims are somehow “foreign” to America 
and American values is problematic at many lev-
els. As mentioned in the first frame on 9/11, first 
and foremost this binary forgets the long history 
of Muslims in the West, such as African Muslims 
who were forcibly brought over to the Americas 
during the Atlantic Slave trade, or the long his-
tory of African-American Muslims, or, in the 
context of Europe, going beyond the immigration 
debates to remind ourselves of Bosnian Muslims 
as Europeans. In this frame, the primary discus-
sions generally focus on questions of democracy 
and freedom and Islam’s compatibility with the 
West in terms of values—reinforcing, somehow, 
that Muslims are less American or less European, 
returning to the language of “us” and “them,” and 
thereby demanding Muslims to prove their loyal-
ties as Americans. The most insidious part of this, 
as we have seen in the efforts by Pamela Geller and 
the “Stop the Islamization of America” crowd, is 
that even if Muslims seem to be “good American 
citizens,” they are not to be believed because they 
are practicing taqiyya—a very marginal concept 
in Islam that permits religious dissimulation if 
under threat (especially within the Shi’a tradi-
tion). Geller’s group attempts to instill fear in the 
American public by stating that Muslims follow-
ing “Islamic ideology” are appearing to be mod-
erate and hiding their real efforts of exerting a 
“jihad” against America—referred to as “stealth 
jihad.” An example of this according to Geller’s 
group is how “shari’a” is supposedly taking over 
the American legal system, but, more importantly, 
she attempts to show how Islamic values, laws, 
and traditions have “always” been at odds with 
progressive Judeo-Christian civilization. Were it 
not for the millions of dollars being poured into 
funding such Islamophobia, with so much agree-
ment by state officials, we might be able to dismiss 
such blatant anti-Muslim racism, but, unfortu-
nately, freedom of expression permits such hatred 
to be exercised. 
If 9/11 is the temporal frame through which we 
think about Islam and Muslims in America, the 
fifth frame is “the Middle East” as the geographic 
and spatial frame. The focus on the Arab world 
and on Israel and Palestine is central to this frame, 
even though we know that the majority of Mus-
lims live outside the Middle East, namely in South 
Asia, with the largest Muslim-majority country 
being Indonesia. While a focus on the Middle 
East may be relevant given the origins, theology, 
and practice of the faith (for example the hajj or 
annual pilgrimage to Mecca), the fixation on the 
Middle East is usually tied to politics, oil, and ter-
rorism, and generally not about the profound intel-
lectual contributions of the Arab Muslims to the 
West, or the incredible history of Islamic aesthetics, 
architecture, and art. 
As these “five media pillars” show, the secular nor-
mative frames, through which Islam and Muslims 
enter the public sphere predominantly through 
global events and media, are the very frames that 
also attempt to format and fix Muslim lived expe-
rience. Though the state guarantees the freedom 
of religion, secularism as a political project is fully 
invested in reformulating religion, and by exten-
sion regulating it. For religious minorities in the 
United States, the historical unfolding of secu-
larism and Christianity is then the very history 
through which we imagine the unfolding of all 
religions, forgetting that religions follow differ-
ent theologies and histories, both overlapping and 
distinct.  Saba Mahmood’s “Secularism, Herme-
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neutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Refor-
mation” is an important work for the way it metic-
ulously exposes how the state has been involved 
with “reformulating” its relationship to Islam and 
Muslims through programs like the White House 
National Security Council’s Muslim World Out-
reach. In addition, think tanks such as the RAND 
Corporation which make policy recommenda-
tions on Islam and Muslims, are hugely problem-
atic for the way they identify “traditionalist Islam” 
as the longer term problem for Western democra-
cies, as the traditionalists take the Qur’an as the 
word of God and the Sunnah (way of life) of the 
Prophet as a legitimate source for the conduct and 
embodiment of everyday life. If the 2003 report is 
correct, then the majority of Muslims are going to 
be problematic. A follow-up RAND report in 2007 
recommended working with Muslims who sup-
port democracy, recognize international human 
rights (including gender equality and freedom of 
worship), respect diversity, accept non-sectarian 
sources of laws, and oppose terrorism and illegiti-
mate forms of violence. These reports are aimed to 
advise the U.S State Department to build moder-
ate Muslim networks, meaning working with five 
categories of Muslims: liberal and secular Mus-
lim academics and intellectuals, young moderate 
religious scholars, community activists, women’s 
groups engaged in gender equity and campaigns, 
and moderate journalists and writers. 
These efforts not only remind us of state involve-
ment with religion, but also the reformulating of 
Islam and Muslims according to secular notions 
of how Christianity ought to be lived. The idea that 
Muslims should adopt a symbolic relationship to 
Islam and its foundations is the very “formatting” 
of religion that this Religious Norms project has 
tried to address.
My aim in this project has been to reveal the socio-
political and historical circumstances in which we 
find Muslims and Islam, to look at secular norms 
rather than theological or religious explanations 
that attach all things Muslims do to their faith, 
and, at the same time, to recognize how religious 
commitment is articulated and practiced amongst 
Muslims. My work with Muslim artists has been 
an attempt to think about Muslims in new ways 
that neither restrict them to theological belief nor 
locate them only at mosques. It has been an effort 
to rethink and re-map the locations where we nor-
matively find Muslims, and to question and make 
more complex secular/religious divides. Through 
artists, we are also reminded that affect, embodi-
ment, and lived experience can easily remain un-
translated if we focus only on legal frames at the 
level of the state. The Religious Norms in the Pub-
lic Sphere project has played an important role in 
bringing together disciplinary and interdisciplin-
ary approaches to understanding religious and 
state actors in all their complexity and relation-
ships. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
OLIVIER ROY
To understand the issue of religious signs in the 
public sphere, one should first disaggregate dif-
ferent conceptions of the public sphere.  More-
over, “rights” is not a uniform category, and rights 
might compete with each other (defamation and 
freedom of expression, right to educate children 
and children’s rights, collective and individual 
rights, and balance between majority and minor-
ity “rights,” such as in the display of Christmas 
trees or crucifixes in a “Christian” country, loud-
speakers calling for prayers in a Muslim country, 
etc.). The paradox is that the courts support either 
total neutrality of the state, which means ignor-
ing the very idea of a shared dominant culture in 
favor of a pure collection of individual rights, or 
on the contrary abide by the concept of a domi-
nant culture (Leitkultur for some German courts 
who banned the scarf for Muslim teachers, but not 
the cornet wimple for teaching nuns). But in the 
meantime, the courts, at least in Europe, acknowl-
edge that most of the Christian religious symbols 
are not religious thus endorsing the de facto sec-
ularization of Europe—a fact that does not nec-
essarily please the Catholic Church. The conse-
quence is a growing discrepancy in the approach 
of religions: some are perceived as first of all “con-
fessional” (stressing faith) while other are seen as 
first of all “cultural.” The courts thus give some 
credence to the concept of “identity” that is nowa-
days the motto of European populist movements 
that are not “religious” but stress the Christian 
identity of Europe  (all the Northern European 
populist movement endorse gay-marriage, sexual 
freedom, and abortion). In a time of a growing 
populist surge in almost all the Western countries, 
the issue of identity, or more precisely national 
identity, is becoming a strong electoral argument.
In fact, when the European Court of Human 
Rights supported the display of the crucifix in 
Italy and the ban on the headscarf in Turkish 
universities it acted first by taking implicitly into 
consideration the political consequences of any 
decision: to make a different choice would have 
entailed a deep political crisis, and, as far as Italy 
is concerned, a stiffening of anti-European feel-
ings. Most of the decisions of the ECHR allowed 
national governments a wide room for maneuver 
through the vague concept of “margin of appreci-
ation” while many local courts’ decisions (Baden-
Wurttemberg on Leitkultur) gave legitimacy to the 
concept of a dominant culture, which nevertheless 
cannot be defined as a right.
There cannot be an abstract use of the law. Court 
decisions have to take into account the density of 
each society constituted by its history, political 
culture, public opinion, and a set of narratives that 
are not necessarily “true” but shape perceptions 
(for example, the narrative of “laïcité” in France, 
as a system of values and a sort of national ideol-
ogy, has nothing to do with the law and the Con-
stitution: the law of 1905 that separated church 
and state was a compromise and never rejected 
religion in the private sphere). And, as far as the 
Muslim societies are concerned, the prerequisite 
stating that there is “no democracy without a pre-
vious secularism” proved also to be wrong. The 
issue is not to fix new boundaries between religion 
and the public sphere, but to re-contextualize the 
debate in the framework of different societies, with 
their own histories, compromises, evolutions, and 
narratives.
The universality of human rights is not an empty 
term: there is a universalization of human rights, 
but it can work only if it is conceived first as a 
political process and not as a mechanic expression 
of abstract legal principles.
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